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I. Introduction
In the transitional period following the end of the Cold War, two
U.S. administrations have grappled with the problem of excess weap-
ons-usable nuclear material in the republics of the former Soviet
Union. These surplus materials, including plutonium and highly-en-
riched uranium (HEU), originated from the dismantling of Russian
nuclear warheads pursuant to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.
HEU, unlike plutonium,' seemed to be disposable in a way that could
1. Plutonium, by contrast, is not currently used as a source of fuel for U.S. power
reactors. For an analysis of the possible use of plutonium derived from nuclear weapons to
produce a reactor fuel mixture in mixed plutonium or uranium oxide:; (or MOX), see
Victor Gilinsky, Russian Swords into American Plowshares, in CONTROLLING THE INTER-
NATIONAL TRANsFER OF WEAPONRY AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY 157, 165-70 (David
Carlton et al. eds., 1995) (arguing that given the current economics of the nuclear fuel
industry, particularly the surfeit of uranium stocks, plutonium storage is the cheapest op-
tion for disposition of excess plutonium). See also DAVID ALBRIGHT ET AL., WORLD IN.
VENTORY OF PLUTONIUM AND HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM, 1992 215- [6 (1993) (calling
for reconsideration of existing European, Japanese, and Russian program!s for the commer-
cial use of plutonium). But see Howard Schneider, Canada Proposes Plan to Beat Excess
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take advantage of the costs of its production. Yet, despite their best
efforts, both administrations have seemed paralyzed or inconsistent in
their attempts to purchase large quantities of HEU from Russia for
transformation into nuclear fuel for use in commercial nuclear power
reactors.
Some have argued that delayed implementation of the U.S.-Rus-
sia HEU Agreement2 constitutes a governmental failure at the highest
levels to balance national security interests in nuclear nonproliferation
against economic interests in protecting U.S. producers of natural ura-
nium and related uranium enrichment services.3 That view ignores,
however, the national security dimension of the Executive Branch's
effort to assure that the purchase of Russian uranium would not un-
dercut the implementation of the U.S. uranium antidumping policy or
the privatization of the U.S. enrichment enterprise. The Executive
Branch did, indeed, pursue a strategy that maximizes national secur-
ity, broadly conceived. Yet, it produced a neo-mercantilist strategy
that sought to maximize unilateral gains for the United States.
As this Article will argue, however, where the relevant national
security interests involved economic considerations, congressional,
rather than executive, management of the privatization process of the
Plutonium Into Plowshares, vAsH. PosT, Aug. 11, 1996, at A25 (Canada proposing to con-
vert its reactors to facilitate burning plutonium as fuel). Nonetheless, the United States
appears to be moving toward at least some disposition through plutonium burning in order
to persuade Russia to dispose of its excess plutonium stocks. See Peter Passell, U.S. Set to
Use Plutonium from Disarmed Bombs, N.Y. Tmw-s, Nov. 22,1996, at Al; Arjun Makhijani,
Heading Off the Plutonium Peril, WASH. PosT, Dec. 15, 1996, at A21 (critiquing U.S. deci-
sion as uneconomical and contrary to long-standing U.S. plutonium use policy).
2. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched
Uranium Extracted From Nuclear Weapons, Feb. 18, 1993, U.S.-Russ., State Dep't No. 93-
59, available in 1993 WL 152921 [hereinafter Agreement Between U.S.-Russ. Concerning
Disposition of HEU].
3. See generally Richard A. Falkenrath, The HEU Deal, in AVOIDING Nuca._AR Arc.
ARCHY: CONTAINING THE THREAT OF LoosI RussIAN NUC(EAR VnwoN,; AND FissILE
MATrmuAL 229 (CSIA Studies in Int'l See. No. 12, 1996). Falkenrath attributes the failure,
in part, to "a determined effort by officials in the Department of Energy [%%ho would later
become USEC's management] to use the HEU deal to enhance the competitiveness of the
U.S. enrichment operation." d at 231. Falkenrath also attributes the failure to -an inade-
quate analysis of the commercial implications of the HEU deal by the Bush administra-
tion's national security team." Id. He has been quoted as describing the Executive
Branch's efforts as "a quagmire of incompetent implementation." William J. Broad, Ev-
perts See Peril for U.S. Pact to Buy Up Russian Bomb Fuel, N.Y. Tzmus, June 12, 1995, at
Al, A6. Yet, as this Article will argue, neither the conflict of interest theory nor the eco-
nomic ignorance rationale effectively address the policy judgments made by Congress in
the Energy Policy Act of 1992 concerning the importance of ensuring a competitive USEC.
See infra text accompanying notes 60-68.
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U.S. enrichment enterprise produced a more rational accommodation
of competing U.S. national security interests. Congressional efforts
addressed: Russia's interest in additional uranium importation, as the
price for facilitating fulfillment of U.S. nonproliferation objectives in
the KEU purchase program; U.S. trade interests in protecting domes-
tic uranium producers and enrichment service providers; and U.S.
competitiveness interests in a privatized national uranium enrichment
capability. The particular virtue of the congressional approach was
that it adopted a strategy that was much less aggressive than the one
adopted by the Executive Branch for incorporating the :national secur-
ity dimension of trade.
That Congress adopted a less aggressive strategy than the Execu-
tive Branch is, of course, contrary to conventional wisdom that Con-
gress is less likely than the Executive Branch to pursue
internationalist polices, but it can be explained through a public
choice analysis of policymaking in the strategic goods context. In par-
ticular, the transfer of strategic trade decision-making authority to
Congress, this Article will argue, is connected not only to a decreased
U.S. demand for offensive strategies, but also to the increased supply
of international institutions in international economic policymaking
even in the areas that bear upon national security.
Part II describes the merging streams of U.S. interests in non-
proliferation through the HEU Agreement, the avoidance of foreign
economic predation through the antidumping proceeding against ura-
nium imports from the former Soviet Union, and the preservation of
U.S. competitiveness through the successful privatization of the ura-
nium enrichment enterprise.4 Part III, drawing upon national security
studies on international cooperation and the work of economists in
strategic trade theory, reconsiders the apparent conflict between trade
and national security interests. It was this conflict that, according to
some, accounted for the delays in implementing the purchase of Rus-
sian HEU. Part III argues that strategic trade interests, such as those
implicated in the HEU Agreement, are considered part of the na-
tional security calculus by domestic policymakers. Part III further ar-
gues that optimizing the economic dimension of national security
entails a strategic choice of whether to rely on unilateral exercise of
power or defensive strategies utilizing international institutions and
rules. 5
4. See infra text accompanying notes 11-66.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 67-114.
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Treating the production of national security, redefined to include
trade as well as nonproliferation interests, as a domestic policymaking
issue,6 Part IV evaluates the competing perspectives on whether the
political process overproduces or underproduces this good. On the
one hand, the public goods argument supports government interven-
tion to produce the economic power dimension of national security;
and, on the other, the public choice argument suggests that such inter-
vention usually inures to private, rather than the overall public, inter-
ests. Part III argues that, because the national security dimension of
strategic goods is maximized through increased international market
power for domestic producer interests, and public choice theory
predicts that legislative processes will favor domestic producers, the
legislative process will likely facilitate an adequate level of market
power for domestic producers in strategic sectors. By contrast, an ar-
gument based on public goods theory for additional production of na-
tional security would seem to result in overproduction of national
security, especially if advanced by an executive branch already biased
in favor of excessive production of national security.
Part IV tests these hypotheses against the pattern of executive
branch and congressional management of the privatization of the U.S.
uranium enrichment enterprise in relation to the uranium antidump-
ing case and the HEU Agreement. It argues that-in contrast to the
Executive Branch's strategy, which initially appeared to facilitate
more aggressively predatory strategies in international economic com-
petition-Congress's approach favored a longer term strategy of as-
6. It should be noted that this Article addresses the differences between the kinds of
policies Congress and the Executive Branch select for the production of market po,, er as a
positive national security externality, rather than whether and for %vhat purposes Congress
or the Executive Branch is more likely to employ such market power once it is created.
For example, Congress recently was the driving engine behind a secondary boycott
targeted against Cuba, while the President deferred imposition of the boycott's most dra-
conian measures. See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-133 (1996) (fle HI, subject to presidential waiver authority, authorizes suits in U.S.
courts by U.S. nationals, whose property had been taken from them %%hile they %%ere still
Cuban nationals, against any person, including a citizen of a third country, w ho is -traffick-
ing" in any such property); see also Charles Krauthammer, Clintontsn Split, Wa.le and
Wait, WAsH. Posr, July 19,1996, at A27 (defending President Clinton's decision on July 16,
1996 to exercise the waiver authority and describing the secondary boycott as an exercis2
of market power by the United States that should be reserved only for significant national
security concerns). The waiver has since been renewed, in part because the Executive
Branch leveraged the threat of sanctions into a European decision to make human rights
developments in Cuba a criterion in future EU-Cuba trade relations. See Thomas Lipp-
man, Clinton Suspends Provision of Law that Targets Cuba, WVs. Pos, Jan. 4, 1997, at
Al.
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suring that the United States would have a presence in a strategically
significant industry, without seeking to exploit shorter term advan-
tages through predatory economic strategies.7
Because, as shown in Part V, international institutions played a
role, albeit muted, in the transfer of decison-making authority for rec-
onciling conflicting trade and security policies to Congress,8 Part VI
considers whether existing international institutions are adequate to
curb predatory policies by the United States in the management of
strategic trade. It argues that, despite NAFTA's, and possibly
GATT's, effect in constraining predatory policies favored by the Exec-
utive Branch in the uranium case, international law rules are currently
inadequate to provide assurance that the Executive Branch's tendency
towards predation will not be deterred. This weakness in NAFTA and
GATT further strengthens the case for abstention by the Executive
Branch in domestic policymaking on strategic goods and for congres-
sional participation in national security decision-making on strategic
trade issues. As international institutional constraints are unlikely to
reduce the risk of international rent-seeking by a determined
predator, this Article argues for the development of an authoritative
interpretation narrowing the potential scope of the NAFTA and
GATT national security exceptions to discourage executive branch
policymaking in the production of strategic goods.9 Part VII summa-
rizes and offers conclusions. 10
H. Swords or Plowshares-Post-Cold War Transitions in
Security, Dade, and Industrial Organizations
U.S. interests relating to Russian uranium production can be sep-
arated out into three strands: first, an interest in minimizing prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons;" second, a trade interest in assuring that
U.S. producers of uranium are not injured by unfair foreign competi-
tion;' 2 and, third, an interest in the successful privatization of the U.S.
Government-owned U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC), entailing
subsidiary interests in assuring USEC's ability to compete in the inter-
7. See infra text accompanying notes 115-52.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 153-201.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 202-36.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 237-39.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 14-30.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 31-55.
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national marketplace (and, correlatively, maximizing U.S. taxpayer re-
turn from the sale of the firm).' 3
A. The HEU Purchase Agreement
At the end of the Cold War, the United States was presented with
a new kind of threat. Instead of Soviet warheads aimed at American
cities, it was the specter of loose nuclear material derived from the
dismantling of former Soviet warheads that haunted American policy-
makers. 4 Problems in the accounting and control of this material cre-
ated the risk that it might be smuggled out of the former Soviet states
and fall into the hands of rogue states or terrorists.' 5 Consequently,
13. See infra text accompanying notes 56-66.
14. See Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-228, tit. II,
§ 211, 105 Stat. 1691, 1693 (1991), as amended by Former Soviet Union Demilitarization
Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. § 5901 (1996); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484, div. A, tit. XIV, 106 Stat. 2315, 2563 (1992); see also 22 U.S.C.
§ 5951 (1994) (initially authorizing use of certain funds appropriated for other Department
of Defense programs for a wide range of assistance from the United States to the former
Soviet Union designed to support implementation of an arms control agreement and as-
sure the safe and secure dismantling of Soviet nuclear weapons). Though implementation
of the Nunn-Lugar program, named in honor of its bipartisan sponsors Senators Sam
Nunn, Democrat from Georgia and Richard Lugar, Republican from Indiana, has been the
subject of fierce controversy, its basic objectives do not seem to have been questioned. See
Dunbar Lockwood, The Nunn-Lugar Program: No Tune to Pull the Plug, Amais Co-N'T.OL
TODAY, June 1995, at 8, 10-11 (arguing that, after early delays due in part to Congressional
insistence on priority to U.S.-sourced procurement and Congress's failure to appropriate
funds specifically for the Nunn-Lugar program, the pace of implementation had recently
begun to increase). Implementation has been undertaken pursuant to the Agreement on
the Destruction and Safeguarding of Weapons and Prosecution of Weapons Proliferation
Between the United States and Russia, with implementing agreements, concluded June 17,
1992. See 3 U.S. DEP'T OF ST. DISPATCH 496 (1992).
15. See generally GRAHAM T. ALLISON Er AL, AVOIDLNG Nuci.An ANARCHY: CON-
TAINING THE THREAT OF LoosE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONSAND FISSILE MiNTEM'AL 1-
28 (CSIA Studies in IntVl Sec. No. 12, 1996) (describing the risks and incentives for nuclear
leakage and projecting that more leakage is likely and disaster is possible) [hereinafter
AvoIDING NucLEAR ANARCHY]; Barry Kellman & David S. Gualtieri, Barricading the
Nuclear Window-A Legal Regime to Curtail Nuclear Smuggling, 1996 U. IW_ L. REv. 667,
671-77 (1996) (summarizing evidence of nuclear smuggling); GLOBAL ORGANIZED CRM'E
PROJECT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES TAsK FORCE REPORT,
THE Nu.uLAR BLACK MAP=ET 4 (1996) (finding that the "probability of theft of a nuclear
weapon or a bomb quantity of weapons-grade materials from the [former Soviet Union] is
growing"); William C. Potter, Before the Deluge? Assessing the Threat of Nuclear Leakage
From the Post-Soviet States, ARMis CONTROL TODAY, Oct. 1995, at 8-12 (describing each
known incident in detail); John P. Holdren, Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Theft in the
Former Soviet Union, Amnis CONTROL TODAY, Mar. 1996, at 14; Wendy L. Mirsky, Com-
ment, The Link Betveen Russian Organized Crime and Nuclear-Weapons Proliferation:
Fighting Crime and Ensuring International Security, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 749,752-57
(1995) (detailing the emergence of a "black market" for fissile materials).
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President Bush leaped, perhaps without looking closely enough at
how the U.S. trade law might complicate implementation, 6 at the
prospect of purchasing from Russia large quantities of fissile HEU 17
removed from nuclear warheads dismantled under the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START I).18
The purchase proposal acquired impetus with "the collapse of the
Soviet Union in December 1991, which caused a serious degradation
in the Soviet nuclear custodial system, heightening the risk of nuclear
leakage."'19 It seemed to lay out the enticing possibility of fulfilling
the Biblical dream of converting swords into plowshares through in-
ternational governance: "He shall judge between the nations, and
shall decide for many peoples; and they shall beat their swords into
16. See infra text accompanying notes 31-55.
17. Fissile material refers to material that can be used to produce a chain reaction and
under certain conditions a nuclear explosion. See Richard L. Williamson, Jr., Law and the
H-Bomb: Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime To Impede Advanced Proliferation, 28
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 71, 77-78 (1995). HEU refers to a mass of uranium whose isotopic
composition has been altered through physical means to increase the percentage of U235,
the fissile isotope of uranium, above its naturally-occurring level. Id. at 78-79. Weapons-
usable fissile material includes plutonium and uranium enriched no less than 20% in U235,
although only certain forms of plutonium and uranium enriched more than 90% in U235
are considered weapons-optimal. Id. at 81 n.30. Nonetheless, the international commu-
nity's legal regime for the management of peaceful nuclear activities and U.S. law give
special significance to the 20% threshold. See, e.g., Nuclear Proliferation Assessment
Statement, in Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Text of a
Proposed Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Between
the United States of America and the European Atomic Erergy Community
(EURATOM), with Accompanying Agreed Minute, Annexes, and Other Attachments,
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2153 (b), (d), H.R. Doc. No. 104-138 art. 21.7 (1995) (Article 21.7
defines highly enriched uranium (HEU) as "uranium enriched to more than twenty per-
cent in isotope 235 (and/or uranium 233)" and low enriched uranium (LEU) as "uranium
enriched to twenty percent or less") [hereinafter US-EURATOM Agieement]; William-
son, supra, at 81 n.30 ("It is infeasible to make deliverable nuclear devices if the U235
percentage is below 20%.").
18. Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, July 31, 1991,
U.S.Russ., S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-70 (1992); Protocol to the Treaty with the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,
May 23, 1992, U.S.-Russ., S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-32 (1992) (providing for significant
reduction of warhead levels) [hereinafter START I]; Treaty with the Russian Federation on
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, December 29, 1992, U.S.-
Russ., S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-1 (1993) (which, when it enters into force, will result in the
reduction of ground-based multiple warhead missiles) [hereinafter START II]. See Bureau
of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of St. 96/03/20, Factsheet, START II (visited Mar. 7, 1997)
<http'/www.state.gov/www/regionslnis/russia_ start2_treaty.html>.
19. See Falkenrath, supra note 3, at 231. According to an October 24, 1991 editorial in
the New York Tunes, "the United States should buy this excess HEU from the Soviet
Union, blend it with natural uranium to produce a mixture suitable for u;e in power-gener-
ating reactors, and resell it to utilities." Id.
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plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks."'2 HEU can easily
be converted into low-enriched uranium (LEU) that could run civil
nuclear power reactors.21
The process of de-enrichment, or converting HEU into LEU, is
substantially less expensive than any known enrichment processes,
particularly the gaseous diffusion process used in the United States.2
Of course, some of the stored value of uranium enriched by the for-
mer Soviet Union to the level necessary for weapons use would be
lost. Russia would, however, receive substantial compensation both
for the value of the energy used to enrich natural uranium to the reac-
tor-grade level at which it would be transferred (separative work units
or SWU-component), and for the value of the natural uranium that
would have been used in producing the enriched uranium transferred
(uranium "feed" component).' Russia's need for immediate infu-
sions of hard currency offered significant incentives for compromise
with the United States. This led to an initial agreement on August 12,
20. Isaiah 2:4.
21. Light-water reactors, the civil nuclear power production reactors used in the
United States, employ a fuel mixture of uranium enriched to between three and five per-
cent U235. See Falkenrath, supra note 3, at 236-37 n.S.
22. See id. at 237 ("The commercial viability of the HEU deal is closely tied to the
economics of the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle, particularly the enrichment of natural
uranium. Enrichment in a gaseous diffusion plant is an expensive process, requiring large
amounts of electricity."). Gaseous diffusion facilities run uranium hexafloride (UF6) gas
through gas-permeable membranes with the effect of separating uranium isotop-.s into a
U235-enriched stream and a U235-depleted stream in large-scale facilities. See William-
son, supra note 17, at 79 n.20. Gaseous diffusion's main competitor in the commercial
nuclear reactor sector is centrifuge enrichment, a technology employed principally by
URENCO, a consortium of British, Dutch. and German firms, in which centrifug,s spin-
ning at high speeds separate uranium isotopes by weight into enriched and depleted
streams. Id. at 79 n.22. While there are a variety of other enrichment processes, such as
calutrons, see id. at 79-80 n.24 (electromagnetic separation was the first process employed
by the United States and the process used by Iraq before the Gulf War), and nozzle
processes, see id. at 79-SO n.25 (developed but never employed by Germany), the likeliest
next competitor in the commercial enrichment process is the laser isotope separation pro-
cess or AVLIS, see id. at 79-SO rL 26 (likely to be extremely efficient). The United States
seems to have made the decision to develop AVLIS as its next generation enrichment
technology. See infra text accompanying notes 174.
23. The uranium enrichment process typically involves two inputs: the enrichment
plant's contribution of separative work units (SWU), and natural uranium "feed" material.
Increased use of SWU lowers requirements for use of feed material, just as increased use
of feed material permits economizing on the use of SWU. Various combinations of SWU
and feed material will yield a given small volume of enriched uranium product (EUP) at a
specific level of enrichment in U235 or assay, and a given larger volume of uranium de-
pleted in U235 (DU) at a specific level of enrichment, or tails, assay. Thus, LEU blended
down from Russian HEU, in effect, displaces both SWU and feed inputs, requiring com-
pensation for each component at separate prices. See Falkenrath, supra note 3, at 23S41.
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1992 for the United States to purchase 500 metric tons of Russian
HEU derived from dismantled weapons 4 and on February 18, 1993 to
a final agreement (the "HEU Agreement") under which the two
states bound themselves under international law to negotiate a con-
tract for purchase.'
This contract (the "HEU Contract") between the United States
Enrichment Corporation (USEC) and the Russian Ministry of Atomic
Energy (MINATOM), as executive agents for their respective govern-
ments, was not signed until January 14, 1994.26 The year-long delay in
negotiating the HEU Contract flowed in part from complications with
the completion of arrangements for the transfer of former Soviet nu-
clear weapons from Ukraine to Russia to permit START II's entry
into force. In effect, the United States was able to link USEC's ad-
vance payments to Russia under the HEU Contract to Russia's agree-
ment to provide nuclear fuel to Ukraine,2 7 which in turn persuaded
24. Ie. at 255.
25. Agreement Between U.S.-Russ. Concerning the Disposition of ttEU, supra note 2.
Article V(10) provided that prior to the conclusion of an implementing contract, the Par-
ties would establish "transparency measures" to ensure that the HEU transferred to the
United States would be derived from dismantled warheads. Id. This requirement was im-
plemented through an international agreement. See Protocol Between the United States
and Russia on Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) in Furtherance of the Memorandum of
Understanding of September 1, 1993, Mar. 18, 1994, U.S.-Russ., State Dep't No. 94-105,
available in 1994 WL 175566; Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government
of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Relating
to Transparency and Additional Arrangements Concerning the Agreement Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federa-
tion Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted From Nuclear
Weapons, Sept. 1, 1993, U.S.-Russ., State Dep't No. 93-176, available in 1993 WL 444606
[hereinafter HEU Agreement].
26. Article II of the HEU Agreement provided that the "Parties, through their Execu-
tive Agents, shall within six months from the entry into force of [the HEU Agreement]
seek to enter into an initial implementing contract. .. ." HEU Agreement, supra note 25,
art. II, at 1. The contract between USEC and MINATOM has not been made public.
However, USEC officers have testified to Congress that the contract gives USEC the right
to purchase, as contemplated in the HEU Agreement, up to 500 metric tons over 20 years
(up to 10 metric tons annually in each of the first five years and up to 30 metric tons per
year thereafter) of Russian HEU (blended down in Russia to 4.4% LEU and shipped to
the United States as UF6) at a price of $780 per kilogram of UF6. See Falkenrath, supra
note 3, at 262.
27. See Annex to Trilateral Statement, issued in Moscow on January 14,1994, by Presi-
dents Clinton of the United States, Yeltsin of the Russian Federation, and Kravchuk of
Ukraine, 5 DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH 19-20 (Supp. 1, 1994). The Anrex provides that:
In the case of Ukraine, as warheads are transferred to Russia for dismantling,
Ukraine will receive in compensation fuel assemblies for its nuclear power sta-
tions.... To help begin this process, USEC will advance to Russia $60 million to
help cover expenses for the initial production of fuel assemblies for Ukraine.
[Vol. 20:331
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Ukraine to become a non-nuclear weapon state and adhere to the
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 8 The HEU
Agreement was also nearly derailed by complications flowing from
U.S. trade law,29 which made it impossible for USEC to resell the feed
component of Russian HEU in the United States. Therefore, USEC
USEC will recover the $60 million advance payment with funds that would other-
wise be paid to Russia under the HEU contract.
Id. at 761; see also Mark Zaid, Reports of ASIL Programs: NSC Official Discusses Nan-
Proliferation Issues, ASIL NEWSLETTER, June 1994 (unnamed NSC officer noting the si-
multaneous conclusion of the HEU Contract and trilateral statement and describing the
advance payment as revenue-neutral to the U.S. taxpayer). The Clinton Administration
appears to have employed this same strategy when on June 30, 1995, Vice-President Gore
agreed with Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin that USEC would advance MINATOM
an additional $100 million to facilitate continued implementation of Russian fuel assembly
deliveries to Ukraine. See Falkenrath, supra note 3, at 275 & n.84 (noting that MINATOM
"by mid-1995 had halted the delivery of reactor fuel to Ukraine").
28. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1,
1968,21 U.S.T. 483,729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970) [hereinafter NPT].
The NPT divides parties into two classes: nuclear weapons states, and non-nuclear weapons
states. Id. arts. I and I. It limits the category of nuclear-weapon states, however, to those
states that had detonated a nuclear device before January 1, 1967. Id. art. LX(3), at 492-93.
The Russian Federation's Duma had made Ukraine's accession to the NFT as a non-nu-
clear weapon state a condition of Russia's bringing into force START 1. See Start 11 Treat,
Approval Urged, U.S. DEP'T OF ST. DISPATCH 345 (1993). Because Ukraine did not exist
as a state on January 1, 1967, and because the Russian Federation appeared to succeed the
Soviet Union as a nuclear weapons state party to the NPT, Ukraine's status as a potential
non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPF %as complicated by the presence on its terri-
tory of former Soviet weapons, albeit under Russian control. Ukraine's accession to the
NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state, a major goal of U.S. policy, was thus simplified by the
transfer of these weapons to the nuclear-weapons state successor of the former Soviet
Union, the Russian Federation. See Statement by Secretary of State Warren Christopher,
U.S. DEP'T OF ST. DISPATCH 65 (1995).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 31-66. On a smaller scale, similar problems
complicated the U.S. purchase of 600 kilogram of Kazakh HEU in November 1994, in a
quasi-covert operation code named Project Sapphire. In that case, the White House an-
nouncement that the Kazakh HEU "would be transferred to a commercial facility within
six to nine months, where the material would be blended down for use in commercial
nuclear reactors," prompted the Department of Commerce (DOC) to inform the Depart-
ment of Energy (DOE) that "any direct or indirect release of the uranium into the U.S.
market associated with the Kazakh HEU will be contrary to the letter and intent of the
uranium suspension agreements." See Michael Knapik, Spot Uraniun Price in U.S. Moves
Up Slightly; USEC Calls for Shutting Down Bypass Option, NUCLEAR FUEL, Dec. 19,1994,
at 1, available in 1994 WL 6797562. Ultimately, the Kazakh HEU was exempted from the
scope of the antidumping regime, subject to limitations relating to use of the feed compo-
nent identical to those that were applied to Russian HEU. See Agreement Suspending the
Antidumping Investigation on Uranium From Kazakhstan, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,699-701 (1995)
(DOC Public Notice A-834-802), available in 1995 WL 103402 (amending Kazakh Suspn-
sion Agreement making it subject to the condition that "any utility-owned uranium prod-
ucts delivered pursuant to enrichment contracts affected by the purchase of HEU or lIEU
products will not be resold in the United States, either as natural uranium or as [LEU]
produced in excess of the contractually-specified amount.").
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insisted on deferring payment to Russia for the feed component of the
HEU until it had itself derived some economic value from the feed
component by reselling it, using it as overfeed in USEC's own enrich-
ment production, or waiting until the completion of the contract.30
B. The Uranium Antidumping Case
At approximately the same time Thomas Neff fathered the idea
of the U.S. purchase of Russian HEU for disposition in the civilian
economy, the seeds of its frustration were already being sown. On
November 8, 1991, a group of 13 U.S. uranium producers and the Oil,
Chemical and Atomic Workers Union (OCAW), fied a petition with
the Department of Commerce (DOC) asserting that the Soviet Union
was dumping uranium into the U.S. market.3' In effect, the petition
argued that the Soviet Union was selling uranium in the U.S. market
for less than its cost of production,3 2 thereby unfairly driving U.S. pro-
ducers out of the market.3 The petitioners' focus was both on the
Soviet Union's pricing policies and on Soviet excess capacity that was
30. See Falkenrath, supra note 3, at 240 (noting that, because the displaced feed mate-
rial, in effect, appeared as an additional inventory asset for USEC, advance payment to
Russia would amount to a loan if USEC were unable to sell or ue this inventory).
Falkenrath observes that the creator of the HEU deal, Thomas Neff, had initially assumed
that the displaced feed component of Russian HEU would be used by USEC as overfeed
to reduce USEC's SWU requirements. Id. at 241 (citing Thomas L. Neff, Integrating Ura-
nium from Weapons into the Civil Fuel Cycle, 3 SCL AND GLOBAL SEC. 215-22 (1993)).
31. See Uranium Producers' Alliance Files Dumping Charges Against Soviets, INSIDE
ENEROY, Nov. 18, 1991, at 8, available in 1991 WL 2435585 (reporting that: "In an execu-
tive summary of the filing, the coalition said U.S. imports of Soviet uranium increased from
less than 200,000 pounds in 1988 to more than 500,000 pounds in 1989. In 1990, imports
from the Soviet Union reached more than 6 million pounds and were placed at more than
5.5 million pounds by August of this year. Between 1988 and 1990, the Soviets increased
their share of the U.S. market from 0.75% to 1733% .... ).
32. The first element of an antidumping claim is that foreign merchandise is being sold
in the United States at "less than fair value." 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. 1996). Ordinarily,
this component is determined by looking to the exporter's home marke : prices. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677b(a) (Supp. 1996).
By contrast, in the case of imports from nonmarket economies, as was Russia was
considered in this, home market price could be manipulated by state sub:idies; accordingly,
"fair value" of imports from nonmarket economies looks directly to cost of production. 19
U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (Supp. 1996).
33. The second element of an antidumping claim is "material injury" to a U.S. industry
producing a "like" imported merchandise. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. 1996). In this case, the
material injury, if any, was as much to foreign concerns as to U.S.-owned firms, since eight
of the thirteen petitioning uranium producers were wholly or partially owned by foreign
firms. See Jeffrey Bialos et al., Trading with Central and Eastern Europe: The Application
of the U.S. Unfair Trade Laws to Economies in Transition, INT'L L. PitACrIuM, Autumn
1994, at 69, 77 n.83.
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newly targeted for Western export rather than defense production.
Such excess capacity would have a suppressive effect on uranium
prices worldwide. 34 Despite the intervening collapse of the Soviet
Union,35 and litigation concerning the broad scope of the proceeding
to apply to uranium in all its forms, -6 the petitioners by October 1992
were on the verge of prevailing.37 At that point, the DOC negotiated
and concluded an agreement with Russia (the Suspension Agree-
34. The petitioners asserted: "In the uranium market today, purchasers generally be-
lieve that prices will remain low or decline even further. This belief is supported by the
knowledge that the Soviet Union has enormous excess production capacity %hich it has
publicly and explicitly targeted for export to the West at rock bottom prices." See Michael
Knapik & Wilson Dizard III, Producers, Union File Antidumping Case Against Imports of
Soviet Uranium, NUCLEAR FUEL, Nov. 25, 1991, at 1, available in 1991 WL 2444194 (quot-
ing petitioners' complaint).
35. On December 25, 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist, but the DOC continued
its investigation against each of the states recognized by the United States. See Tech-
snabexport, Ltd. v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 469, 473-74 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1992) (noting
that U.S. agencies' focus is on particular factories where merchandise exported to the
United States was produced, rather than political boundaries within which these factories
are located). The U.S. Court of International Trade subsequently approved the decision on
September 25, 1992. Id.
36. Article I of the Suspension Agreement provided that "uranium enriched in U235
or compounds of uranium enriched in U235 in the Russian Federation are covered by this
Agreement, regardless of their subsequent modification or blending.... [HEU] is within
the scope of this investigation, and HEU is covered by this Agreement." See Agreement
Suspending the Antidumping Investigation on Uranium From the Russian Federation, 57
Fed. Reg. 49,220, 49,235 (1992) (DOC Public Notice A-100-002), available in 1992 WL
312125 [hereinafter Suspension Agreement]. Suspension agreements with Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekstan were concluded as well. Id. For subse-
quent history of these suspension agreements, see Bialos et al., supra note 33, at 76 n.73.
37. The petitioners had prevailed at each stage in the proceeding. On December 23,
1991, the International Trade Commission (ITC), a quasi-judicial, independent federal
agency, issued a preliminary material injury determination. Uranium from the U.S.S.R.,
ITC Investig. No. 731-TA-539 (1991). On June 3, 1992, the DOC's International Trade
Administration (ITA) published its preliminary determination of sales at less than fair
value and, as required by law, imposed a preliminary duty on importation of Russian ura-
nium corresponding to the dumping margin. Preliminary Determinations of Sales at Less
than Fair Value, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,350 (1992); see also Bialos et al., supra note 33, at 69-70
(citing 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (d), (e)). On July 13, 1992, however, at the request of the import-
ers, DOC postponed its final determination on sales at less than fair value, presumably in
order to facilitate negotiation of the Suspension Agreement. See Postponement of Final
Antidumping Duty Determination: Uranium from Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Russia, Tajik-
stan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Byelarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Turk-
menistan, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,946 (1992) (DOC Public Notices A-834, 835, 821, 842, 823, 844,
831, 832, 822, 833, 841 and 843-S02), available in 1992 WL 1596S6. The ITC, therefore,
never had an opportunity to make its final material injury determination, since the statute
provides for final ITC action only after final ITA action. See generally John H. Jackson &
William J. Davey, Reform of the Administrative Procedures Used in U.S. Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Cases (Administrative Conference of the United States, Washington,
D.C.), Nov. 1991, at 21-27.
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ment), under which Russia agreed not to export any uranium to the
United States unless the U.S. uranium price reached specified levels,
and only certain quantities thereafter depending on price levels.38
The Suspension Agreement also gave Russia a short-term infusion of
hard currency by permitting a substantial one-time sale to the Depart-
ment of Energy (DOE) outside of the Suspension Agreement limits.3 9
During 1993, however, uranium prices failed to reach the price
required to permit Russian importation,40 while U.S. uranium produ-
cers continued to suffer the effects of the collapse of the uranium mar-
ket.4 ' The DOC therefore agreed to amend the Suspension
Agreement (Amended Suspension Agreement) effective March 11,
1994.42 In a radical shift in U.S. trade law,43 the Amended Suspen-
sion Agreement provided for a program of "matched" sales under
which the DOC would approve specific contracts for the importation
of Russian uranium or SWU on two conditions. First, the Russian
uranium or SWU had to be jointly supplied with an equal quantity of
U.S. uranium or SWU," subject to certain numerical limitations. Sec-
38. Section IV of the Suspension Agreement sets forth complex rules for determining
the applicable quota schedule in terms of U.S. market price, based on a weighted average
of long-term and spot market prices. Suspension Agreement, supra note 36, at 49,236, art.
IV. Under the schedule, Russia's quota would be zero until the U.S. price reached $13 per
pound U308. See id. at 49,241, app. A.
39. Section IV.L of the Suspension Agreement provides that:
Because the Russian Federation has no long-term pre-existing contracts under
which deliveries begin before 1994 and because the [DOE] can consume EUP
[enriched uranium product] in a market-neutral manner which releases no feed
into the U.S. market that could lead to the suppression or undercutting of price
levels of U.S. uranium products, the Russian Federation will be granted a one-
time only opportunity to sell to DOE, its contractors, assigns, or U.S. private
parties acting in association with DOE or the U.S. Enrichment Corporation, an
amount of 4.1 million pounds of U308 [uranium oxide, which is the. precursor in
the gaseous diffusion enrichment process to UF6] equivalent for delivery during
the period form the effective date of this Agreement to December 31, 1994 ....
Suspension Agreement, supra note 36, at 49,237.
40. See Bialos et al., supra note 33, at 76.
41. Amendment to the Agreement Suspending the Antidumping Investigation on
Ukraine From the Russian Federation, 59 Fed. Reg. 15,373 (1994) (DOC2 Public Notice A-
821-802), available in 1994 WL 107377 ("The parties signed the Amendment recognizing
that the Agreement to date had not generated the anticipated increase in the price of U.S.-
origin natural uranium that would have permitted renewed sales of Russian uranium
under the price-tied quota mechanism nor increased sales of U.S.-origii natural uranium
or employment in the U.S. uranium industry.") [hereinafter Amended Suspension
Agreement].
42. See i at 15,374, annex 1.
43. See Bialos et al., supra note 33, at 76.
44. Specifically, the Amended Suspension Agreement permits wlat it describes as
"joint sales" or "matched sales" of uranium, either in the form of U308 or UF6, and SWU,
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ond, the price for the Russian-origin uranium had to be less than the
price for the U.S.-supplied component of the sale.45
In retrospect, it seems likely that the Russian Federation delayed
in concluding the HEU Contract to force the United States to soften
its implementation of the antidumping regime through the Amended
Suspension Agreement.46 Russia thus linked its trade interests in ex-
porting natural uranium to the United States with its national security
interest in reducing its stockpile of weapons-usable nuclear material.
This arguably drove the United States to subordinate its trade inter-
ests to its nuclear nonproliferation objectives. The matched sales pro-
gram finally gave Russia additional access to the U.S. market, but the
price was a transfer of economic rent from Russian to U.S. producers,
rather than to U.S. consumers or taxpayers.47
Amended Suspension Agreement, supra note 41, at 15,374 (Public Notice) and at 15,375
(Amended Suspension Agreement, section IV). Section IV of the Amended Suspension
Agreement provides that "[t]o qualify as a matched import... 'Russian-origin' natural
uranium (i.e., U308 or UF6) or SWU must be matched with an equal portion of 'ne%%ly-
produced' U.S.-origin natural uranium ... or SWU .... " Id. at 15,374. Section IV defines
"Russian-origin" as "natural uranium ... or SWU which is produced in Russia, and which
is exported from Russia for the first time after the effective date of this Amendment." Id.
It defines "newly-produced natural uranium in the form of U3OS" as "uranium produced,
on or after the effective date of this Amendment, by conventional mining," and "newly-
produced natural uranium in the form of UF6" as "UF6 containing newly-produced U3OS
...." Id. at 15,375 (section III.K). Similarly, "U.S. origin natural uranium must be mined
in the United States, and the U.S.-produced S\VU must be or have been performed in the
United States, subsequent to the effective date of this Amendment and must b. delivered
pursuant to a new contract, or a new extension or modification of a contract, to supply the
needs of an end-user which are uncommitted as of the date of the Amendment." Id. sec-
tion IV.A.
45. Section V.A provides for annual limits for uranium imports throughout the life of
the Suspension Agreement but provides for matched SWU imports only for the first two
years of the Amendment. Id. Section IV.C states: -The unit price paid to the U.S. pro-
ducer for the U.S. component for each sale involving matched imports must be greater
than the unit price paid by the end-user for consumption in the United States." Id. at
15,376.
46. See Elizabeth Martin, A Conversation with Viktor Mikhailov, NUKEM Miwmk=
REPoRT, Oct. 1993, at 25 (quoting MINATOM official's assertion that "[i]f the [anti-dump-
ing] issue is resolved, we vill sign the [HEUI agreement. . . ."); see also Falkenrath. supra
note 3, at 259 & n.52. The Amended Suspension Agreement was initialed on December
15,1993. See Amended Suspension Agreement, supra note 41, at 15,374. The HEU Con-
tract was initialed on the same date. See Falkenrath, supra note 3, at 262.
47. The Amended Suspension Agreement provides that the U.S. partner in the
matched sale must consent in advance to the matching of its uranium or SWU to Russian-
origin uranium or SWU. See Amended Suspension Agreement, supra note 41, at 15,375.
Section IV.B provides that:
In the case of SWU, prior to the presentation of the matched sale to the Depart-
ment for confirmation, the U.S. producer must be informed of all material terms
1997]
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What ultimately blocked implementation of the matched sales
program, however, was that it also may have involved collusion be-
tween the U.S. and Russian producers at the expense of foreign natu-
ral uranium producers and enrichment service providers. Previously,
through an exception for the import of Russian-orighi uranium en-
riched in a third country, the Suspension Agreement had encouraged
Russian sales to European enrichers, thereby giving European com-
petitors a cost advantage over U.S. producers.4 s The matched sales
of the matched sale to the end-user and must consent to the matching of its SWU
in that sale with the imported Russian SWU.
Id. Section IV.C provides that:
In the case of natural uranium, if the U.S. producer is not the contracting party
with the end-user, then, prior to the presentation of the matched sale to the De-
partment for confirmation, the U.S. producer must consent to the matching of its
uranium in that sale with the imported Russian uranium.
Id. Because the Amended Suspension Agreement provided for a higher price for the U.S.-
origin component of every matched sale and gave the U.S. producers a veto on Russian
access, U.S. producers were strongly positioned to ensure substantial redistribution of the
total price in their favor. See Falkenrath, supra note 3, at 269 n.71 (noting "rent transfer"
from Russian to U.S. producers).
The matched sales program also conferred power on the DOC to approve or disap-
prove specific proposals for matched sales. See Amended Suspension Agreement, supra
note 41, at 15,376 (section IV.E) (setting forth criteria for confirmation including, in addi-
tion to receipt of certification of the U.S. producer's consent to matching, information on
the contract price, quantity, time of delivery information, as well as providing for the
DOC's right to "any other information that [DOC], after consultation with MINATOM,
determines necessary to confirm that the requirements of this Amerdment have been
met"). Thus, the DOC was positioned, much like a cartel ringmast-ar, to ensure that
matched sales unfairly favored U.S. producers. Cf. Thomas G. Krattenraaker & Steven C.
Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Poer over Price, 96
YALE LJ. 209 (1986) (describing Cartel Ringmaster as a technique whereby a horizontal
price-fixing agreement is induced by a third party to raise its rivals costs) [hereinafter Krat-
tenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion].
48. The Suspension Agreement's exemption of Russian-origin HEU enriched in a
third country had, in effect, driven Russian natural uranium into Europe for enrichment
there, and ultimately led to access to the U.S. market in what became known in the trade
as "bypass" sales. See Falkenrath, supra note 3, at 260; but see Spetrin! Explains Nuclear
Fuel Trade, Antidumping Policy on Russian Uranium, NUCLEAR FUEL, Oct. 10, 1994, at 6,
available in 1994 WL 2223755 (transcript of remarks by the DOC Depu:y Assistant Secre-
tary denying the existence of a mechanism for bypassing the Suspension Agreement since
anti-circumvention rules allow the DOC to prevent import in the case of transactions, such
as "a partial enrichment transaction overseas," designed solely to circumvent and not for
sound economic reasons). Access to low-cost Russian uranium gave USEC's European
competitors in effect a supply cost advantage, which compelled USEC to reduce its prices.
See Knapik, Spot Uranium Price in U.S. Moves Up Slightly; USEC Calls for Shutting Down
the Bypass Option, supra note 29, at 1, available in 1994 WL 6797562. The article reports
USEC President William Timbers comments in a December 13, 1994 letter to Commerce
Secretary Ron Brown that:
[t]he ability of U.S. utilities to buy [Russian] uranium and have it enriched in
Europe ... generally translates into a saving of $10 or more per SWU ....
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program now gave U.S. producers a competitive advantage over other
foreign market producers of uranium by giving the U.S. producers ac-
cess to lower-priced Russian-origin uranium. This encouraged U.S.
purchasers to prefer the lower-cost, matched U.S.-Russian sales over
other imports, drawing antitrust scrutiny from the U.S. Department of
Justice.4 9 Moreover, because the matched sales program potentially
violated the national treatment standard of GATT and NAFTA,"
European competitors [URENCO and COGEMA] have won contracts in excess
of $250 million in revenue in which use of the bypass has been a significant factor.
In addition, negotiations representing potential revenues of more than $60 mil-
lion are now under way in competition with European enrichers, all of which are
at risk of possible loss to bypass sales.
lId
49. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Diane Wood wrote to the Department of
Commerce, articulating antitrust concerns about the matched sales program, in particular
the risk that the program would facilitate collusive bidding by natural uranium and SWU
suppliers to U.S. consumers. See Bialos et al., supra note 33, at 78 & n.94; (citing Peter
Passell, A Deal With Russia On Uranium Draws Protest From U.S. Industry, N.Y. Ti.sEs,
June 8, 1994, at A-1 and D-5). Technically, in accordance with the then applicable DOJ
antitrust guidelines an "agreement among foreign competitors to restrict output or raise
price in response to an antidumping agreement is exempt from the application of the U.S.
antitrust law only to the extent that the agreement is reached and carried out in accordance
with the suspension agreement provisions of the antidumping law." U.S. DEP'T oF Jusr,
ANITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIoN, Nov. 10, 19S3
(reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 113,109 (Nov. 17, 19B3); 5 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep., (BNA) Spec. Supp., Case 17 (Nov. 17,19SS); but see Bialos et al., supra note 33, at 78
(asserting that "it is arguable that the suspension agreement falls outside the parameters of
the suspension provisions of the antidumping law and, therefore, is not exempt from anti-
trust liability on that basis").
50. NAFIA provides that the GATT national treatment obligations relating to "any
prohibition or restriction on the importation of any good" are -incorporated into and
made a part of" NAFTA. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dee. 17, 1992,
Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 309(1), 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 612 [hereinafter NAFTA]. The
GATT national treatment obligation stipulates that:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported in to the territory
of any contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transporta-
tion, distribution or use.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,1947,61 Stat. A-3, 55 U.N.T.S. 1I67, art.
111(4) [hereinafter GATT]. In substance, Canada's argument was that the "amendment
provides to U.S. producers a term or condition of sale for uranium not available to other
NAFTA producers of uranium otherwise similarly situated (i.e., it deprives producers of
national treatment within the United States)." See Bialos et al., supra note 33, at 78 n.101;
see also Dumping: Canada Seeks NAFTA Consultations on U.S.-Russ. Uranium Agreement,
11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 13 (Mar. 30, 1994) (reporting that in his March 18, 1994 letter to
USTR Representative Kantor, Canadian International Trade Minister MacLaren "ex-
pressed the view that the amendment is inconsistent with national treatment obligations of
the United States under both NAFTA and GAT"); Canada Canada May Ask for Consul-
tations on Uranium Dispute with United States, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 11 (Mar. 16,
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Canada challenged the Amended Suspension Agreement,51 ultimately
persuading the United States to provide assurances that it would not
be implemented to deprive Canada of competitive opportunities.
5 2
The United States did not, at least publicly, seek to defend its policies
in terms of the NAFTA and GAIT exceptions relating to "the essen-
tial security interests" of the United States.53 The only remaining ve-
hicle for arranging U.S. purchase of Russian uranium became
purchase by USEC of Russian HEU as overfeed, 54 bringing the HEU
Agreement back to square one and thereby aborting the possibility of
1994) (reporting Canadian official's argument that "the agreement provides an incentive to
the user to purchase U.S. uranium and distorts the competitive basis for Canadian sales in
the U.S. market").
51. See Canada Seeks NAFTA Consultation on U.S.-Russian Uranlum Agreement, 11
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 13 (Mar. 30, 1994); Michael Knapik, Russians Said to Want Higher
U.S. Prices; USEC Concludes Deal with Nuclear Electric, NUCLEAR FUEL, Apr. 11, 1994, at
1, available in 1994 WL 2223542 (noting that Australia declined at this stage to challenge
the agreement under the GA IT because some in the uranium mining industry considered a
GATT challenge "premature until the effect of the suspension agreement is known"). One
EU official stated that, as producers of enriched uranium as opposed to natural uranium,
their "situation is a bit different" from that of Australia and Canada. Id. It may be that
EU officials believed that the United States would be more likely to prevail in a challenge
based solely on the GAIT than under Canada's NAFTA-based challenge. See infra note
209 (discussing differences between GAIT and NAFTA national security exceptions).
52. It appears the "State Department has provided the Canadian government with
assurances that 'the natural uranium component imported under the [Russian HEU con-
tract] is subject to the restrictions of Section IV.M of the suspension agreement.' On the
basis of these assurances, the Canadian government agreed to suspend ts NAFTA consul-
tations on uranium without prejudice to its right to reactivate them should circumstances
warrant." See GAO REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMITTEES: URANIUM ENRICI-iMENT -
PROCESS TO PRIVATIZE THE U.S. ENRICHMENT CORPORATION NEEDS TO BE STRENGTH.
ENED, GAOIRCED 95-245, at n.30, available in 1995 WL 596931 [hereinafter GAO RE.
PORT]; see also Michael Knapik, Analysts Expect Rise in Spot U Price, NUCLEAR FUEL,
Feb. 27, 1995, at 18, available in 1995 WL 7929456 (reporting exchange of letters between
Canadian Ambassador Cretien and Undersecretary of State Davis).
53. See infra text accompanying notes 201-36 for a discussion of GATr and NAFTA
security exceptions.
54. The original Suspension Agreement specifically exempted Russian HEU sales to
the DOE or its successors under the HEU Agreement. See Suspension Agreement, supra
note 36, at 49,237 (section IV.M.1). It also barred, however, the resale of the feed compo-
nent. Id. at 49,238 (section IV.M.2(2)) (imposing the condition that "any utility-owned
uranium products delivered pursuant to enrichment contracts affected by purchase of
HEU or HEU products are not resold in the United States, either as natural uranium or as
LEU produced in excess of the contractually-specified amount"); see also Falkenrath,
supra note 3, at 254 (describing this formula as a DOC attempt to "stike a compromise
between the national security interests served by the HEU deal and the commercial inter-
ests of the U.S. uranium industry."). The Amended Suspension Agreement thus left
USEC with the sole option, as Thomas Neff originally foresaw, of overfeeding the dis-
placed feed component of Russian HEU into USEC's own enrichment operations, Id. at
255.
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using the matched sales program to implement the HEU Contract.'-
In sum, just as the HEU Agreement could not be implemented with-
out addressing the implications of the Suspension Agreement, neither
could the Suspension Agreement be implemented without considering
its impact on implementation of the HEU Contract.
C. The U.S. Enrichment Corporation-National Security-Based
Privatization
Because USEC was intimately involved in both the HEU Con-
tract and the Suspension Agreement, the interests implicated by its
privatization were equally linked to the implementation of the trade
protection and nonproliferation policies. During most of the Cold
War, the U.S. Government's gaseous diffusion, enrichment-services
capability effectively monopolized the worldwide uranium market.5 6
Through the 1970s and 1980s, however, the United States lost this mo-
nopoly, particularly to European enrichment operations using the
technologically more advanced centrifuge method.57 This led to con-
55. There is some debate about the precise effect of exchange of letters. See
Falkenrath, supra note 3, at 271 & n.77 (noting that, while "the U.S. State Department and
USEC take a different view, Canada regards the Davis letter as an official assurance that
the U.S. will allow no more Russian-origin uranium-including the feed component of the
Russian -EU-to be released on the U.S. market beyond that which is already allotted by
the matched sales quota."). Nonetheless, despite its own questions about the meaning of
Section IV.M of the Suspension Agreement. USEC subsequently acknovledged to GAO
that it recognized that the agency responsible for its authoritative interpretation, the DOC,
"has interpreted the provision as prohibiting the corporation from reselling the Russian
natural uranium in the United States." GAO REPoRT, supra note 52, at n.29. The letters
appear to be politically-binding only, as they have not been reported to Congress under the
Case Act as an international agreement. Telephone Conference with John Zylman, De-
partment of State, IJT (June 28, 1996). The national security significance of the matter is
emphasized by the fact that it is rather unusual, if not unprecedented, for the Undersecre-
tary of State responsible for national security issues, rather than the Undersecretary of
State responsible for economic affairs, to conclude a settlement of a trade dispute.
56. At the time of the petition, DOE supplied approximately 90% of U.S., and 46% of
worldwide, demand for uranium enrichment services. See Falkenrath, supra note 3, at 250
& n.30 (citing Maybe Good News for U.S. Producers, Maybe Not, Nwu.m-i MAP.KEr RE.
PORT, May 1992. at 14).
57. Congressman Schaeffer put the point crisply:
The Federal Government has been in the uranium enrichment business since the
1950's. For most of the time since then, the United States held a virtual monopoly
on the production and sale of enriched uranium.
Only since the 1980's have new competitors, most notably the British, French
and Russians entered the market. In this short amount of time, however, the U.S.
share of the worldwide uranium market has dropped from its near monopoly to
about 50 percent. The United States is the world's highest-cost supplier of enrich-
ment services. This is not an unexpected result, since the Federal Government
runs the uranium enrichment business.
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gressional consideration of privatizing DOE's enrichment operations
in an effort to make them more competitive internationally., Such
privatization would benefit the United States not only for commercial
reasons,5 9 but also because of the strategic implications of U.S. enrich-
Privatization of the U.S. Enrichment Corporation: Hearing Before the Siabcomm. on Energy
and Power of the Comm. on Commerce of the House of Representatives, 104th Cong. 1
(1995) [hereinafter House Hearings of Feb. 24, 1995].
Wilson Dizard III, Antidumping Case Likely to Continue Despite Opposition at 'Confer-
ence', NUCLEAR FUEL, Dec. 9, 1991, at 1, available in 1991 WL 2444189.
The antidumping case proceeded on the assumption that Russian centrifuge technol-
ogy would be at least as threatening to U.S. gaseous diffusion technology as European
centrifuge technology. URENCO cost data was used as a surrogate for calculating fair
market value, because the DOC took the position that the exporters' failure to provide
cost data made comparisons with URENCO's centrifuge technology appropriate under
best information available analysis. See Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair
Value: Uranium from Ukraine and Tajikstan, supra note 47, at 36,640, 36,650-51 (DOC
Position on Comment 22). In its summary of the views of interested parties, however,
DOC even suggested Russia might be an even greater threat, reporting:
Tenex states that the Department's EUP factors of production fail to account for
the advanced centrifuge technology employed at enrichment plant,, in the former
USSR. Although petitioners argue that the supposedly advanced URENCO
technology makes the URENCO plants more productive than Soviet plants,
which in turn leads to higher depreciation and finance charges for Soviet enrich-
ment, their claims are unsupported, absurd and have been rejected by the Depart-
ment in its preliminary [fair market value] calculation. Actually, the Soviet
technology enjoys technological and productivity advantages over URENCO cen-
trifuges, suggesting that depreciation and finance charges should be reduced, not
increased, from those estimated for the URENCO plant.
Id.
On the other hand, it may be that Russian cost advantages were derived from an
indirect subsidy through the Russian Federation's willingness to tolerate inferior safety in a
nuclear industry that gave the world Chernobyl. See Mark Hibbs, Antidumping Case Eu-
rope Will Resist Pressure to Follow U.S. Antidumping Suit, NUCLEAR FUEL, May 25, 1992,
at 5, available in 1992 WL 2461115 ("Western industry does not know what environmental,
labor and investment costs are faced by CIS producers."). Another factor pushing up Rus-
sia's true costs-perhaps involving a direct subsidy through what is t.rmed "upstream"
dumping-might be, according to "one European official," that "the cost of electricity
faced by URENCO is three times more than Russian enrichers pay for power." Id.; see
also CONG. BUDGET OFF., How THE GATr AFFECTs U.S. ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTER-
VAILING-DUTY POLIcY at xi (1994) [hereinafter CBO STUDY] (below cost pricing of inputs
for export products). Compare Falkenrath, supra note 3, at 243 n.18 (describing implicit
subsidies, including low-cost power, U.S. government conferred upon USEC).
58. As Senator Ford of Kentucky argued, "[W]e must enact these provisions into law
in order to keep this business viable. The enterprise now operates in v tangle of bureau-
cratic red tape as if it is a monopoly-except that it isn't a monopoly, and hasn't been a
monopoly for 20 years." See 137 CONG. REC. S. 10066-67 (daily ed. July 16, 1991), re-
printed in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ENERGY POLICY Acr oF 1992 1305 (1994).
59. Senator Ford added:
Our balance of payments would suffer. Perhaps more importantly, we would not
have the billions of dollars needed to dismantle and clean up the edsting enrich-
ment plants.
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ment's commercial viability for U.S. energy independence,'9 a factor
of increasing salience in light of 1991 Gulf War over Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait.61
The U.S. Government had direct commercial and national secur-
ity interests in Russia's uranium marketing practices, particularly with
respect to the worldwide uranium market and Russia's general post-
Cold War nuclear export strategy62 Thus, well before the antidumping
petition was filed, it was reported that DOE itself was pressuring the
DOC to initiate an investigation. 63 Not surprisingly, DOE's interven-
The revenues from the enrichment enterprise will provide a steady source of
income that will pay for these cleanup costs. If the business is healthy, the costs
of the cleanup will come from revenues. If the business fails, the costs of cleanup
will have to come out of the taxpayers' pockets.
Id. at 1306.
60. Senator Ford emphasized: "The consequences of the business failing are serious.
We would become dependent on foreign suppliers." fd See also House Hearings of Feb.
24, 1995, supra note 57, at 10 (statement of WVilliam Timbers) ("America was beginning to
lose a critical sector in its domestic energy industry to foreign competitors. The U.S. share
of the world market collapsed from 100% to below 50%. The threat of U.S. electric utili-
ties becoming dependent on foreign sources for yet another vital energy service %%as be-
coming very real." Id.).
61. See Senator J. Bennet Johnston, LEGISLATr 'E HISTORY OF THE ENERGY POICY
Acr OF 1992, supra note 58, at iii ("Observing the buildup of Operation Desert Shield
through October and November 1990, I concluded that the specter of a full-szale war to
protect our access to the oil supplies of the Middle East might finally prove to be the
catalyst that could unite America behind a rational and effective energy policy.").
62. See Victor Gilinsky, Russian Swords Into American Plowshares, in Coto-rZoLL :
TnE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF WEAPONRY AND RELATED TECIiNOLOGY 157, l0
(David Carlton et al. eds., 1995) ("[USECI supplies about 40 percent of the warld's en-
riched uranium. It has every interest in a stable market. At the relevant time, in late 1991,
there were already signs of 'dumping' (sale at prices below reasonable cost) of uranium by
former Soviet republics, so further dumping of enriched uranium was a real and worring
prospect."). Russia's export strategy extends to nuclear reactors as well. Sec Colin \Vood-
ward, Fighting for the Scraps, 52 BuLLEIN OF THE AToMic SCIENTISTS 56,59 (1996) (not-
ing that "a recent study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies %%arns that
MINATOM is emerging as an aggressive exporter, citing Russian activities in Iran. Cuba
and India. Belarus may choose Russia's Soviet -style reactors because they are less expen-
sive than Canada's CANDU-6. Meanwhile, there are concerns that MINATOM will suc-
cessfully market its plants in China."). When, for example, Western states through the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) declined to finance the
completion of a Russian-model VVER-440 nuclear reactor at Mochovce, Slovakia, for en-
vironmental and safety reasons, "Russia and a consortium of Czech banks [offered) to help
complete Mochovce at a fraction of the cost." Id. The combined effect of these activities
was surely to strengthen Russia's strategic position in Central and Eastern Europe, as %%ell
as its leverage with rogue states, such as Iran, and nuclear threshold states, such as India.
See infra text accompanying notes 107-14 (for national security significance of supply
relationships).
63. See Lisa Behrens, DOE Lawyers Considering Filing Complaint Over Soviet Ura-
nium Sales, INSIDE ENERGY AND FEDERAL LANDS, June 1991. at 2, available in 1991 WL
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tion was perceived as an effort to preserve its monopoly position in
the United States.' 4 Similarly, whether DOE's uranium enrichment
enterprise would be privatized as a normal competitor or as an instru-
ment of national security policy endowed with market power would
have implications not only for the transaction value of privatization to
the U.S. taxpayer 65 but also for implementation of the HEU
Agreement.
At first glance, it would seem that the USEC privatization
agenda, as well as the uranium anti-dumping ca-e, should be
subordinated to the national security interest in nonproliferation: that
is, the effective implementation of the HEU Agreement. 66 This con-
clusion holds if one accepts the false dichotomy between trade and
national security for evaluating the competing U.S. interests, thereby
treating trade interests as automatically of a lesser order of magnitude
than interests defined as national security interests. A broader con-
ception of national security to account fully for the national security
interest in market power, which this Article will now develop, might in
theory yield a different calculus.
2436272 (stating: "DOE officials involved with the uranium enrichment enterprise and
their allies in Congress have long complained that the Soviets' selling of low-priced separa-
tive work units is harming the department's program, and have been trying to prove that
the Soviets are selling SWUs below their cost of producing them, or dumping.").
There was also Congressional pressure on DOC, in the draft National Energy Policy
Act that would privatize DOE's enrichment operation, to initiate an investigation. Id. (re-
porting that "Senate Energy Committee ranking Republican Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming
attached an amendment to the panel's national energy strategy bill... that would require
DOE to investigate whether foreign suppliers are dumping uranium in the U.S. market"
and "require an International Trade Commission probe of sales practices of foreign
suppliers.")
64. Frank Fahrenkopf, former Republican Party National Chairman and counsel to
the respondents in the uranium proceeding. observed that DOE involvement in the case is
"especially ironic" since "[t]he DOE has a monopoly on U.S. uranium enrichment services,
and ... has historically, through its action and inaction, directly controlled the domestic
mining and milling industry .... DOE actually supports this petition, we believe, in a
futile attempt to preserve their monopoly, a monopoly which, of course, results in higher
costs to U.S. energy consumers." See Dizard, supra note 57, at 1.
65. It could be argued that privatizing USEC as a monopoly would also increase the
value capital markets place on the firm and would thereby maximize the likely taxpayer
return from privatization. On the other hand, setting aside the question of positive na-
tional defense externalities flowing from USEC's market power internationally, whatever
increased returns taxpayers might gain from privatization of a monopoly might be out-
weighed by taxpayers' losses as consumers from supracompetitive prices for electricity gen-
erated by utilities purchasing uranium enrichment services.
66. See generally Falkenrath, supra note 3.
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I. The New National Security-False Conflicts Between
Trade and National Security
Briefly, the production of market power is a national security
good that, like any other good, will reflect supply and demand param-
eters. One might think of the demand for market power as a function
of perceptions about the international environment. The supply of
market power could be treated as a function of the cost of predatory
strategies that produce market power, compared to the cost of their
next best substitute, international institutions. A rational national se-
curity maximizer would face a strategic choice in selecting a balance of
unilateral and multilateral means for increasing trade-related national
security. Each of these propositions needs to be elaborated. The cen-
tral idea is that security includes advantages that can derive from mar-
ket power, and the acquisition of such power can entail the self-
conscious use of government regulatory authority and other assets to
disturb market outcome, i.e. rent-seeking behavior.67
A. National Power and the Demand for International Rent-
Seeking Opportunities
In assessing the balance struck between the trade and non-
proliferation interests in the implementation of the HEU Agreement
the threshold question is whether market power is a form of national
security sought by states. In practice, the economic sources of na-
tional power have played a large role in U.S. defense policy,6S as has
the need to address the balance between means and ends in the con-
duct of U.S. defense and foreign policy.69 In recent years, historians
67. The concept of rent-seeking, broadly understood, captures this idea. See Kenneth
G. Elzinga, Antitrust Policy and Trade Policy An Economtst's Perspective, 56 ANrmTpnusr
L.J. 439, 439 (1987) ("A crude definition of rent-seeking is using the power of the state to
increase one person's wealth at the expense of another's."). Accordingly, this Article will
use this vocabulary to criticize implementation of the HEU Agreement. See Amended
Suspension Agreement, supra note 41, 59 Fed. Reg. at 15,375.
68. See The Defense Production Act, 50 U.S.C. § 2061 (19,2) (providing the authority
for the Government to require individuals to place defense production requirements ahead
of civilian requirements); Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act, 50 U.S.C. § 98
(1982) (ensuring the availability to U.S. producers of sufficient quantities of strategic min-
erals). The range of defense related limitations on the domestic economy is eNtensive. See
Kathleen A. Buck, Emergency Preparedness, in NATiONAL SECURI'm Lw: 1157, 1164-67
(John Norton Moore et al. eds., 1990).
69. See Jom LEvis GADDIS, STaRATEGms OF CONTAINNMr. A CRnmCAL APPRAISAL
OF PosTWAR AmIcAN NATIONAL SECURITY PoLicy 355 (19S2) (-The perception of
means available, then, appears to be the single most decisive determinant of national strat-
egy .... ").
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have given greater attention both to the role played by economic com-
petition in laying the groundwork for political and military supremacy,
and in particular to the role of relative economic rates of growth.70
This view takes international economic competition as a precursor to,
and perhaps surrogate for, military rivalry. It draws from the received
understanding that competition for resources fueled imperialist wars
on the periphery of the world economy in the nineteenth century,7 as
well as from the insight that economic dependency yields political
power.72 The adversarial approach to economic relationships has also
recently matured through the application of the theory of relation-
specific assets in private contractual arrangements,73 which explains
how opportunistic behavior is facilitated.74 Theories relating to con-
70. See, e.g., PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS: ECO-
NOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000 (1987) (employing the con-
cept of "imperial overstretch" to argue that U.S. political and military hegemony in the
next century is threatened by the increasing gap between U.S. imperial commitments and
the relative decline of its share of world economic output); see also JosE-iPH J. ROMM, DE-
FINING NATIONAL SECURITY: Tim NONMILITARY ASPECT 1 (1993) ("Military security has
not vanished as a key element of national security, but it has certainly declined in impor-
tance relative to the issues of economic, energy, and environmental security."); LESTER
THUROW, HEAD TO HEAD: THE COMING ECONOMIC BATrLE AMONG JAPAN, EUROPE,
AND AMERICA (1992) (discussing international economic competition)' Sean P. Kanuck,
Recent Development: Information Warfare: New Challenges for Pubic International Law, 37
HARV. INT'L L.J. 272 (1996) (discussing the relationship between the new information in-
frastructures connecting national and transnational economic activity and national
security).
71. See, e.g., J.A. HOBSON, IMPERIALISM (1965); VLADIMIR I. LENIN, Imperialism: The
Highest Stage of Capitalism, in THE LENIN ANTHOLOGY 204-74 (Robert C. Tucker ed.,
1975) (explaining competition among European powers for spheres of influence worldwide
as flowing from monopoly capitalism); FRrrz FISCHER, GERMANY'S AIMS IN THE FIRST
WORLD WAR 247-80 (1961) (describing German war policy as the continuation of objec-
tives of economic domination of Eastern Europe that preceded and survived the specific
conflict with France that gave rise to the First World War).
72. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, NATIONAL POWER AND THE STRUCTURE OF FOR-
EIGN TRADE 34-40 (1945) (arguing that Germany pursued foreign trade strategies during
the period leading to the Second World War to maximize the dependency of foreign states
on German exports and on access to the German markets) [hereinafter NATIONAL
POWER].
73. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, Tim ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 53
(1985) ("Transactions that are supported by investments in durable, transaction-specific
assets experience lock-in effects, on which account autonomous trading will commonly be
supplanted by unified ownership (vertical integration)."). Although Wi liamson describes
this process in the superficially value-neutral language of transaction cost economics, it
seems clear that, under his model, relations of contractual equality are transformed into
hierarchical modes of economic and social organization. Id.
74. See Anthony Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 YALE J.L. ECON.
ORG. 5, 12-24 (1985) (describing various methods to overcome contractual insecurity).
Kronman argues that hostage-taking gives the hostage taker no real contractual security,
because the hostage giver knows the hostage is itself of no value to the hostage taker, id. at
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tractual opportunism have been employed to understand similar rela-
tionships between national economies and corresponding
opportunistic behavior by competing states.75 Yet the theoretical
foundations for this emerging conventional wisdom fly in the face of
the modem economic theory of comparative advantage, which posits
that nations are not really in competition with one another in eco-
nomic matters.76
One way of understanding the debate between these two views is
in terms of modern game theory, which might serve to highlight the
circumstances under which trade competition might usefully be stud-
12-15, and that collateral gives the collateral-giver no real contractual security, because the
collateral-taker can take the collateral as a substitute for performance without suffering a
cost for its own nonperformance. Id. at 15-18. Thus, he seems to favor "hands-t% ing," such
as a relation-specific investment, under which the party whose hands are tied automatically
suffers a loss conditioned on its owvn nonperformance and thus is efficiently deterred from
breach without giving the other party the power to opportunistically gain from breach. Id.
at 18-20. Union, of course, is the only possible solution for the case where more than mere
transactional insecurity is at stake and a party abandons "an earlier commitment %hen he
thinks it is in his o\vn self-interest to do so." Id. at 20. Hands-tying thus cannot eliminate
opportunistic behavior, and its only solution, union, may well amount to absorption.
75. See BETH V. YARBROUGH & ROBERT I. YARBROUGH, COOPERATION AND GOV
ERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: Tim STRATEGIC ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH 56
(1992) (pointing to the possibility of "investment in relation-specific assets for trade that
can be held up by an opportunistic trading partner"); David A. Lake, Anarchy. Hiterarelky.
and the Variety of International Relations, 50 INT'L ORG. 1. 14 (1996) (-the more specific
the asset, the greater the state's opportunity costs and thus the greater the costs inflicted by
the partner's opportunistic behavior"). Lake has employed this transaction costs model of
relational contracting to explain the preference of the United States for alliance-based se-
curity and the former Soviet Union for empire-that is, between indirect and direct control
mechanisms, or between anarchy and hierarchy-through an analogy with a firm's choice
between contract and integration in structuring its relationship with another firm in the
joint production of a product Ld. at 2 (theorizing that "the state is a firm producing secur-
ity"); cf. Kronman, supra note 74, at 20 (explaining "union" as a method of reducing con-
tractual insecurity). The equilibrium solution of treaty versus union, according to Lake. is
an intersection of curves expressing the costs of governance, which increases with increas-
ing hierarchy, and the costs of opportunism (that is, the costs to the dominant state in a
bilateral relationship that the other state will act in a way that undermines the joint defense
effort), which decrease with increasing hierarchy. See Lake, supra. at 16 (emploing a
graphical model). A dominant state might decrease the costs flowing to it from opportu-
nistic conduct by the dominated state and, mutatis mutandis, increase the costs to the domi-
nated state of opportunistic conduct by the dominating state by restructuring its trading
and investment patterns so as to increase the degree to which the value of assets of the
dominated state depend on its relationship with the dominated state and decreasing the
degree to which the value of assets of the dominating state depend on its relationship with
the dominated state. See generally HIrscHmAN, NATIONAL POwEP supra note 72.
76. See, eg., PAUL KRUGMAN, Pop INTERNATIONAuSM (1996) (series of essays which
argue, inter alia, that states gain from trade regardless of whether one trader gains more
than the other); Paul Krugrnan, Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession, 73 FoPEIGN
AsF. 28-44 (1994).
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ied, in a variant of Clausewitz's unforgettable expression, as power
politics by other means.77 The central insight in game theory is that
noncooperative behavior can be explained by evaluating the incen-
tives players face based on uncertainty about how other players in a
game will act.78 In assessing whether economic relationships should be
77. See KARL VON CLAUSEwrrz, ON VAR xxix (O.J. Matthijs Jolles trans., 1943).
78. See generally THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960); for a re-
cent application of game theory to a range of legal problems, see DouoLAs G. BAIRD ET
AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994) [hereinafter BAIRD ET AL., GPbME THEORY]. As
Kenneth Abbott argues, game theory yields a distinction between regimes that relatively
favor defection and regimes that relatively favor cooperation-that is, btween those char-
acterized by "offensive" defection, under which expected payoffs induca a player to seek
an outcome that is best for itself through driving the other player to its worst outcome; and
those characterized by "defensive" defection, under which expected payoffs induce the
defecting player only to seek to avoid its own worst outcome. See Kenneth W. Abbott,
"Trust But Verify": The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other
International Agreement, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 8 (1993). The distinction here seems
akin to the one Kronman draws between motives for defection that flow from the fear that
the other side will breach first and those that flow from a unilateral judgment that gains
can be secured at least in part by a beggar-thy-neighbor strategy. Kronman, supra note 74,
at 20.
The perception of the nature of the game is thus in large part a judgment about the
payoffs for cooperation and defection. See Kenneth A. Oye, Explaining Cooperation
Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies, in COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 1, 9-11
(Kenneth A. Oye ed., 1986) (discussing ways to alter payoff structure).
A related, and perhaps even more important, factor in discounting payoffs may well
be whether the game is perceived to be a single- or iterative-play, since in the latter case
experimental evidence supports the conclusion that strategies can be cteveloped that in-
duce long-term cooperation despite overwhelming incentives to defect. See ROBERT Ax.
ELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 27-54 (1984)(describing the superiority on
average of the tit-for-tat strategy, under which a player initially cooperates and thereafter
rewards cooperation with cooperation and defection with defection). On the other hand,
because enforcement mechanisms diminish uncertainty, it is now widely argued that inter-
national regimes can play a role in changing these perceptions by raising the costs of defec-
tion and raising the gains from cooperation. See Oye, supra, at 11; see generally
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983). International regimes are not
panaceas, however, and the prospects for cooperation emerging from international anarchy
are thought to depend on the number of actors involved, their mutuality of interest, and
their perception of the relevant time horizon. See Robert Axelrod & Robert 0. Keohane,
Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, !'n COOPERATION
UNDER ANARCHY, supra, 226, 253. Game theory, according to Axelrod and Keohane,
employs an "upward-looking" methodology, under which the behavior of individual actors
is modeled. 1d. at 252. Keohane has argued that this methodology can be combined with a
"downward-looking" approach focusing on "public goods and market failure to develop a
functional theory of international regimes." Al. at 23 n. 45 (citing KEOHANE, AFrER HE.
GEMONY: COOPERATION AND DIscoRD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL EcoNoYlv (1984) (ad-
vancing a public goods justification for hegemony)). Cf. LEA BRILMAYER, AMERICAN
HEGEMONY (1994) (developing and analyzing the limits of a public good 5 theory justifying
the power the U.S. exercises in the international system). Thus, game theory's key insight
is that perception of payoffs and game structure are the determinants of strategic choice.
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treated as national security problems, a critical debate in the new
game-theoretic approach to the study of international regimes is
whether the payoffs and game structure of economic regimes are com-
parable to those of security regimes.79 It is usually argued that secur-
ity regimes suffer from greater barriers to cooperation, largely
because of the inability to distinguish between offensive and defensive
motivations in security regimes and the high costs of cooperation in
the face of defection even if the other party defects only for defensive
reasons.80 But this is entirely an empirical observation, which various
factors could affect. For example, the precise value of payoffs can be
interpreted in two ways, either in absolute terms or in relative terms.
Thus, a perception that relative gains matter may well increase payoff
79. See Charles Lipson, International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,
37 WoRLD Poi- 1, 2 (1984) (attempting to "construct a theoretically principled account of
why significantly different institutional arrangements are associated with international eco-
nomic and security issues") (emphasis in original) [hereinafter Lipson, International Coop-
eration]. Lipson nonetheless recognizes that there may be a strong connection between
national military power and economic power. See Charles Lipson, The Transformation of
Trade: Sources and Effects of Regime Change, in INTERNATIONAL REGImEs, supra note 73,
at 233, 270.
Others, by contrast, believe that even full compliance with GATT during the post-%ar
period would have facilitated the exercise of political power drawn from relation-specific
assets. See Yarbrough & Yarbrough, supra note 75. Accordingly, some commentators
have focused on the role of certain GATI" exceptions, principally the escape clause in
avoiding opportunism. See Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionism as A "Safeguard": A Positive
Analysis of the GATT Escape Clause" with Normative Speculations, 58 U. Ciii. L REv.
255, 273 (1991) (arguing that the escape clause is explainable under public choice theory,
because "greater protection would arise ex post through direct legislation to protect the
injured industry") [hereinafter Sykes, Escape Clause]. Similarly, efficient breach of inter-
national agreements could lessen the threat of opportunism in economic affairs. See Rich-
ard Morrison, Efficient Breach of International Agreements, 23 DENv. J. INVTL L & POL'y 1
(1994).
80. See Robert Jervis, Security Regimes, in INTERNATioNAL RE OLmE, supra note 73,
173, 174-76. As Charles Lipson argues, -The luxury of time is especially important." Lip-
son, International Cooperation, supra note 79, at 17. In game-theoretic terms, he argues
that the key issues are "how much future payoffs are discounted" and "the relative costli-
ness of the sucker's payoff in any single game, compared to rewards for mutual coopera-
tion and the temptations to defect." Id. at 7. Yet Lipson adds: "The crucial differences
appear to lie in the costs of betrayal, the difficulties of monitoring, and te tendency to
comprehend security issues as strictly competitive struggles." la, at 18 (emphasis added).
Thus, like Axelrod and Keohane, who emphasize the importance of perception, see Axel-
rod & Keohane, supra note 78, at 247-48, Lipson ultimately focuses on the psychological
component to world politics. Cf. Alexander Wendt, Constructing International Politics, IN-
TE_NATIONAL SEcuRrrY, Summer 1995, at 71, 81 (advancing a constructivist approach to
international relations theory under which, in contrast to the realist focus on barriers to
international cooperation, the question is "how processes of interaction produce and
reproduce the social structures-cooperative or conflictual-that shape actors' identities
and interests and the significance of their material contexts").
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ratios in favor of defection and thus undermine prospects for coopera-
tion.8 There seems to be some empirical support that; relative gains
do matter significantly to states even on economic issues.' In addi-
tion, time horizon-the so-called "shadow of the future"- can play a
major role in the perception of payoffs, for a long time horizon may
permit the discounting of gains from future defection or the losses
from future cooperation in the face of defection. 83 Thus, if time hori-
zons are compressed so that the economic relations are perceived
under the single-play game model, diminished cooperation can be ex-
pected even in economic games.84 Even if economic relationships
could be viewed as iterative games with long time horizons, a focus on
relative gains could so dramatically change perceived future losses in
81. Compare Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Cri-
tique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INT'L ORG. 485, 487 (1988) ("Ne-
oliberal[s] ... argues that states seek to maximize their individual absolute gains and are
indifferent to the gains achieved by others.... Realists understand that states seek abso-
lute gains and worry about compliance. However, realists find that states are positional,
not atomistic, in character, and therefore realists argue that, in addition to concerns about
cheating, states in cooperative arrangements also worry that their partners might gain
more from cooperation than they do.") with Duncan Snidal, Internarional Cooperation
Among Relative Gains Maximizers, 35 INT'L STUD. Q. 387,388 (1991) ("Relative gains con-
siderations are shown to matter only for issues involving small numbers of states. The Im-
pact of relative gains drops off quickly with more than two states and is virtually irrelevant
for issues involving a large number of actors. In addition, the transition to cooperation is not
appreciably more difficult under relative gains than under absolute gains."). Snidal observes
that the superficial plausibility of the relative gains hypothesis makes it -t central part of the
"new mercantilism," under which "the contemporary international economy provides in-
centives for states to interfere with free trade in order to capture marke: share and thereby
a lasting advantage in key industries." Id. at 389 (citing ROBERT GILPi, U.S. POWER AND
THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION (1975), and PAUL KRUGMAN, STRATEoIC TRADE
POLICY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (1986)).
82. See John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, INTERNA-
TIONAL SECURITY, Winter 1994/1995, at 5, 21 (relying on case studies of the international
communications industry, EC and U.S. efforts to negotiate non-tariff barrier agreements,
and U.S.-Japan concerning the FSX fighter aircraft, satellites, and high-definition televi-
sion) (citations omitted).
83. See generally BAIRD, ET AL., GAME THEORY, supra note 78.
84. See Lipson, International Cooperation, supra note 79, at 17 n.49 (conceding that
there are exceptions in economic affairs where time horizons are short, and giving the U.S.
suspension of gold convertibility on August 1, 1971 as an example). The phenomenon is
known in game theory as the problem of unraveling, because "the sequence of transac-
tions unravels from the last one back to the first .... In order to avoid the unraveling
problem, the last period must not be known in advance...." Beth Yarbrough and Robert
M. Yarbrough, Reciprocity, Bilateralism, and Economic 'Hostages': Self-Enforcing Agree-
ments in International Trade, 30 INT'L STUD. Q. 7, 13 (1986); see generally BAIRD ET AL,
GAME THEORY, supra note 78. Thus, dividing a transaction into an ind .terminate number
of single-play games has the effect of making it more difficult to calculate the end point of
the game and thus diminishes the risk of unraveling.
[Vol. 20:331
To Judge Between the Nations
relation to future gains that no plausible discounting of future payoffs
could make the risk of future losses seem like anything less than a
present catastrophe.8 5 In that case, too, economic relations might be
better modeled as security games, thus strengthening the argument for
considering trade as a national security issue.
Game theory thus provides a basis for treating analysis of cooper-
ative and noncooperative trade policies as species of cooperative and
noncooperative strategy in national security regimes. It does not,
however, specify what trade strategies might be seen as offensive or
defensive defections or how to distinguish the two. To develop a
model for defining defection in trade, one might turn to national se-
curity analysts, who have argued that, given the opportunities and in-
centives for opportunistic behavior in economic competition for
national power, aggressive state behavior in international economic
relations can also be understood from the standpoint of the theory of
market power. S6 This model predicts that players will believe that
they can improve their situations relative to others by acquiring and
85. Oye observes that, even in iterated games, "the magnitude of differences among
payoffs within a given class of games can be an important determinant of coop.-ration."
Oye, supra note 78, at 9 (emphasis in original). Oye continues:
The more substantial the gains from mutual cooperation... and the less substan-
tial the gains from unilateral defection .... the greater the likelihood of coopera-
tion. In iterated situations, the magnitude of the difference between [mutual
cooperation and mutual defection] and [unilateral defection] in present and fu-
ture rounds of play affects the likelihood of cooperation in the present.
Id.
86. See, e.g., JoANNum GOWA, ALLIES, ADVERSARIES, AND NER-,TAio.N'u. TRADE 6
(1994) ("power politics is the inexorable element of any agreement to open international
markets, because of the security externalities that trade produces"). Theodore Moran
characterizes Gowa's argument as follows:
Building on a rational-choice theory of alliance formation, [Gowa] shows that
tariff games between allies differ systematically from those played between actual
or potential adversaries .... A utility-maximizing state in a potentially hostile
environment will internalize not only private but also social returns in calculating
the payoff from trade with allies and adversaries. Power considerations predict,
therefore, that trade liberalization will take place highly selectively, to the extent
that states can manipulate imperfections in international markets-with greater
openness toward allies and lesser openness toward those with whom political re-
lationships are more problematic.
Theodore H. Moran, Grand Strategy: the Pursuit of Power and the Pursuit of Pkn ', 50
INT'L ORG. 175, 181-82 (1996) (reviewing GoWA, supra) [hereinafter Moran, Grand Strat-
egy]. Moran argues that Gowa's approach, if anything, understates the case, since -avoid-
ing excessive dependence on potential adversaries (a motive Gowa says she avoids since it
has been dealt with by other writers) offers a strong complementary rationale for selective
liberalization." Id. at 184.
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then exercising market power87-either to exploit advantages for
themselves, or to deny others the same opportunity.
Clearly, payoffs from market power will vary by sector. Accord-
ingly, national economic strategy theorists might borrow a criterion
from the new theory of strategic trade-which purports to modify the
neoclassical theory of comparative advantage under which tariffs are
counterproductive"--to postulate that when a state has market
power in a particular product market it can change relative prices and
thus its terms of trade vis-A-vis others by employing a so-called "opti-
mal tariff."89 The theory defines as "strategic" those sectors of the
economy where economic rents are available or positive externalities
are produced, that is, respectively, where "labor and capital either di-
rectly receive a higher return than they could elsewhere or generate
special benefits for the rest of the economy."90 Increased national se-
curity represents one such kind of special benefit, or positive external-
ity, that justifies a strategic trade policy.
87. Duncan Snidal describes a commonly used "analogy between states in the interna-
tional political system and firms in an oligopolistic market (and, implicitly, the game-theo-
retic structure of the market)." Snidal, supra note 78, 25, 31. Snidal notes that use of the
analogy rests on "a number of postulated empirical correspondences, including:
economic marketplace-international system
firm-nation-state
firms maximize profits-states maximize survival
oligopolists -great powers
market concentration-concentration of power
price wars-military wars
Id. at 31-32.
88. See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 17-21, 27, 33 (5th
ed. 1973).
89. Compare ALAN V. DEARDORFF & ROBERT M. STERN, CURRENT ISSUES IN U.S.
TRADE POLICIES: AN OVERVIEW, U.S. TRADE POLICIES IN A CHANGING WORLD ECON-
OMY 37-38 (Robert Stern ed., 1987) (arguing that, "like other forms of exploitative inter-
vention ... the optimal tariff argument is likely to find countries in the classic position of
the Prisoners' Dilemma. That is, each country has available a policy that will benefit itself
at the expense of others, but, if all countries simultaneously pursue that policy, all are
likely to lose... ") with Paul R. Krugman, Is Free Trade Passe?, J. ECON, PERSP., Fall 1987,
at 131-44 (showing in game-theoretic payoff matrix that the credible threat of a subsidy for
a domestic producer can deter future entry by a foreign competitor so that "a government,
by supporting its firms in international competition, can raise national welfare at another
country's expense.").
90. See Paul R. Krugman, New Thinking about Trade Policy, in STRATEGIC TRADE
POLICY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 15 (Paul R. Krugman ed., 1986).
Krugman points to "economies of scale, advantages of experience, and innovation" as in-
dicators of why it might be possible to "earn significantly higher returns in some industries
than in others." Id. Cf. infra note 169 (discussing scale economies and positive externali-
ties in uranium enrichment services).
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B. International Structure and Supply of Rent-Seeking
Opportunities
As Part V of this Article will later demonstrate, both the Execu-
tive Branch and the Congress perceived the positive national security
externalities of market power in the uranium enrichment sector to be
significant.91 Part IV will demonstrate, however, that the Executive
Branch is institutionally biased towards demanding more national se-
curity than the Congress, even though Congress' demand may be
more than adequate.92 Setting aside these inter-branch differences
and assuming a unitary demand for national security, however, any
explanation of the U.S. policymaking process would need to consider
the supply of opportunities for maximizing U.S. market power and
denying other states market power in the uranium enrichment sector.
It seems plausible to suppose that international institutional
structure would play a critical role in the incentives for states to adopt
policies designed to create market power. This is because it is likely
that exercise of market power is facilitated by the prevalence of bilat-
eral relationships in the interaction of weaker states with a more pow-
erful state, as individually weak states are unable to impose significant
costs on strong states in response to the strong states' exercise of mar-
ket power.93 Thus, the multilateral approach to international trade ne-
gotiations codified in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) after the Second World War may well be understood as an
effort to reduce opportunities for the bilateral exercise of market
power by great powers.94 Albert Hirschman, drawing lessons from
German economic imperialism before the Second World War and in
91. See infra text accompanying notes 153-201.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 115-52.
93. See John Conybeare, Trade Wars: A Comparative Study of Anglo-Hanse, Franca-
Italian, and Hawley-Smoot Conflicts, in COOPERATrON UNDER ANARCr.n supra note 78. at
147, 162 ("The strong power then moved quickly to increase the costs of mutual defection
for the small power, mainly by punitive tariff surcharges.") [hereinafter Conybeare. Trade
Wars].
94. GATT, 61 Stat. at A3, 55 U.N.T.S at 1867. Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) treat-
ment emerged out of bilateral treaty practice in the 19th century. first in the Cobden-
Chevalier treaty of 1S60. See Lipson, International Cooperation, supra note 79, at 241-42.
It was employed by the United States before the imposition of the Smoot-Haley tariff to
free ride on tariff advantages U.S. treaty partners had given third parties, with "the predict-
able result ... that American tariffs remained high while the U.S. benefited from tariff
reductions by the rest of the world." See Conybeare, Trade Mars, supra note 93, at 164-65
("This situation was possible in part because of the publicness of MFN systems and in part
because of the economic power of the United States.") Rival powers responded to U.S.
abuse of its market power in closing its market through high tariffs and free riding on
others' open markets by insisting on "conditional" MEN, whereby "benefits would be ex-
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anticipation of the Bretton Woods conference that would create the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, asked: "should we
rather endeavor to build a new framework of international relations in
which this use of foreign trade for purposes of national power would
encounter more difficulties than hitherto?" 95
How far the GATT system succeeded in institutionalizing eco-
nomic cooperation through multilateral decision-making is an open
question, however. Admittedly, the GATT system itself never com-
pletely eradicated bilateralism and the advantages it gives to more
powerful states.96 Moreover, the multilateral characteristics of the
GATT negotiating system dissipated over time; in particular, the rise
of non-public side agreements, such as voluntary restraint agreements,
signaled the weakening of the system. 7
tended to third parties only in return for reciprocal concessions," and "regional and barter
arrangements with smaller client states." Id. at 166.
95. HIRSCHMAN, NATIONAL POWER, supra note 72, at 53. Hirschman pointed out that
the Treaty of Versailles seemed founded on the opposite premise, that "economic sover-
eignty, even of the defeated enemy, is not questioned, and it is supposed that economic war
will continue after the end of the military war." Id. at 61 (quoting the resolutions of the
Paris Economic Conference adopted by the Allied Powers: "The representatives of the
Allied governments... declare that, after forcing upon them the military contest in spite of
all the efforts to avoid the conflict, the Empires of Central Europe are today preparing, in
concert with their allies, for a contest on the economic plane, which will not only survive
the re-establishment of peace, but will at that moment attain its full scope and intensity.")
Id. at 60-61.
The connection between trade and security is highlighted by the fact that, shortly after
the United Nations was formed, "its subordinate body, ECOSOC, at its first meeting,
adopted a resolution calling for a conference to draft a charter for an 'international trade
organization."' See JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 10 (1990)
[hereinafter JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT].
96. See Jock A. Finlayson & Mark W. Zacher, The GATT and the R.qgulation of Trade
Barriers: Regime Dynamics and Functions, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES. supra note 78, at
273, 302-03 (describing the "principal supplier rule," under which in negotiating tariff con-
cessions states negotiated only with their principal suppliers of a product rather than with
all their suppliers, effectively advantaging states likely to be principal suppliers in securing
concessions to their advantage; quoting KENNETH DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 62 (1970)). Yet after "the advent of linear, across-the-
board tariff reductions in the Kennedy Round and the growth of interest in negotiating
NTB [non-tariff barriers] codes, this bilateral technique was discarded for a greater degree
of multilateralism." Id. at 303. Yet bilateralism persisted, since the NT3 negotiations re-
flected mainly the views and interests of the major powers. Id. at 303-04. See aLho JOHN H.
JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND TEXT 422 (3d ed. 1995)[ hereinafter JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS].
97. See Finlayson & Zacher, supra note 96, at 273, 310 (noting the resurgence of bilat-
eralism). This decline, it is argued, accords with hegemonic stability theory, in that the
power of the United States was perceived to decline from the late 1940's to the mid-1970s,
roughly the period under analysis. See generally ROBERT 0. KtoHANE, AFTER HEGEM-
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On the other hand, the recent revival of multilateralism in the
GATT through the new dispute settlement mechanism of the World
Trade Organization (WTO), together with new rules against voluntary
restraint agreements, might suggest a strengthened world trade system
capable of authoritatively resolving disputes.98 And just as interna-
tional institutionalization in the early post-war period has been ex-
plained in terms of the rise of American hegemony, one might explain
the emergence of more effective international institutions as the corol-
lary of the revival of American hegemony after the end of the Cold
War.99 Such explanations are based on the premise that international
free trade is a public good that can be supplied effectively only by an
international hegemon.100
ONV. COOPERArION AND DiscoRD N TmE VoRLD PoLrcAL Eco\,omy (1984) (advanc-
ing a public goods justification for hegemony); Lipson, International Cooperation, supra
note 79, at 267-70 (marking the decline of nondiscrimination and partial explanation in
terms of the decline of American hegemony and unwillingness or inability of the United
States to enforce compliance with an international free trade system).
98. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Final Act, Annex 2, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,1994, arts. 16.4, 17.14, LEGAL 1NsrRUMENs'r-REsULTs OF
rm URUGUAY RoulD vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1226 (providing, contrary to earlier
GATT practice, for the automatic adoption of Panel and new Appellate Body Reports
absent consensus of the WTO to the contrary) [hereinafter WTO Dispute Settlement Un-
derstanding]; see also Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 11, Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, The Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 315 (GATT Secretariat ed. 1994) (providing for
prohibition or phasing-out governmental VRAs and restraints on equivalent nongovern-
mental measures) [hereinafter Agreement on Safeguards].
99. See KEOHANE, supra note 97, at 135-82 (explaining the emergence of major inter-
national institutions resulting from the United States interest in stabilizing key features of
the international order).
100. Arguably, hegemonic systems are more stable than international cooperation in
securing gains for the same reasons that monopoly is more stable than oligopoly. See Lip-
son, International Cooperation, supra note 79, at 20 n.59 ('The reason is that a hegemon
alone may find it worthwhile to supply the collective good, bypassing the difficulties of
forming and sustaining a group of joint providers."). Cf. PinLuP AREEDA & Louis
KAPLOW, ANTIrrrusr ANALYsIs: PROBLEMS, Ts-x'r, CASES 279 (4th ed. 1983) ("Larger
numbers increase the likelihood of disagreements, the variety of differentiated products,
the difficulty of detecting cheating by an individual firm and of enforcing a coordinated
response, and the temptation to pursue an independent profit-maximizing course in the
hope of increasing their market share under the price umbrella of the coordinating
group.").
Arguably, however, coordination problems among a group of hegemonic powers may
well lead to consolidation or union under the banner of a single monopolist. Cf. RlcnAHA
A. POSNER, EcoNoafic ANALYSiS OF LAW 286 (4th ed. 1992) ("Despite the instability of
cartels, non-enforcement of cartel agreements is unlikely to be an adequate remedy. By
reducing the efficacy of price fixing by contract, it creates an incentive for the members of
the cartel to consolidate into a single firm. The monopoly price can then be enforced
without reliance on contracts.") However, in addition to the moral grounds for skepticism
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Yet, like Mark Twain's death, reports of the death of bilateralism
may well be greatly exaggerated. Despite appearances, it seems
doubtful that American hegemony actually has made a comeback 101 -
even if it ever actually declined'° 2-thus undercutting one explanation
for an apparent renewal of multilateralism. Nonetheless, it might be
that international free trade can be produced without hegemony, be-
cause it is not a public good but rather a case of joint production. If
so, free trade would be less likely to be underproduced by the global
economy than would a public good.10 3 It may also be that the interna-
of a public goods argument for hegemony, see LEA BRILMAYER, AMERICAN HEGEMONY
11 (1994), it may be that "collective goods are rare internationally an! certainly do not
include all cases of cooperation for joint benefit (since, in many cases, non-cooperators can
be excluded)." See Lipson, International Cooperation, supra note 79, at 20 n.59 (1984);
John Conybeare, Public Goods, Prisoners' Dilemmas and the International Political Econ-
omy, INT'L STUD. Q., Mar. 1984, at 5, 20 (arguing that international free trade is not a
public goods game with payoffs favoring cooperation but rather a Prisoners' Dilemma
game in which a hegemon, contrary to the predictions of hegemonic stability theory, does
not have a first-best policy of supporting international free trade) [hereinafter Conybeare,
Public Goods]; and Joanne Gowa, Rational Hegemons, Excludable Groups, and Small
Groups: An Epitaph for Hegemonic Stability Theory?, 41 WORLD PoL. 307, 323 (1989)
(hegemonic stability theory, in predicting free trade, fails to account foi the fact that "na-
tional power is engaged in free trade agreements because such agreements inevitably pro-
duce security externalities" that "arise from its inevitable jointness in pioduction," so that
"free trade can disrupt the pre-existing balance of power among the contracting states")
[hereinafter Gowa, Rational Hegemons]. See also infra text accompanying notes 127-35
(discussing excludability from national defense connecting with public good theory argu-
ment for production of national security).
101. See, e.g., Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Virtual State, 75 FOREIGN Ann. 45
(1996) ("Developed states are putting aside military, political, and terriorial ambitions as
they struggle not for cultural dominance but for a greater share of world output. Countries
are not uniting as civilizations and girding for conflict with one another. Instead, they are
downsizing-in function if not in geographic form. Today and for the foreseeable future,
the only international civilization worthy of the name is the governing economic culture of
the world market."). Although Rosecrance's views are not new it may be that he is the
author of an idea whose time has finally come. See generally RICHARD ROSECRANCE, TE
RISE OF THE TRADING STATE: COMMERCE AND CONQUEST IN THE MODERN WORLD
(1986).
102. See Bruce Russett, The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, Is Mark
Twain Really Dead?, 39 INT'L ORG. 207, 208-14 (1985) (questioning the conclusion that
U.S. hegemony has declined as based on insufficient analysis of the post-World War II
baseline for power and the relevant constituents or indicators of national power).
103. Whether free trade is a public good is not beyond dispute. Some consider it an
example of "team production," which the economic theory of organization explains as a
case where "the group can produce more than the sum of the outputs of the individual
members." See Beth Yarbrough & Robert M. Yarbrough, Free Trade, Hegemony, and the
Theory of Agency, 38 KYKLos 348,350 (1985). There seem to be two objections to consid-
ering international free trade a public good: first, it is not clear that "trade liberalization
embodies the two essential characteristics of public goods, in other words non-rivalry in
consumption and non-excludability"; second, the hegemon who would provide the public
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tional regime favoring free trade that was created by hegemony can
survive hegemony's demise through the institutionalization of the
hegemon's alleged preference for free trade.10 But, finally, and most
ominously, it may even be that a hegemon is necessary, the United
States can no longer play that role, and the resurgence of multilateral-
ism under the GATI' is at best a mirage.105 'The rise of regional trad-
good may have a first-best policy in which it "is much more likely than a small country to
gain from trade restrictions." Id. at 349; see also DE~ARnonrr & STERN, supra note 89, at
21-22 (optimal tariff theory); see also Conybeare, Public Goods, supra note 100, at 6 (the
benefits of free trade are excludable, since countries may, individually or collectively, pe-
nalize a country that attempts to impose a nationally advantageous tariff at the expense of
the international community); cf. Gowa, Rational Hegemons, supra note 100, at 315 (argu-
ing that free trade may be excludable but noting that, "[i]f, however, the policing of a
cooperative agreement is costly, enforcement itself becomes a public good") (citation omit-
ted). If international free trade is not, in economic terms, a public good, then it would
seem that free trade would not require a hegemonic provider and the hegemon would not
necessarily provide it. See Yarbrough & Yarbrough, supra at 349.
104. See KEOuANE, supra note 97, at 215 (the theory of hegemonic stability "is inade-
quate because of its failure to take into account the role of international institutions, such
as international economic regimes, in fostering and shaping patters of cooperation. More
cooperation has persisted than the theory of hegemonic stability would predict"). Keo-
hane adds: "The theory of hegemonic stability predicts substantial erosion of the trade
regime.... Trade wars have not taken place, despite economic distress. On the contrary
,
what we see are intensive efforts at cooperation." Id. at 213.
105. The United States and Japan continue to address many of their trade disputes,
particularly in key sectors, through bilateral, rather than plurilateral, negotiations. See,
e.g., Automotive Agreement and Supporting Documents, Aug. 23, 1995, U.S.-Japan, re-
printed in 34 I.L.M. 1482 (from the text provided by the Office of the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative); but see Paul Blustein, U.S. Shelving Threat of Sanctions on Japan Kodak Case to be
Taken to the WTO Instead, VASH. PosT, June 12, 1996, at Fl (reporting that United States
has decided to take its complaint against Japan-namely, concerning Japan's domestic pol-
icy of under-enforcing anti-competition law and instead favoring vertical restrictions in
supplier-distributor arrangements in the camera market-to the WVTO rather than make it
the subject of unilateral trade sanctions under Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act). The
Kodak case is particularly noteworthy because "Kodak has long opposed taking the WTO
route, on the grounds that the organization's rules probably don't cover such complex
practices, and its officials have publicly urged the trade representative's office to wrest
concessions from the Japanese by brandishing Section 301 of U.S. trade law," although
Kodak "has recently discovered new evidence of the Japanese government in limiting im-
ported fim ... that.., could make a WTO case more compelling," See Blustein, supra, at
F7. The strength of the U.S. commitment to dispute resolution remains in doubt, however.
Compare American Trade Policy: War Cancelled, Ecoxor.is'r, June 22, 1996, at 72-73
(questioning genuineness of U.S. commitment to WTO dispute resolution mechanism),
with Alan 0. Sykes, "Mandatory" Retaliation for Bread of Trade Agreements: Some
Thoughts on the Strategic Design of Section 301, 8 B.U. INT'L LJ. 301, 316 (1990) (observ-
ing that post-Cold War amendments to the Trade Act suggest "the United States %ill re-
spect the outcome of dispute resolution if it concludes within an eighteen month period")
[hereinafter Sykes, Mandatory Retaliation]; and Articles 12.9, 16.4. 17.5, and 17.14 of the
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 98 (providing that: "In no case
should the period from the establishment of the panel to the circulation of the report to the
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ing blocs, covering an ever larger percentage of world trade, might
well suggest that the bilateral rent-seeking model is a better picture of
world trade, notwithstanding the new WTO.Y°6
C. Strategic Choice
If multilateralism's revival is genuine, it might be that the current
international distribution of power and institutional arrangements
governing trade are likely to produce an optimal amount of free trade.
Yet, certain sectors of the global economy that are closely tied to the
production of strategically-significant goods and services may still be
better understood through power-maximizing models. 10' Thus, strate-
gic choice cannot be avoided even assuming the triumph in general of
multilateralism.
As analysts of strategic trade theory have observed, it is possible
to identify appropriate sectors as targets for such policies.108 One sug-
gested targeting criterion might be whether the sector at issue involves
Members exceed nine months"; that "[w]ithin 60 days after the date of circulation of a
panel report to the Members, the report shall be adopted at a [Dispute Settlement Body]
meeting unless a party to the dispute formally notifies the [Dispute Settlement Body] of its
decision to appeal ... ;" that "In no case shall the [Appellate Body] proceedings exceed 90
days"; and, finally, that "[a]n Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the [Dispute
Settlement Body] and unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute unlss the
[Dispute Settlement Body] decides by consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body report
within 30 days following its circulation to the Members."). For a nuanccd appraisal of the
U.S. government's mixed posture on WTO dispute settlement, see Robert E. Hudec, Inter-
national Economic Law: The Political Theatre Dimension, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 9
(1996).
106. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 50, 107 Stat. at 2057, 32 I.L.M. at 612; see Paul R.
Krugman, Is Bilateralism Bad?, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND TRADE POLICY 9
(Elhanan Helpman & Assaf Razia eds., 1991) (arguing that regional trade arrangements
may exploit their market power positions in various sectors to employ optimal tariff strat-
egy); see also Moran, Grand Strategy, supra note 86, at 197 (describing rules of origin pro-
visions of regional trading blocs as indicative of neo-mercantilist grand strategy).
107. See GOWA, ALLIES, ADVERSARIES, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 86, at
29 ("[D]ebates about hegemonic theory have neglected what may be the most durable
barrier to free trade among the constituent great powers of any given international polit-
ical system: that is, the primacy of concerns about security that characterize life in an anar-
chic world.") (quoted in Moran, Grand Strategy, supra note 86, at 183); see also Gowa,
Rational Hegemons, supra note 100, at 323 ("the anarchic international system.., makes
two facts common knowledge among states: (1) each seeks to exploit the wealth of others
to enhance its own power, and (2) trade is instrumental to this end").
108. See Barbara J. Spencer, What Should Trade Policy Target?, in SrRATEOIC TRADE
POLICY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 69-89 (1986) (discussing criteria for
selecting which industries to assist through rent-seeking subsidies) [hereinafter STRATEOIC
TRADE POLICY].
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free trade with allies or adversaries, 109 so that market power strategies
could be calculated to strengthen allies and weaken adversaries. That
approach, however, would seem to attend inadequately to the imper-
manence of such relationships."' The acquisition of market power in
strategic sectors with positive national defense externalities, rather
than only against particular adversaries, is arguably a more persuasive
national power enhancing strategy."'
It should be noted, however, that there is no one "right" power-
maximizing strategy." 2 Thus, "the question for grand strategy as it
pertains to high-tech industries is whether to permit consolidation and
exploitation of national quasi-monopolies or to deliberately en-
courage diffusion of monopoly power across borders."' 13 Ultimately,
109. See GOWA, ALLIES, ADNERSARIES, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 86. at
6 CTrade with an adversary produces a security diseconomy, trade with an ally produces a
positive externality. In either case, agreements to open international markets create a di-
vergence between the private and social costs of trade.").
110. See Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston, "We have no eternal allies and %e
have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and these interests it
is our duty to follow." Speech on the Polish Question in the House of Commons IS4S).
reprinted in BARTLETt'S FA LIAR QUOTATIONs 454 1 12 (15th ed. 19,0).
111. As Moran argues:
[Tin the case of high-technology strategic trade industries whose economies of
scale are greater than national markets, some countries (or regions) are likely to
be left without players of their o\vn, at the mercy of external monopolists. The
potential threat this poses to national security, and the potential vulnerability it
carries for foreign manipulation, may be much more significant than vhatever
economic rents might or might not be captured by one nation or another. The
rationale of public intervention to field a national presence in key high.tech stra-
tegic trade sectors appears compelling: sins of omission may be as damaging as
sins of commission.
Moran, Grand Strategy, supra note S6. at 184-85.
112. Moran, Grand Strategy, supra note 86, at 193. Rather, "nations can take one of
two distinct paths for grand strategy, the two involve profoundly different approaches to
national sovereignty and national identity .... They might be characterized as a path
toward a late-twentieth century neo-mercantilismn or, in contrast, a path that most accu-
rately might be called transnational integration." ld.; see also MoRA,, A?.iEPICAN Eco-
NOMIC POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY 72-Sl (1993) [hereinafter MorAN, A. rICo N
EcoNo.Nc POLICY].
113. Moran, Grand Strategy, supra note 86, at 193. A "transnational integrative" ap-
proach would need to limit the threat of market power in strategic sectors by assuring
appropriately deconcentrated global market structures. See id. at 196 (citing MoRAN,
AmmcAN ECONOMIC PoLc', supra note 112, at 46, 52-54 (employing four firm concen-
tration ratios and the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index, "drawing on antitrust theory"). Mo-
ran's effort to draw "on antitrust theory" to develop indexes of market power for national
security analysis, in a magnificent irony, returns full circle to Albert Hirschman's early
work in developing the basis for what later became the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as a
tool for national security analysis that measured "concentration upon markets and supply
sources of the foreign trade of small or weak nations" and thus their susceptibility to
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the "right" policy mix must be determined on the basis of empirical
judgments about the international environment. 114 In short, national
power could be maximized in the long run either by securing interna-
tional market power or, more modestly, simply by denying interna-
tional market power to other states.
National policymakers' formulation of a national security policy
in the area of strategic trade will depend not only on their rational
judgments about the international environment, but also on how their
domestic constitutional structures affect the formulation and imple-
mentation of national economic policy. Thus, to assess whether a
proper balance has been achieved between national security interests
in market power and national security interests in nonproliferation,
analysts will need to determine whether domestic institutions are
likely to produce strategies that seek national power through bilateral
exercise of market power rather than through reliance on interna-
tional institutions to achieve security. In short, as elaborated by Part
IV, evaluating the policy mixes pursued by the Executive Branch and
Congress requires assessing their respective biases.
IV. Domestic Implementation of a National Security
Conception of International Economic Relations
If international market power is a type of national security, as
argued in Part III, one might argue that, because of the public goods
character of national security, which would lead to its underproduc-
tion, government policymaking should overcompensate to favor its
production. This argument would prove too much, however, for it
would be based on an incomplete view of the public goods character
of national defense. Part IV.A will therefore elaborate the quasi-pub-
lic goods character of national defense and show that government in-
tervention to compensate for the putative underproduction of trade-
related security may not be necessary in order to produce the optimal
amount of national security. In brief, the argument of Part IV.A is
external influence. See HIRSCHMAN, NATIONAL POWER, supra note 72, at 85, 157-62 (pro-
viding mathematical derivation).
114. Which choice national leaders will make depends on their judgment of the nature
of their international environments as "Hobbesian" or "Lockean" worlds, in sum their
"calculation of whether greater potential threats to their domestic well-being come from
binding or loosening their own hands and the hands of others in the international system."
Moran, Grand Strategy, supra note 86, at 192-93; Cf. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING TlE
GATT, supra note 95, at 49-55 (arguing for a "rule-oriented," rather than a "power-ori-
ented," approach to the management of international trade and the development of a
GAIT "constitution").
[Vol. 20:331
To Judge Between the Nations
that both trade-related national security and traditional politico-mili-
tary security create positive externalities. Accordingly, the mere cate-
gorization of an activity as trade-related, such as USEC privatization
and the anti-dumping case, or politico-military, such as nuclear non-
proliferation, does not indicate the magnitude of these positive exter-
nalities. Because of the operation of political markets, however, one
could surmise that pressure from the economic interests supporting
potentially competing forms of national security will stimulate policy-
makers to evaluate and trade off different security programs. The
centrality of the political process in the production level of the various
national security goods thus makes the domestic political structure a
critical factor in assessing whether production decisions might be bi-
ased in favor of particular kinds of security.
Part IV.B argues that the Executive Branch is likely to pursue
excessive rent-seeking strategies, particularly through bilateral agree-
ments such as the HEU Agreement. Finally, Part IV.C argues that the
legislative process is probably more likely than executive branch poli-
cymaking to assure production of positive national defense externali-
ties without generating excessive rent-seeking behavior. These
theoretical predictions are then assessed in Part V in a comparative
analysis of how the Executive Branch and Congress processed the pol-
icy conflicts discussed in Part I.
A. Public Goods vs. Public Choice-The Paradigmatic Case of
National Defense
Doubts about the efficacy of the market will ordinarily be framed
as a "public goods" argument; doubts about the efficacy of the polit-
ical process will usually be framed as a "public choice" argument.115
115. See generally Paul B. Stephan, II, Interdisciplinan, Approaches to International
Economic Law: Barbarians Inside the Gate: Public Choice Theory and Internattonal Eco-
nomic Law, 10 Am. U. J. INTL L. & POL'Y 745 (1995) [hereinafter Stephan, Barbarians].
Stephan argues:
Many instances of government-imposed regulation might be justified as an effort
to provide a public good, although they also may have as an effect a reduction in
competition among producers of other private goods. There are no a priori
grounds for determining which explanation best fits any given regulation; charac-
terization usually involves constructing a contestable narrative as to what hap-
pened and what mattered. The dualism of public goods and public choice
accounts means, on the one hand, that proponents of public choice theory e.,.hich
purports to describe and predict government actions without passing judgment on
them) must confront the public goods explanation and provide comincing rea-
sons why that alternative analysis does not adequately account for the measures
taken, and, on the other hand, critics of public choice theory must be prepared to
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Both public goods theory and public choice theory focus on mar-
ket failure: public goods theory focuses on the failure of the private
market to produce goods and services," 6 and public choice theory fo-
cuses on failure of the public market-that is, the political process-to
produce government intervention in the economy.' L7 The public
goods argument essentially supposes that the market economy will not
produce an optimal level of the good in question, because the optimal
level would reflect a demand for benefits from which a private market
justify the anticompetitive effects of particular regulatory measures associated
with the provision of public goods.
Id at 750.
116. The idea of public goods was formalized by A.C. Pigou and developed by Paul
Samuelson. See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 183-84 (4th ed. 1932); PAUL
SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 159 (6th ed. 1964); critiqued In
Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE
LAW 187, 189-91 (1988), reprinted in Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17
J.L. & ECON. 357 (1974) [hereinafter Coase, Lighthouse]. A "public good" is simply a
good that satisfies two conditions. First, it is nonrivalrous in that consumption by one
person does not impair another's consumption. Second, it is nonexcludable in that once
the good is produced consumers cannot effectively be barred from enjoying the benefits of
its production. See Tlyler Cowen, Public Goods and Externalities: Old and New Perspcc-
tives, in Tim THEORY OF MARKET FAILURE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION 3 (Tyler Cowen
ed., 1988); cf Yarbrough & Yarbrough, supra note 103, at 350; DEARDORFF & STEARN,
supra note 103, at 21-22; Conybeare, Public Goods, supra note 100, at 6. Accordingly, non-
excluded beneficiaries will "free ride" on the efforts of others that lead to the production
of the public good. The market will then underproduce the public good, because true
consumer preferences are not reflected in the actual demand curve. In other words, a
public good yields positive externalities, or increases in consumer welfare, that are not
included in marginal revenue curves of producers. Id.; see also Stephan, Barbarians, supra
note 115, at 750.
117. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE-A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 7 (1991) ("When we speak of the relationship between public
law and public choice, then, we are really talking about several fields of law in which the
role of legislatures is crucial .... ."). Public choice "takes from classical theory [of monop-
oly] the concept of rent-seeking through restrictions on production, and uses it to account
for governmental behavior." Stephan, Barbarians, supra note 115, at 747 (drawing from
JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: THE LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTrrTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962), and MANCUR OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965)). It
argues that "discrete and insular [producer] groups ... can act collectively more effectively
than can the general public. Such a group can generate and disseminate information
among its members more efficiently, and generally can organize itself at a lower cost than
can a similarly sized group of persons with diverse interests." Id. Accordingly, the political
market will be biased in favor of producer groups, giving a persuasive account for the
perceived bias of trade law in favor of producer groups through apparantly economically
inefficient antidumping and countervailing duty laws. See id. at 754 (describing public
choice theory as a "field developed in part to provide an explanation for.., the resilience
of protectionism in international trade"); but see Sykes, Escape Clause, supra note 79, at
259 (advancing a public choice argument for the GATT escape clause in terms of its facili-
tating ex ante increased trade liberalization).
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actor could not realize gains.1' 8 Meanwhile, the public choice argu-
ment assumes that the political market will produce a greater than
optimal level of government regulation (in effect government-subsi-
dized production) of a good, because producers can more effectively
influence the political process to a degree disproportionate to their
share of voting rights.119
The public goods and public choice characterizations may present
a false dichotomy, however, since recent evidence suggests that mar-
ket solutions can be found to overcome the apparent public character-
istics of so-called public goods.120 If the market can finds ways to
overcome public goods problems of lighthouses and other such para-
118. See PIGou, Thm EcoNoIucs OF ,VELFARE, supra note 116, at 183-S4; SAiMUELSO1,
ECONOafics: AN IrMODUcrORY ANALYsTs 159, critiqued in Cease, Lighthouse, supra note
116, at 357.
119. FARBER & FnxcKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE-A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION,
supra note 117, at 7; Stephan, Barbarians, supra note 115, at 747,754; but see Sykes, Escape
Clause, supra note 79, at 259.
120. Lighthouses, for the benefits they confer on seafarers, and apple-farming, for the
benefits apple-farmers confer on bee-keepers, are considered the two classical examples of
public goods. The lighthouse example seems first to have been suggested by Henry
Sidgwick:
[T]here is a large and varied class of cases in which the supposition [that an indi-
vidual can always obtain through free exchange adequate remuneration for the
services he renders] would be manifestly erroneous. In the first place, there are
some utilities which, from their nature, are practically incapable of being appro-
priated by those who produce them or would be willing to purchase them. For
instance, it may easily happen that the benefits of a well-placed lighthouse must
be largely enjoyed by ships on which no toll could be conveniently imposed.
See HENRY SmGwIcx, THE PRINCaPLES OF POLMCAL ECONoMY 406 (3d ed. 1901) (quoted
in Coase, Lighthouse, supra note 116, at 1SS). The bee-keeping example seems first to
have been suggested by J.E. Meade:
Suppose that in a given region there is a certain amount of apple-growing and a
certain amount of bee-keeping and that the bees feed on the apple blossom. If
the apple-farmers apply 10% more labor, land and capital to apple-farming, they
will increase the output of apples by 10%; but they will also provide more food
for the bees. On the other hand, the bee-keepers will not increase the output of
honey by 10% unless at the same time the apple-farmers also increase their out-
put and so the food of the bees by 10% .... We call this a case of an unpaid
factor, because the situation is due simply and solely to the fact that the apple-
farmer cannot charge the beekeeper for the bees' food.
See J.C. Meade, External Economies and Diseconomies in a Competitive Situation, 52
EcoN. J. 54, 56-57 (1952) (quoted in Steven N.S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees, in THE
ThEoRY OF MARPE FAmURE A CRrTICAL EXAMINATION 279, 280 (Tyler Cowen ed.,
1988).
The bee-keeping example illustrates the potential breadth of the public goods concept,
if it is understood to provide a justification for publicly subsidized production of any good
which becomes a factor in the production of another good on non-excludability grounds.
The theoretically-constructed prices for such unpaid factors might give the appearance of
systemic "market" failure in a market economy. As a matter of economic theory:
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digmatic cases, it may be worth considering whether market solutions
are available for the production of certain aspects of national defense.
Toward this end, it may be useful to consider national defense as a set
of goods and services, rather than a single monolithic: product, and
assess the degree to which the public goods characte:rization seems
apposite.
Treating a standing national military as a monolithic product, the
public goods argument seems on the surface straightforward. Citizens
cannot be excluded from the obvious benefits of having a military
force, such as deterrence of invasion and destruction of property or
loss of life, except perhaps through their expulsion from the territorial
boundaries the standing army will protect.12 1 It might be possible,
however, to exclude a class from the benefits of national security if we
reconsider the exclusion from the standpoint of what services will be
provided-in other words, by determining whether the good will be
It is easy to show that if apple blossoms have a positive effect on honey produc-
tion ... any Pareto-efficient solution ... will associate with apple blossoms a
positive Lagrangean shadow-price. If, then, apple producers are unable to pro-
tect their equity in apple-nectar and markets do not impute blossoms their correct
shadow value, profit-maximizing decisions will fail correctly to allocate re-
sources... at the margin.
See Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q. J. Eco,,i. 351, 364 (1958)
(quoted in Cheung, The Fable of the Bees, supra, at 280-81). This public goods theory
seems to prove too much.
Recent scholarship calls into question the theory underlying these examples because
evidence indicates that the examples are invalid. See Coase, Lighthouse, supra note 116, at
195-213 (demonstrating empirically, based on a study of the British lighthouse system, that
lighthouse owners can recoup most of the benefits of a lighthouse by charging ship-owners
port access fees, since the set of port users largely intersects the set of beneficiaries of
neighboring lighthouses); see also Cheung, The Fable of the Bees, supra, at 281-304 (show-
ing empirically that apple-farmers and bee-keepers do contractually find ways to compen-
sate apple-farmers for the positive externalities of apple-farming with respect to honey
production). The falsifiability of a theory by way of counter-example i,.. of course, a cen-
tral test of scientific method, particularly one purporting to call for diminished private
freedom and increased government intervention. See KA. R. POPPER, 2 THE OPEN SOCI-
ETY AND ITs ENEMIEs: THE HIGH TIDE OF PROPHECY: HEGEL, MARX AND THE AFTER.
mAa-H 13 (1902) ("In so far as scientific statements refer to the world of experience, they
must be refutable, and, in so far as they are irrefutable, they do not refer to the world of
experience.").
121. Even this argument has not gone unchallenged. One author writes: "[c]ontrary to
public goods theory, even in the key case of defense from external attack, exclusion is not
impossible and the marginal cost of serving additional persons generally is not zero. There
is no a priori case for equal access to defense . .. " Kenneth D. Goldin, Equal Access v.
Selective Access; A Critique of Public Goods Theory, in THE THEORY OF MARKET FAIL.
uRE, supra note 116, at 80 [hereinafter Goldin, Selective Access].
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produced at all.Y A standing military has potential benefits other
than deterring invasion, such as the deterrence of attacks against na-
tionals overseas. Thus, if the military is not employed to protect na-
tionals overseas, but only to provide territorial defense, then one
group of consumers can be excluded from the consumption of na-
tional defense.'-m Likewise, if the military is not employed to defend
national commercial interests overseas, holders are, in effect, excluded
from consumption.124 Moreover, if the military is not used to protect
access to cheap foreign raw materials, then all consumers of that raw
material are, ceteris paribus, excluded from consumption.'2
122. Kenneth D. Goldin speculates that, "even with a communal army, selective exclu-
sion is possible from some aspects of its defenses. It may not be possible to exclude anyone
from 'protection against massive nuclear attack.' But this is not the only service rendered."
Id. at 69,79. Goldin concedes that no one can be excluded from "massive" nuclear attack.
Even accepting this concession, Anti-Ballistic Missile point defense systems, which are per-
mitted in small numbers by the current ABM Treaty although not currently deployed by
the United States, could have the effect of excluding citizens from a particular national
defense service. See Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems, May 26,
1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435. Much of the current controversy concerning theater
ballistic missile defense could be viewed as a debate about whether it is cost-effective to
expand national defense services to include protection from the threat of a single or small
number of nuclear warheads launched by a rogue state or sub-national terrorist. See John
Pike, Taking Aim at the ABAI Treaty: THAAD and U.S. Security, Aw.is Co.nrOL TODAY,
May 1995, at 3, 4 (dismissing the risk of third world threats).
123. While problematic under international law as an exercise of the "inherent right of
self-defense" under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the U.S. air attack on Libya in April
1986 reflected an effort to protect American nationals from Libyan attacks outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 51, discussed in Louis
HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LA~W CASES AND MATERIALS 922 (3d ed. 1993) [hereinaf-
ter HENKiN, CASES AND MATERiAI.S] (noting that the "President's statement justified the
action as being in response, in particular, to a bombing of a Berlin nightclub frequented by
U.S. servicemen in which one was killed and many wounded" and that the attack was a
"'mission fully consistent with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter"') (citations omitted); but cf.
Goldin, Selective Access, supra note 121, at 79 ("A military force also protects people from
theft of property and kidnapping by foreigners. Exclusion from this service is relatively
easy: The military force simply makes no attempt to stop theft or kidnapping of named
persons.").
124. See generally CHARLEs LmSON, STANDING GuAR : PRorcrriNG FoREtGN CAPI.
TAI. iN THE NINETEENTH AND TwENT rm C.NaRuEs (19S5). In addition, covert military
intervention by the United States has played a role in preventing the installation of govern-
ments likely to expropriate property of American nationals. See, eg., STEPHEN SCHLES-
INGER & STEPHEN KINZER, BriTER FRuIT (1982) (describing the covert U.S. intervention
in Guatemala in 1954 to facilitate the overthrow of the Arbenz government and thereby
protect American-owned United Fruit's holdings in that country); but cf. Goldin, Selective
Access, supra note 121, at 79-SO ("Americans with substantial property abroad or at sea
might well prefer to provide their own anti-theft defenses, rather than pay for a communal
army which cannot be counted on to protect their property.").
125. The United States arguably used military force during the Gulf War of 1991 to
assure itself access to Mideast oil at prices lower than would have been available if Saddam
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Unpacking national defense as a set of goods and services thus
invites the question whether the production of strategically-important
goods might be included among that set. Part III has argued that a
state's ability to produce key goods for its own consumption and sup-
ply other states will have the effect of increasing the state's relative
power.126  This additional state power unquestionably can be
deployed to increase the welfare of participants in the political com-
munity, much as a standing army can be used in various ways. At the
same time, if access can be limited to beneficiaries so that free riding
is minimized, then it might be possible to produce so-called public
goods through the private economy.127 Optimal pricing may, how-
ever, involve price discrimination, 128 in which event it may be that a
Hussein had achieved market power in the international oil market through the acquisition
of Kuwaiti oil fields. Secretary of State Baker, in fact, claimed that the principal justifica-
tion for a U.S. action was American "jobs," presumably on the theory that increased oil
prices would raise costs for Western economies, producing a recession of global demand,
and thereby leading to increased American unemployment. See David Hoffman, Baker
Calls Iraqi Threat to "Economic" Lifeline, WASH. POST, Nov. 14,1990, at A25; see generally
DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE Epic QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY & POWER (1991)
(describing the increasing strategic interest of western powers in Middle East oil over the
course of the century).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 68-90 (discussing strategies for enhancing na-
tional power based on inducing relation-specific investments by other 3tates).
127. See Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, ;n THE THEORY OF
MARKET FAILURE, supra note 116, at 111 (concluding that, "given the ability to exclude
non-purchasers, private producers can produce public goods efficiently") [hereinafter
Demsetz, Private Production]. Demsetz notes, however, that the "technology of modern
weaponry may, in fact, make it difficult to exclude non-purchasers from benefiting from
national defense purchases, and national defense might be termed an 'cpproximate collec-
tive good . . . ."' Id. at 113. Demsetz sees the cost of exclusion as the key variable in
determining whether a good can be efficiently produced by the private market rather than
through government intervention. Id. at 126; see also Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and
Enforcement of Property Rights, in THE THEORY OF MARKET FAILURE, supra note 116, at
127, 135 [hereinafter Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights] ('The
cost of excluding those who have not contracted for benefits from the enjoyment of some
of these benefits is so high that a general attitude of letting others bear the cost of defense
can be expected.").
128. See Demsetz, Private Production, supra note 127, at 122 ("There is no single price
that can satisfy all equilibrium requirements under the conditions that have been posited,
that is, under the condition that differences in demand prices can be identified at relatively
low cost."). Demsetz argues that:
[The] problem of identifying and separating submarkets, given the ability to ex-
clude nonpurchasers, is not any different or any more severe for the public goods
than it is for the production of private goods. A monopolist who produces private
goods and seeks to price discriminate must be able to identify ard separate his
markets; undoubtedly, he must cope with the problem of those who seek to mis-
lead the monopolist into thinking their demands are more elastic than they truly
are [that is, that they would substitute to another good if the monopolist raised its
price]. But devices for doing this are available.
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monopolist or group of oligopolists would be better positioned to en-
sure optimal pricing.129 As Harold Demsetz has argued, "an omnis-
cient and efficiency-minded government could do no better." 39 Thus,
even if from a national perspective there are positive national security
externalities flowing from market power in strategic sectors, it is un-
clear that public goods reasoning warrants government intervention to
increase the production of this good.
In sum, while even libertarians agree that the national defense is
one area where the state must play a central role,"'1 this starting point
only begs a series of questions: How much defense is enough? What
constitutes defense? How do we determine whether goods that are
important to the national defense should be supplied by the market or
by the state? Would it be necessary for the government to take action
to assure the optimal production of strategic goods, or do oligopolists
already achieve the same results through rent-seeking behavior in the
political process? One might also want the political process to address
the distributive implications of national security-enhancing policies.'-
But one thing is clear: one might be able to rely on the superior influ-
ence of producer groups in the political process to correct for the pu-
tative underproduction of trade-related national security positive
externalities. This Article now turns, however, to whether domestic
institutional considerations suggest that this corrective mechanism
might also overcompensate for the possible underproduction of trade-
related national security.
B. Separation of Powers in the National Security State-Bias
Toward Rent-Seeking in the Executive Branch
A domestic politics explanation for the degree to which a state
adopts a security-based approach to international trade policy views
Id. at 123 (emphasis in original).
129. See POSNER, supra note 100, at 281 ("If the monopolist can prevent arbitrage, he is
likely to fix different prices to different purchasers depending not on the costs of selling to
them, which are the same, but on the elasticity of their demands for his product. This is
price discrimination.").
130. Demsetz, Private Production, supra note 127, at 123.
131. See, e.g., ROBERT NozicI , ANARcmY, STATE, AND UToPiA 113 (1974) justif)ing
the state as "the dominant protective association wvithin a territory").
132. Government intervention to produce an optimal level of security might also be
justified on grounds other than efficiency, such as the effect national security enhancing
policies play in the reduction of liberty or considerations of justice in the distribution of
national security benefits. Compare JOHN RAWIS, A THEORY OF JusrICE passun (1971)
(setting forth as basic principles for the just state that it maximize, first, the basic liberties
of its citizens and, second, the position of the least advantaged in society).
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public policy as "the output of what actors in the society want,... of
process defined by institutions, or . . .of both variables" in which
"preferences shape institutions and institutions shape preferences
. . . ,"133 Hypotheses about how "institutions shape preferences" can
be drawn from historical evidence. Significantly, recent scholarship
suggests the early modem state adopted policies favoring domestic
oligopolization as an instrument for amassing external influence as
Executive power increased. 34 More recently, the increased demand
for national security issues during the Cold War also was widely asso-
ciated with a shift in power from the legislative to the executive
branches, particularly in executive branch management of govern-
ment expenditures, domestic prices, and tariff and exchange rates.' -' 5
Although the checks and balances in the U.S. Constitutional system
addressed the need to avoid excessive assertions of executive
supremacy, 36 the national security state reposed significant authority
133. See Peter Alexis Gourevitch, Squaring the Circle: The Domestic Sources of Interna.
tional Cooperation, 50 INT'L ORG. 349, 350-51 (1996) (setting out a framework for the
study of the domestic sources of international cooperation and, by parily of reason, inter-
national competition).
134. Some historical evidence suggests that domestic monopolization can facilitate the
production of resources that strengthen the state internationally. See ROBERT B.
EKELUND, JR. & ROBERT D. TOLLIsoN, MERCANTILISM AS A RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY:
ECONOMIC REGULATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 25 (1981) ("In sum, then, we posit
that the pursuit of special favor by individuals was the driving force behind the flourishing
rent-seeking, activities over the mercantile era.... The ascension of mercantilism in the
early part of the era is easily explained by the institutional setting facing the participants in
the process of monopolization.") (emphasis added) [hereinafter MERCANTILISM]; Cf.
GowA, ALLIES, ADVERSARIES, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 86, at 6; and Mo-
ran, Grand Strategy, supra note 86, at 181-82 (outlining a theoretical explanation in the
context of criticizing hegemonic stability theory's account of free trade as a public good).
135. See generally HAROLD KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTnrIlTON (1990); AR,
THUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1974). Schlesinger, in fact, rely-
ing on British historian Hugh Trevor-Roper, drew a fascinating parallel between President
Nixon's use of national security rationales to expand the domestic power of the presidency
and efforts by the Stuart kings of England to assert powers of taxation and revenue-raising
through grants of monopolies in order to finance their wars, leading ultimately to the Eng-
lish Civil War and a brief interregnum. Id. at 266 (discussing the "ship rr oney" controversy
under Charles I); see also Hugh Trevor-Roper, Nixon-America's Chartes 1?, SPECTATOR,
Aug. 11, 1973 ("Like Charles I, [Nixon] found means to raise money and make war without
the consent of the 'political nation."') (quoted in Schlesinger, supra, at 267). Ekelund and
Tollison indeed point to the decline of the monarchy in 17th century England as the institu-
tional change which had the effect of reducing the possibilities for rent-,eeking behavior-
that is, the acquisition of legally enforced monopolies-in Restoration England. See MER.
CANTILISM, supra note 134, at 65-73.
136. Compare Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585-89 (1953)
(expressing concern that national security argument by President could be extended to
subvert constitutional system of checks and balances if it were to be used to allow the
President to seize domestically held property) with Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
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in the President, particularly in strategically significant commercial
questions, largely because many decisions could be made only based
on information not widely distributed to the public. 137 Because of the
concentration of information in channels that were likely to receive
less public scrutiny, public choice theory predicts that decision-making
by the Executive Branch in national security issues is strongly suscep-
tible to rent-seeking behavior, such as that created by firms involved
in defense procurement.13S
Arguably, the same reasoning applies to national security related
agreements, such as the NPT, supplier export guidelines, or even the
HEU Agreement, suggesting that the United States supported these
arrangements in part to seek gains for U.S. producers. It has been
argued that executive branch international lawmaking is generally sus-
ceptible to rent-seeking behavior.139 The strength of this argument
may turn on whether executive branch international lawmaking is
achieved through transparent procedures.
At one extreme, it would appear that multilateral agreements ne-
gotiated in transparent settings and with substantial opportunity for
congressional participation seem no more likely to be susceptible to
rent-seeking behavior than legislative action on domestic issues under
similar conditions of publicity.140 This is not to say that states would
654, 672-75 (1981) (relying on congressional acquiescence as authorization for assertion of
constitutional authority by the President to bar adjudication in a domestic forum of con-
tract claims arising from international transactions).
137. See, e.g., Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp.. 333 U.S. 103,
111-13 (1948) (interpreting the Federal Aviation Act not to require judicial review of the
award ultimately subject to Presidential review of an international air route by the then
Civil Aeronautics Board in part because presidential review might entail consideration of
information that would not be appropriate for judicial review).
138. See MERCANMIUSM, supra note 134, at 25; Stephan, Barbarians, supra note 115, at
757 (an approach to legislative interpretation that "frees the Executive from strict adher-
ence to statutory restraints constitutes a delegation of lawmaking power that carries vith it
no guarantee that executive action will not pander to special interests to the detriment of
the general welfare").
139. Stephan adds that unilateral executive action in international affairs is subject to
the same risks of rent-seeking behavior as executive decision-making in the regulation of
the economy. Stephan, Barbarians, supra note 115, at 75S ("where a measure constitutes
the unilateral exercise of executive power, the barriers to rent-seeking are too low"). For a
general critique of rent-seeking behavior in international lawmaking, see Paul Stephan,
Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 901 (1997).
140. Certain congressional-executive agreements in which the Congress has delegated
authority to the Executive Branch to make international agreements in a multilateral con-
text without significant congressional supervision at the ratification stage might require
and permit judicial scrutiny to avoid rent-creating domestic effects. See, e.g., Trade Act of
1974, §§ 102, 151, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2112, 2191 (1974) (so-called "Fast-Track" pro edures under
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not use multilateral agreements if they could to facilitate rent-seek-
ing.141 Arguably, informal multilateral processes managed solely by
the Executive Branch might be subject to insufficient publicity to
overcome the risk of rent-seeking behavior notwithstanding the par-
ticipation of large numbers of state actors. 42 On the other hand, if
the "compliance pull" of formal international law is still less compel-
ling than that of domestic rules, given the continuing absence of a
common global community,143 it would seem a dubiou:3 rent-seeking
strategy for procedures to invest in manipulating the compliance pull
of informal international norms.'" That said, even informal interna-
which implementing legislation for trade agreements cannot be amended from the text
submitted by the Executive Branch based on the final text of the applicable international
agreement).
141. Posner suggests that oligopolists' "demand for legislative protection may be less
than that of an otherwise similar but more numerous set of competitors." POSNER, supra
note 100, at 525.
142. But cf. Stephan, Barbarians, supra note 115, at 758 (noting that much international
cooperation takes place outside the framework of explicit agreements and occurs rather as
"patterned cooperation, epitomized by the tit-for-tat game," but arguing that "there exists
no obvious reason why cooperation of this sort would more likely reflect interest group
rent-seeking than cooperation based on express agreements").
143. See generally THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMAcY AMONG NATIONS
(1990) (discussing the relevance of international law in terms of its likelihood of inducing
compliance).
144. In the international sphere, at this stage at least, Posner's "more. numerous set of
competitors," POSNER, supra note 100, at 525, may not be able to secure rents from an
international legislative body because, as yet, no international legislative body exists for
the management of economic affairs, although some General Assembly resolutions might
be understood as efforts to take advantage of monopoly power. See United Nations Reso.
lution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR,
17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1963) (adopted by 87 votes to 2, with 12
abstentions) (purporting to authorize host states to render only "apprcpriate compensa-
tion, in accordance with the rules in force in the State" expropriating foreign property
rather than prompt, adequate and effective compensation as required by customary law);
cf. David W. Leebron, A Game Theoretic Approach to the Regulation of Foreign Direct
Investment and the Multinational Corporation, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 305, 342 (1991) (discuss-
ing the threat of efforts to secure quasi-rents in bilateral investment relationships). It re-
mains to be seen whether the new World Trade Organization will move in that direction.
See Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Stendard of Review,
and Deference to National Governments, 90 Am. J. INT'L L. 193, 195 (1996) (concerning the
need for a constitutional approach to the study of the new trade regime). Moreover, the
requirement for virtual universality of acceptance in customary international law also les-
sens the risk that large numbers of competitors can pursue rents through customary law-
making. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38 (1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1031, 3 Bevans 1153, 1179 (defining custom as "evidence of a general practice, ac-
cepted as law"). Nor would multilateral agreements seem to permit ren :-seeking by com-
petitors, since involvement by a large number of states would increase the likelihood of
more publicity in the negotiating process. But cf. Stephan, Barbarians, supra note 115, at
757 & n.18 (alluding to the "possibility that proponents of international lawmaking, in
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tional agreements should be scrutinized for the possibility that they
reflect rent-seeking behavior, especially in cases (such as recent inter-
national efforts to establish supplies guidelines for nonproliferation
reasons) where the international norms they establish are relied upon
as a basis for domestic legislation that might have trade-restrictive ef-
fects. 145 Even efforts at international coordination that seem perfectly
particular technical experts the influential value of whose skills vil1 grow in the face of
international lawmaking, constitute an interest group"). Also, adversely affected states
would always be free not to adhere to the treaty or join and disrupt its implementation.
See, e.g., AniAh CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNrY: COI-
PLiAICF wrrH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 130 (1995) (discussing the
role of antiwhaling states in joining the International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling in order to disrupt its implementation). Thus, bilateral or multilateral agree-
ments, especially those involving relatively minimal congressional oversight and highly
technical matters, would seem more susceptible to rent-seeking behavior, and it seems
doubtful that judicial interpretive techniques could cure explicit language that enforces
monopolistic restrictions on output.
145. See, e.g., Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual Hy-
phen Use Goods and Techniques, white House Press Statement, 748 PLI(Comm 717, 829,
Dec. 9, 1996 (reporting on the October 1, 1996, the agreement of 33 states meeting in
Vienna on July 11-12, 1996 to implement the Wassenaar Arrangement). The so-called
"Wassenaar arrangement," instituting a successor regime to the lapsed COCOM controls
on strategic trade to the former Eastern Bloc, was concluded as a nonbinding international
agreement but was delayed in negotiation largely because U.S. efforts to secure a new
regime were perceived by most major exporters of strategic goods as an attempt to deny
them major new export markets and thereby preserve U.S. leadership in strategic sectors.
Brahma Chellaney, Bad Backfirefrom the New Co-con, ASIAN Wvut. ST. J, Feb. 19, 1996,
available in 1996 WL-WSJA 32274S0. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States
seems to have pursued a more aggressive strategy in achieving dominance in international
arms trade, for example, with U.S. purchases from NATO's European members declining
while the United States has been able to increase its arms sales to those same countries.
The Arms Trade.- Missile Wars, EcoNo!,usT, May 25, 1996, at 72. It has simultaneously
pressured others not to export to countries, such as Iran, which the United States believed
represented a strategic threat, and other countries were positioned to become major ex-
porters. See Lynn Davis, Address by Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and Inter-
national Security Affairs, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Jan. 23, 1996),
<gopher'/lgopher.state.gov.70100ftp°,o3ADOSFan%3AGopher %3 A05 ?320Global%20
Affairs %3AArms%2OControl%20Issues%3A01%20Releases%20--%20 State-
ments%3A960123%20\Vassenaar%20Arrangement> ("The United States has sought and
obtained commitments through sensitive, high-level negotiations that produced bilateral
agreements with Russia and other prospective members [of the Wassenaar Arrangement]
to close down their arms sales to Iran and forego any new contracts involving arms and
arms-related technologies."); but cf. Thomas E. McNamara, Rethinking Proliferation in the
Post-Cold War Era: The Challenge of Technology, 6 U.S. DEV'T OF ST. DISPATCH 928, 931
(Dec. 1995) (Address to the Wilton Park Special Conference, London, U.K., by Assistant
Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, stating- "The U.S. offered to facilitate Russian ac-
cess to the international commercial space-launch market-which did not involve any
transfer of sensitive technology-if Russia committed to abide by the [Missile Technolo,
Control Regime] guidelines.").
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justifiable from a public goods perspective might have a hidden public
choice dimension.146
By contrast, at another extreme, it would appear that bilateral or
plurilateral agreements increase the risk of rent-seeking in interna-
tional lawmaking by the Executive Branch because they facilitate pri-
vate understandings concerning international issues.147 The chief
reason is that large numbers of actors increase the costs of coordina-
tion and the likelihood that controlling access to information neces-
sary to secure rents will surface under scrutiny. Accordingly,
agreements involving small numbers of states may be more likely to
reflect organized producer interests rather than overall welfare. 148
In sum, while a general case against any executive branch interna-
tional lawmaking remains to be made based on public choice reason-
ing, it does seem plausible that the bilateral HEU Agreement was
susceptible to rent-seeking behavior, given the complexity of the sub-
ject matter, limited publicity of its terms, and small nuraber of actors
involved in its initial negotiation. This prediction will be assessed in
Part V.A's detailed review of executive branch policymaking in the
implementation of the BEU Agreement.
146. Restrictions on the dissemination of goods or technology relevant to the prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction can be thought of as restrictions oil output reflecting
rent-seeking. Nonetheless, superficially there seems to be no doubt they would be justified
from an aggregate welfare standpoint given the danger that such weapons might be used
against the exporting country. See, e.g., Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 940,
42 U.S.C. § 2153 (b), (d) (1994) (provided for 90 continuous legislative (lays congressional
review prior to entry into force of agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation, which
under the AEA permit certain kinds of nuclear trade, subject only to enactment of con-
gressional joint resolution of disapproval not vetoed by the President). However, recent
agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation under this statutory regime have involved
such complex provisions for management of nuclear trade, including the assertion a variety
of end-use and end-user restrictions, that their explanation may require several hundred
pages of attachments to the President's Letter of Transmittal to the Congress. See, e.g.,
Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Text of a Proposed
Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Between the United
States of America and the European Atomic Energy Community (EUFATOM) with Ac.
company Agreed Minute, Annexes, and Other Attachments, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 215
(b), (d), H.R. Doe. No. 138, 104th Cong., 1-246 (1995). It would seem cesirable to review
these agreements to determine how much they reflect legitimate national security concerns
and how much they facilitate the exercise of market power by U.S. finns involved in the
nuclear industry. See infra note 170 (discussing the relation between the EURATOM
Agreement and the US-RF HEU Agreement).
147. See Case-Zablocki Act, 1 U.S.C. § 112 (b) (1994) (requiring notification to Con-
gress of agreements binding under international law concluded by the Executive Branch).
148. See POsNER, supra note 100, at 525 ("the fewer competitors there are in a market,
the easier they will find it to organize a private cartel that is unlikely to be detected"); see
also Oye, supra note 78, at 9-11 (discussing ways to change payoff struzture).
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C. Separation of Powers in the Post-National Security State-
Production of Positive National Security Externalities
in the Legislative Process
If, as suggested by Part IV.B, executive branch international law-
making in the HEU Agreement is likely to overproduce international
rent-seeking policies, one might look to the alternative policymaking
institution to compensate. But the legislative branch also, under the
public choice theory described in Parts IV.A and IV.B, might tend to
overproduce policies, such as efforts to increase market power, that
favor producer interests. Yet, policies produced by the legislative
branch in this area may well be optimal because the imperfection in
the political process favoring producer interests may well be balanced
by imperfection in the legislative process that favors consumer inter-
ests, making legislatively-produced policies on the whole more relia-
ble than policies produced by the Executive Branch.
Recall that market theory ordinarily posits welfare maximization
through free trade because exchanges yield gains in utility.149 But a
perfect political market-that is, a democracy of one person, one vote,
in which each person's preferences are given equal weight, each per-
son participates equally, and which therefore yields political outcomes
that reflect the majority's views' 5s--would not account for the possi-
bility of disproportionate gains or losses. It may be that the costs to
political losers exceed the benefits to political winners because the
political winner's gains may be smaller per person than each political
149. This proposition is repeatedly brought to the attention of legislators. See, e.g.,
CBO STmy, supra note 57, at 11 (discussing Fundamental welfare Theorem of economic
theory that "a free market without governmental interventions will provide the most effi-
cient and productive results possible").
150. The U.S. Constitution only recently has been interpreted along these lines for the
purposes of legislative representation. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 56S (1964)
(adopting the one-person, one-vote principles as the authoritative meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in districting cases); Bush v. Vera, 116
S. Ct. 1941, 1955 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 246S (1995) (rejecting argu-
ments that majoritarian democracy precludes minority group representation of their pref-
erences); see LAURENCE TRIBE, ANmRcAN CONSTITIONAL Lw. (2d ed. 19S)
(discussing the equal protection model of U.S. constitutional law); but see Lani Guinier,
The Representation of Minority Interests: The Question of Single.Member Districts, 14 CAR.-
Dozo L. REv. 1135 (1993) (arguing that strong minority group preferences should b. given
weight in the political process perhaps by adopting cumulative voting procedures under
which voters with strong preference for a minority candidate or minority viewpoint could
express their views by assigning their votes to a particular candidate or viewpoint while
voters with less intense preferences would disperse their votes, resulting in an allocation of
votes better reflecting voters' preferences). The Executive, by contrast, is not elected on
the basis of the same one-person one-vote scheme. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XII.
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loser's losses.' 5' Thus, it may be a welfare-maximizing result from the
national perspective when, even if a free and open trading system is
advantageous to the majority of citizens in a particular country, pro-
ducers of strategic goods will have interests that so significantly di-
verge from the nation's general interest in global free trade that they
will be encouraged to organize so that the state will not cooperate
fully in the creation of a free trade regime, at least with respect to the
relevant sector.152 This result might even be acceptable to consumers
who would favor less free trade if they could be compensated by pro-
ducers for gains foregone through a loss of free trade. Ironically, it
seems that the very imperfection of the legislative political market
under the current constitutional law opens the door to the possibility
that rent-seeking by producer groups will not excessively bias legisla-
tive policymaking.
Part V.A of this Article will now assess executive branch and con-
gressional management of the national defense intersection with the
private economy in the privatization of the U.S. enterprise for ura-
nium enrichment services. Briefly, the case substantiates the hypothe-
151. See Ronald H. Coase, Notes on the Problem of Social Cost, 3 .L. & EcON. 1, 2
(Oct. 1960), reprinted in COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 95, 96 (1988). As
Harold Demsetz points out:
Aside from problems of monopoly in government or of errors in calculation, in a
one-man, one-vote democracy, where voters are not for sale, the polling place will
generate information that is based on majoritarian principles rather than on maxi-
mum benefit principles. Thus, suppose some citizens prefer a stronger national
defense but that a majority prefer a weaker national defense. Left to a vote, the
weaker defense will be our chosen policy even though the minority is willing to
pay more than the additional cost required to bring defense up to the level they
desire (and so, if possible, they may hire private police services).
Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, supra note 127, at 140.
Notice that Demsetz's hypothetical assumes a world of inalienable voting rights, so
that votes cannot be transferred to their highest and best uses. The assumption, in the
characterization of the political market, corresponds to the assumption Ronald Coase em-
ploys to show that transaction costs, if high enough to prevent a Pareto-efficient exchange
of rights to impose costs, preclude socially efficient transfers that are necessary to maxi-
mize social welfare. See Coase, Notes on the Problem of Social Cost, supra, at 175-76.
Notice also that Demsetz treats "monopoly in government" as a caveat to his argument.
Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, supra note 127, at 140. Pub-
lic choice theory, in fact, observes that political market outcomes are "imperfect" precisely
on the ground that certain voter groups can organize more effectively in the political pro-
cess to secure, like monopolists in the economic market, outcomes that are not socially
optimal. See supra text accompanying notes 126-130.
152. See, e.g., Conybeare, Trade Wars, supra note 93, at 156 ("changing domestic rent-
seeking coalitions complicated negotiations .... [For example,] somc members of the
King's Council... were not above financing pirate attacks on Hanse ships when their
private gains outweighed their interests as consumers of Hanse imports ").
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sis that executive branch management can result in excessive rent-
seeking. Where a public choice analysis already predicts a high level
of rent-seeking for producer groups in executive branch decision-mak-
ing, a neo-mercantilist strategy of seeking the public good of national
security-enhancing market power would plainly be overkill. Part V.B
supports the prediction that congressional management can be fully
consistent with the production of an adequate level of national secur-
ity externalities derived from strategic goods.
V. Executive Versus Legislative Balancing of Traditional
National Security, Trade Interests, and Competition-
Based National Security Interests in the
USEC Privatization Process
To recap, the standard criticism of the Executive Branch's imple-
mentation of the HEU Agreement has been that, in turning over im-
plementation to USEC, the Executive Branch permitted the private
interest of producers of uranium enrichment services to supersede the
public interest in the transfer of excess nuclear material out of the
former Soviet Union. 153 But if, as argued here, USEC's privatization
in a manner that assures it competitive advantages is an important
element of U.S. national power, then the validity of this naive criti-
cism of executive branch implementation, which seems to be widely
153. See generally Falkenrath, supra note 3. The Director of MIT's Defeme Technoloai
Conversion Center goes so far as to claim that:
what started as a coordinated effort to ensure safe and economical nuclear arms
reductions became a conflict of private interests .... The reason is that U.S.
officials delegated implementation of the deal to a government group-
[USECI-that Congress then turned into a for-profit enterprise. And beha%ing
just like any for-profit enterprise would, USEC tried to lower the price to be paid
to Russia for uranium, basically reneging on the original terms of the agreement.
The Russians, understandably, felt stung and refused, stalling the deal yet another
year.
See Clark C. Abt, Confronting the New Nuclear Threat, TECH. RE\., July 1Mb, at 69-70
(reviewing AvoMING NUCLEAR ANArvC., supra note 3). Privatization, like any legisla-
tive act, can be approached from the public choice perspective. See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan,
HI, Toward a Positive Theory of Privatization-Lessons from Soviet-Type Ecrnomws, 16
INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 173, 174-76 (1996) (advancing two models for explaining privatiza-
tion: one, the welfare hypothesis, under which elites foresee that economic comp2titiven, s
requires privatization; the other, the cartel hypothesis, under which elites seek to continue
to maximize their gains from control of productive resources through privatization. Thus,
one might argue that the privatization decision, like any other government decision, is
prone to maximize private, rather than public, interests.).
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shared in the national security community, would require an empirical
demonstration based on the widest possible fact-finding.154
Enhancing USEC's capacity to secure monopoly rents interna-
tionally-at the expense of the Russian Federation and in coordina-
tion with the Russian Federation, at the expense of third parties-
may, in fact, have constituted a national security-maximizing strategy.
On the other hand, assessing whether the Executive Branch's strategy
went too far in the other direction is a more difficult question. Will
the strategy of maximizing national power through trade that is likely
to be pursued by the Executive Branch-neo-mercantilist rent-seek-
ing, if you will-lead to excessive international predation by the
United States?'55 Would congressional management of policymaking
be better able to balance the pursuit of low-cost, rent-seeking oppor-
tunities against domestic interests in global trade expansion and paro-
chial producer interests? 156 Although specific cases will need to be
analyzed on their particular facts,'157 theoretical analysis can be used
to generate presumptions. Accordingly, Part IV considered theoreti-
cal grounds for predicting the relative tendencies of the two political
154. Abt, for example, relying on the false public and private goods dichotomy, argues
that:
[p]rivatization makes sense for consumer goods, but weapons of mass destruction
call for a different approach. It is not in the interests of U.S. national security to
drastically reduce government subsidies to the Russian nuclear complex, privatize
it, and attempt to make it profitable while also trying to persuade the country not
to market its nuclear technology and fissile materials worldwide.
Nor is such heedless privatization wise when it occurs on our own soil ....
Abt, supra note 153, at 69.
155. As Theodore Moran argues:
along the sophisticated neomercantilist path, national strategists would have to
adopt unilateral and arbitrary measures to fortify the predominance of U.S. firms
and production sites in key industries (imposed import quotas, blocked acquisi-
tions, exclusive technology-development programs, dictated standards for subsi-
dies and dumping) that would ultimately depend on the threat of denying access
to the American market to be accepted. This approach would ddiberately run
risks of generating political divisiveness in the international arena, including mir-
ror-image reaction and possible mutual retaliation to bolster the relative position
of American firms and workers. In short, this approach would constitute the non-
military equivalent of coercive diplomacy.
MORAN, AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY, supra note 112, at 78-79.
156. A strategy that moved "toward a more transnationally-integrated international
system," Moran cautions, "would require national strategists to keep the United States in a
system-maintenance role, bearing a disproportionate share of the burdens, tolerating a cer-
tain amount of free-riding by others, taking the long-term view as the major powers strug-
gled toward common multilateral rules on trade, investment, technology development,
subsidies and dumping, and transborder corporate alliances." Id. at 79.
157. Cf. Stephan, Barbarians, supra note 115, at 764 (describing whether public goods
or public choice arguments are more persuasive as, ultimately, empirical questions).
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branches of the U.S. government and suggested, as a rule of thumb,
that public choice arguments against government intervention should
be given greater attention when a national security policy is deter-
mined by the Executive Branch.
An additional implication that will be addressed in Part VI of this
Article is whether there is a need for increased international institu-
tionalization to avoid excessive predation. To test the theoretical pre-
dictions made in Part IV and provide a backdrop for assessing the
question of international institutionalization for trade and national se-
curity that will be considered in Part VI, this Article will now analyze
the conflicting positions taken by the Executive Branch and Congress
on USEC's privatization. In the process, it will demonstrate that the
two positions represent different strategies for the production of na-
tional power in strategic goods: the Executive Branch, in an approach
it defended on grounds drawing from the public goods argument,
nonetheless pursued international rent-seeking opportunities for
USEC; and the Congress, by contrast, advanced policies that were less
mercantilistic than these sought by the Executive Branch.
A. Public Goods and Strategic Trade Privatization Under the
Executive Branch
U.S. trade-related national security interests in the HEU Agree-
ment had both defensive and offensive dimensions. It was argued
early on that DOE's purchase of Russian HEU could be justified on
commercial grounds as a preemptive strike against potential dumping
or predatory pricing by Russia.' -5 s Even congressional sponsors of
privatization cautioned the Executive Branch that the HEU Agree-
ment would need to be implemented with an eye to its effect on the
privatization of the U.S. enrichment capability.' 59 But access to low-
cost Russian uranium and SWU also potentially gave the United
158. See Gilinsky, supra note 1, at 160 (citing Neff, as arguing that "if the United States
did not buy the highly enriched uranium in one overall deal, the Russians might dump it on
the world nuclear fuel market, with a resultant drop in prices.").
159. On August 3, 1992, Senator J. Bennett Johnston (D-La.), chairman of the Senate
Energy Committee and the Senator most responsible for the privatization effort, wrote to
President Bush that: "uncontrolled release of reactor-grade uranium derived from disman-
tled Russian weapons, whether by the Russians themselves or a third party %%ould
destabilize the world uranium market and lead to a collapse of the United States' enrich-
ment enterprise and domestic uranium industry." Quoted in Gilinsky, id. Senator John-
ston's interest was not limited to USEC's success, since in his home state of Louisiana,
Louisiana Energy Services (LES), a joint venture including URENCO, since 19S9 had
been seeking government approval to become the first privately-ownmed U.S. enrichment
operation. See Favoritism Charged at Site Pick, BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE, Mar. 17, 1995,
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States the ability to adopt predatory pricing strategies
internationally1 60
Congress, however, was unwilling to finance solely for national
security reasons the direct purchase of Russian HEU.' 6' Rather, in
the context of a re-election campaign where his attention to issues of
domestic prosperity was repeatedly challenged, President Bush pub-
licly justified the HEU Agreement as a "foreign policy measure that
can promote our domestic economic well-being."' 162 This is not to say
that the President consciously pursued a grand strategy of neo-mer-
cantilism. But in adopting the Energy Policy Act of 1992, which spe-
cifically endorsed the Executive Branch's decision to make USEC the
U.S. Executive Agent for implementing the HEU Agreement, 163 Con-
at 4B, available in 1995 WL 6315526 (reporting Senator Johnston's influence in recent site
selection proceedings).
160. See Wilson Dizard III, Antidumping Case Petitioners Seek Dumping Duties on
HE; Kyrgyzstan Joins Trade Court Case, NUCLEAR FUEL, July 6, 1992, at 3, available in
1992 WL 2461047 (quoting petitioners' argument that "DOE could augment or supplant its
enrichment of uranium by blending down HEU which would result in significantly lower
operating costs," and that "this HEU is the equivalent of more than 30 years of U.S. pro-
duction of uranium concentrate"); see also Wilson Dizard III, Antidvnping Case DOE
Said to be Trying New Approach to Paying for Russian LEU, NUCLEAR FUEL, Dec. 7,1992,
at 3, available in 1992 WL 2460813 (reporting Russian charge that the U.S. "offered so little
for the Russian material that the LEU deal would amount to government-sponsored
dumping of Moscow's SWU in America").
161. Former NRC Commissioner Gilinsky has argued:
A particularly important aspect of the US-Russian deal as a way of transferring
funds to Russia was that it was budget-neutral. That is, the money for the HEU
would be paid by the Enrichment Corporation's customers. Instead of paying for
electricity to run the enrichment complex, the Corporation would buy enriched
uranium at equivalent cost from Russia. The funds to pay the Russans would not
have to be appropriated by the Congress. This made the whole arrangement
much more appealing to the Congress, which would not have to votn funds for the
Russians when there were so many other domestic claims upon tlem.
See Gilinsky, supra note 1, at 160-61.
162. The President also stated: "At home, this agreement will secure long-term supplies
of less expensive fuel for U.S. customers, with no adverse impact on American jobs. Thus,
this Russian-American agreement illustrates how foreign policy accomplishments can pro-
mote our domestic economic well-being while making the world a safer place." Gilinsky,
supra note 1, at 161 (quoting Executive Statement of August 31, 1992).
163. There is some lingering doubt whether the Energy Policy Acl: required USEC's
designation as executive agent. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486,
§ 1408(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2297c-7(a) (1992) ("The Corporation is authorized to negotiate the
purchase of all highly enriched uranium made available by any State of the former Soviet
Union under a government-to-government agreement or shall assume the obligations of
[DOE] under any contractual agreement that has been reached with any such State or any
private entity before the transition date... [Le., July 1, 1993, when USEC was scheduled to
be established as a government-owned corporation]." Id.) [hereinafter :lie "EP Act"] see
Falkenrath, supra note 3, at 232-33 n.4 (arguing that Section 2297c-7(-) is ambiguous on
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gress seemingly ratified the Executive Branch's public position. By
delegating to the Executive Branch responsibility for setting the terms
for USEC's privatization,164 the Congress made the President USEC's
ultimate master in developing a U.S. negotiating position,"S thus em-
this point); section 1401(a) of the EP Act, by contrast, indisputedly made USEC the exclu-
sive marketing agent for the United States. See Pub. L. No. 102-4S6, § 1401(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2297c(a), ("The Corporation shall act as the exclusive marketing agent on b.half of the
United State Government for entering into contracts for providing enriched uranium (in-
cluding low-enriched uranium derived from highly enriched uranium) and uranium enrich-
ment and related services. [DOE] may not market enriched uranium (including low-
enriched uranium derived from highly enriched uranium), or uranium enrichment and re-
lated services, after the transition date.").
In any event, the Department of State, in hearings on USEC's privatization, seemed to
have assumed that USEC was, under the EP Act, the only lawful Executive Agent for the
United States. In response to Congressman Schaeffer's request for its position on the ef-
fect of USEC's privatization on its role in the HEU Deal, the Department of State asked
for additional legal flexibility in the proposed legislation governing USEC's privatization:
We expect that USEC will continue to be the executive agent to implement the
HEU contract following privatization, and have no plans to reconsider this ques-
tion. We see no basis, however, for legislation granting USEC exclusive rights to
market enriched uranium from the new states that emerged from the breakup of
the Soviet Union once USEC becomes a private company. The February 1993
agreement between the United States government and the government of the
Russian Federation allows either government to change the executive agent upon
30 days notice. We believe that if in the future, for any reason, USEC proves
unable to fully implement the HEU contract, the United States government
should not be prohibited by law from considering other possibilities for the execu-
tive agent to purchase and market uranium products under the HEU contract.
See House Hearing of Feb. 24, 1995, supra note 57, at 61 (emphasis added).
164. Privatization under the EP Act could take place at the discretion of the Executive
Branch. Section 1501(a) provided that "[w]ithin two years of the transition date, the Cor-
poration shall prepare a strategic plan for transferring ownership of the Corporation to
private investors." Section 1502(a) provided that the USEC "may implement the privatiza-
tion plan if [USEC] determines, in consultation with appropriate agencies of the United
States, that privatization will" meet certain substantive conditions, namely that it: "(1) re-
sult in a return to the United States at least equal to the net present value of [USEC]"; (2)
not result in [USEC's] being owned, controlled, or dominated by an alien, a foreign corpo-
ration, or a foreign government"; (3) not be inimicable to the health and safety of the
public or the common defense and security"; and (4) provide reasonable assurance that
adequate enrichment capacity will remain available to meet the domestic electricity utility
industry." Section 1502(b), however, explicitly provided that "[USECI may not imple-
ment the privatization plan without the approval of the President," thus giving the Presi-
dent veto power on privatization and a sword of Damocles hanging over USEC's head.
165. The President exercised his indirect power to induce USEC on at least two occa-
sions to make advance payments to MINATOM in order to achieve U.S. disarmament
objectives in Ukraine. See Annex to Trilateral Statement, supra note 27; but see
Falkenrath, supra note 3, at 257 (noting that after July 1, 1993, the Executive Branch lost
all "formal" authority over USEC's operations). USEC officials repeatedly argued that
USEC should not be required to pay a "national security premium" for Russian HEU,
which might impair USEC's successful privatization by requiring it to take on inventory
that it would be unable to sell, thus raising its costs of production. See GAO REPoRT,
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powering the Executive Branch as an institution to pursue rent-seek-
ing strategies.
In exercising this delegation of authority, the Executive Branch
managed the antidumping issue and HEU purchase in order to maxi-
mize USEC's competitive posture in the run up to privatization. Ini-
tially, USEC declined to purchase Russian HEU until it was able to
obtain prices beneath its own cost of production.166 The matched
sales program under the Amended Suspension Agreement ultimately
enhanced USEC's market power in the U.S. market,167 as did the
HEU Agreement itself in deterring Russia's independent entry into
the U.S. enrichment market. 6 Matched sales, arguably, also raised
supra note 52, at n.34 ("In the past, USEC officials have stated that the corporation should
be compensated for what it termed the 'national security premium,' or the difference be-
tween its marginal price and the price it pays for enrichment services under the implement-
ing contract."). But in negotiations with Congress on privatization, USEC declined to
advance this argument. Id. ("USEC officials strongly state that this is no longer their posi-
tion and that they are not currently advocating that the government reimburse the corpo-
ration for the difference between its marginal cost and the contract price.").
166. Because, under long-term leases held and managed by DOE for USEC's benefit,
USEC receives power at cost, see GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at n.4, i: is argued that the
U.S. Government has subsidized USEC's production and thereby undercut any incentives
it might have to purchase Russian HEU. See Falkenrath, supra note 3, at 243 n.18, 280.82
& n.86 (citing studies by Thomas Neff and Mozelle Thompson) (citations omitted). But
this argument fails to take into account that Russian SWU production may receive a siml-
lar subsidy. See Hibbs, Antidumping Case Europe Will Resist Pressure "o Follow U.S. An-
tidumping Suit, supra note 57, at 5, available in 1992 WL 2461115 ("one European utility
official said that the cost of electricity faced by URENCO is three times more than Russian
enrichers pay for power"). It also fails to account for the disproportionately high environ-
mental clean-up costs USEC would face in the United States. Compare supra note 57;
Michael Knapik & Wilson Dizard III, U.S. Weapons May be Given to USE to Aid Econom-
ics of Russian Deal, NUCLEAR FUEL, May 24, 1993, at 1, available in 1993 WL 2421846
(reporting explanation of U.S. government official that the reason overfeeding was un-
economical was that because "USEC becomes responsible for the management and dispo-
sal of tails produced after" it becomes a government-owned corporation on July 1, 1993).
167. It was reported that the matched sales agreement, "according to a number of ana-
lysts, also increases the leverage of USEC in the market. It also provides an opportunity
for U.S. producers to sell uranium to USEC. This would allow USEC and the Russians to
conclude matched uranium product deals without fear of criticism from U.S. mining inter-
ests." Michael Knapik, Special DOC, MINATOM Sign Amended Agreement Providing for
'Matched' U/SWU Sales, NucLEA FUEL, Mar. 15, 1994, at 1, available in 1994 WL
2223571.
168. As the General Accounting Office (GAO) observed in a report to Congress on
options for USEC's privatization, the HEU Agreement might be seen as vertical integra-
tion between USEC and the Russian enrichment enterprise, Tenex. GAO stated:
USEC recognizes the economic value of being the executive agent under the
HEU agreement. The global uranium enrichment industry has four major produ-
cers: USEC, Tenex, Eurodif (a French-Belgian-Spanish-Italian-lianian consor-
tium), and URENCO (a British-Dutch-German consortium). According to
USEC, the market for enrichment services has become highly competitive be-
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the costs for USEC's rival European SWU producers,169 paving the
way for an export strategy for USEC to "dump" lower-cost Russian
SWU in Europe as part of a predatory campaign. 170 The European
market may have presented an inviting target to predatory U.S. strate-
cause the nuclear power industry has been growing slowly while the world's ura-
nium enrichment capacity has been expanding. The implementing contract
enables USEC to control a large volume of material while, at the same time.
giving Tenex the opportunity to take advantage of USEC's marketing ability.
Without this opportunity, Tenex might be tempted to compete directly with the
corporation by developing its own marketing ability.
See GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at text accompanying note 34 of the GAO Report.
169. USEC's option to purchase such large quantities of uranium might have the effect
of tying up enough worldwide supply to drive up the price of remaining supplies of ura-
nium, thereby raising European SWU producers' costs. See generally Krattenmaker &
Salop, supra note 47, at 236-39 (discussing antitrust "bottleneck" or :essential facilities"
doctrine and the "supply squeeze" or "quantitative foreclosure" strategies). Indeed,
USEC's acquisition of the option to purchase Russian HEU may amount to the strategic
acquisition of excess capacity, with the effect of deterring potential competition in uranium
enrichment services market. See generally Oliver Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strate-
gic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE LJ. 284 (1977) (arguing that a predator might build a
plant at a larger than optimal size for maximizing short-run profits in order to deter entry
by maintaining excess capacity that would allow the predator to increase output, thereby
lowering market prices to the point that a new entrant operating at an efficient scale of
production would fail, while still pricing above its marginal cost).
170. On December 31, 1995, statutory authority for U.S. nuclear exports to the EC
lapsed with the expiration of the U.S. Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation with
the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). See U.S.-EURATOM Agree-
ment, supra note 17, at 91. Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the succes-
sor agreement required 90 days advance congressional consideration before the President
was statutorily-authorized to bring it into force. See Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §123(b),
(d), 6S Stat. 940, 42 U.S.C. § 2153 (b), (d) (1994). In testimony to the Senate Committee
on Governmental Affairs during that waiting period, the chief American architect of the
agreement, Fred McGoldrick, argued:
The new agreement with EURATOM is also important for implementing the
agreement between Russia and the United States to purchase low enriched ura-
nium from 500 tonnes of high enriched uranium from dismantled Russian nuclear
weapons. As the U.S. government agent for executing this agreement, USEC %vill
need the European market to sell this material.
See U.S. EURATOM Agreement, Testimony of Fred McGoldrick, State Department Bu-
reau of Politico-Military Affairs, Feb. 28, 1996 (Federal Document Clearing House), avail-
able in 1996 WL 7136435. These exports might be considered predatory if they reflected
pricing below cost of production. LEU derived from Russian HEU would, as the president
of the U.S. uranium producers trade association argued to Congress, be "available to be
sold at the marginal cost of blending it down-a cost significantly below the production
cost of even the most efficient producers available today." See Testimony of Dale L. Al-
berts, President Uranium Producers of America Before the Senate Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources, June 13, 1995, (Federal Document Clearing House), available in
1995 WL 365922 [hereinafter Alberts Testimony]; cf. Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner,
Predatory Pricing and Related Practice Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 8S HARv. L
REv. 697 (1975) (arguing that, in theory, predatory pricing is indicated by pricing below
marginal cost).
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gies, given Europe's high energy costs and the absence of barriers in
EC law to low-cost imports. 7 '
In sum, the Executive Branch's neo-mercantilist policies reflected
efforts to maximize the public good of national security gains through
exploitation of low-cost Russian goods and services. The secretive-
ness of the policymaking process and the absence of explicit congres-
sional authorization laid the groundwork for rent-seeking predicted
by public choice theory that resulted in an exceptional example of
U.S. predation. Meanwhile, congressional opposition swelled to the
apparent Executive Branch policy of strategic use of Russian re-
sources to pursue monopolistic gains for USEC in world uranium
markets. U.S. worker interests, as well as domestic producers in com-
petition with USEC, would be harmed by turning USEC into a colos-
sus that relied on Russian, rather than U.S., goods and labor to
compete internationally.'72
171. See, e.g., Commission Decision 93/428 on a Procedure for the Application of the
Second Paragraph of Article 53 of the EAEC Treaty, 1993 0.1. (L 197) 54, 55. The Com-
mission of the European Communities [the Commission] decided that the European
Atomic Energy Community [EAEC] Treaty did not obligate the European Supply Agency
[ESA] to require European consumers to purchase excess Portuguese capacity because:
the applicable rules authorize Community users to negotiate with the producers
of their choice. Neither the EAEC nor the Secondary Legislation provide for
'Community preference,' and the Agency is therefore not required to order Com-
munity users to obtain supplies from Community producers before they can con-
clude supply contracts with non-Community suppliers.
Id.
172. Senator Wendell Ford, Democrat from Kentucky, noted that:
under the HEU Contract USEC will make the sales, but [blending] will be done
in Russia rather instead [sic] of at [USEC's Paducah plant] in Kentucky or at
[USEC's Portsmouth plant] in Ohio. [Congress] set up [USEC] to protect Ameri-
can jobs and America's energy security.... We did not set it up to be just a
broker. We expect [USEC] to remain a producer. We did not set it up to finance
foreign policy initiatives, or to solve budget woes of other domestic programs.
We expect [USEC] to maintain and enrich this nation's enrichment capabilities.
See Pamela Newman, Republicans Slam Clinton Nuclear Budget Proposal, 22 ENERGY
DAILY KING COMMUNICATIONS GROUP (1994), available in 1994 WL 2489737 (quoting
remarks at Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Hearing on confirmation of
USEC Board of Directors). In hearings on USEC's privatization, Congressman Schaeffer
added: "Congress should not support any proposal which would give the new Corporation
a competitive advantage over other private businesses at taxpayer expense." See House
Hearing on Feb. 24, 1995, supra note 57, at 2. Opposition to Executive Branch waiver
authority was intense, given the perception that such authority would serve as a precedent
for a general weakening of trade law. See Wilson Dizard III, Enrichment: Administration
Seen Stalling, Then Backing Off Waiver in USEC Sale Bill, NUCLEAR FUEL, Jan. 29, 1996,
at 2, available in 1996 WL 8610878 (reporting that "Staffs of the Ways & Means and Fi-
nance committees have been receiving numerous telephone calls frcm attorneys in the
trade law community opposing the waiver authority measure.").
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B. Public Choice and Strategic Trade Privatization Under
Congress
Although additional congressional action was not necessary for
USEC's privatization, 173 Congress asserted itself and ultimately over-
turned Executive policymaking without abandoning the strategic
dimensions of USEC's privatization. Assured that USEC had within
its grasp next-generation technology that would make it an effective
international competitor, 174 Congress pursued a privatization strategy
designed to reduce USEC's ability to extract economic rents interna-
tionally in the short-term yet ensure that it would be an effective mar-
ket competitor in the long-term.
Two factors seemed to play a role in initiating Congressional ac-
tivism. By spring 1995, congressional leadership was finally forced to
confront the effect of predatory pricing on U.S. uranium producers by
173. Congress reserved for itself only the right to be notified of USEC's intent to pro-
ceed with privatization, and assured itself the right to receive the Comptroller General's
assessment of certain financial implications of the privatization plan within 30 das of re-
ceiving that notice. See the EP Act, supra note 163, § 1502(c). There may have been tech-
nical details that required minimal congressional intervention, given gaps and ambiguities
in the EP Act. USEC President William Timbers stated:
Although no new major legislation is required for privatization, technical legisla-
tive changes are needed. These changes include clarifications and other changes
to existing law that would enhance the value of the Corporation thereby maximiz-
ing the return to the government-and the American taxpayer. Private investors
likely will place an increased value on USEC if the future relationship between
USEC and the government is defined as clearly as possible. To the extent that
technical and other amendments to the law can achieve this, USEC's value should
be enhanced. In addition, such changes increase the likelihood that USEC wvill
continue in the private sector as a profitable domestic supplier of uranium enrich-
ment services and a cornerstone of the nuclear industry.
See Prepared Statement of William H. Timbers, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer,
United States Enrichment Corporation, House Hearings of Feb. 24, 1995, supra note 57, at
12; see also Testimony of Representative Scott Kug, id. at 5 (referring specifically to the
following technical changes: "We must authorize the sale of USEC as a private entity
under federal and state corporation laws. We must repeal laws exempting USEC from
State and local taxes or otherise treating it as a federal agency. We must protect private
investors from liabilities for operations of USEC while it wvas still under the control of the
federal government. And we must ensure the rights and obligations of parties to contracts
with DOE and USEC, that they wvill not be terminated or affected by privatization.").
174. USEC President William Timbers told Congress: "The Corporation believes that a
new enrichment method called Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation or AVLIS is a U.S.
technology that can lower productions costs for uranium enrichment. It gives the Corpora-
tion a measurable competitive advantage for the future. We are in the feasibility and
predeployment stage regarding AVLIS." House Hearing of Feb. 24,1995, supra note 57, at
12.
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sellers of excess HEU derived from weapons. 175 At the same time,
implementation of the HEU Agreement had been stalled in light of
the U.S. agreement not to implement the matched sales program in a
manner inconsistent with Canada's rights under NAFTA and
GATT. 1 76  Accordingly, Senator Domenici proposed permitting
purchase of Russian uranium for future introduction in the U.S. mar-
ket, with the objective of effecting immediately some compensation to
Russia for the uranium feed component of LEU transferred under the
HEU Agreement. 77 This was done through a discounted price associ-
ated with sales in a futures market, delaying the impact of that addi-
tional supply on the U.S. market, but still giving USEC the
opportunity to realize some, albeit diminished, monopoly rents.178
175. In characterizing the problem as one posing the risk of predatory pricing, Senator
Domenici noted that:
[LEU] derived from [HEU], regardless of its country of origin, has suddenly be-
come available in large quantities and, for the most part, in order to be sold in the
commercial market, is being offered at prices significantly below its total produc-
tions costs. Material once required regardless of cost, is now available to be sold
at the marginal cost of blending it down-significantly below the production costs
of even the most efficient producers in operation today.
See 141 CONG. REc. S. 6082-04, S. 6106 (May 3, 1995) (Statement of Senator Domenici on
Introducing USEC Privatization Act) [hereinafter Domenici Statement]. It is noteworthy
that he employed language virtually identical to that used little over a month later by the
representative of the U.S. Uranium Producers Association in congrestional testimony on
the Domenici bill. Compare Alberts Testimony, supra note 170. Clearly, the two were
speaking from the same script.
176. In introducing his proposed solution, after noting the Amended Suspension
Agreement's impact on preventing importation of LEU derived from HEU under the
HEU Agreement, Domenici said:
In addition, the Department of State has recently reached an undcrstanding with
Canada on the implementation of the Suspension Agreement particularly as it
pertains to the natural uranium component of the low-enriched uranium derived
from highly-enriched uranium. That understanding stipulates that such material
could be used only in the operation of the U.S. Enrichment Corpcration [e.g. for
overfeeding purposes], for sale in accordance with Section IV.M of the Suspen-
sion Agreement [e.g. outside the United States], or it could be retu -ned to Russia,
Those commitments place severe restrictions on the ability of the United
States to implement the [HEU Agreement] .... While USEC may sell the
separative work units into the commercial market, the Suspension agreement and
the understanding with Canada prevent USEC from selling the vast majority of
the natural uranium derived from the agreement. While USEC is technically ob-
ligated to pay the Russians for the natural component only when it is sold or 2013
[the expiration of the HEU Agreement], whichever comes first, Russia has made
it clear that failure to pay for the natural uranium upon delivery jeopardizes the
entire HEU agreement-clearly a detriment to United States na.tional security
interests.
Domenici Statement, supra note 175, at S. 6106. See also infra Part 1V.
177. Domenici Statement, supra note 175, at S. 6106.
178. Senator Domenici stated:
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Senator Domenici sought to harmonize the multiple U.S. interests at
stake:
In addition to the benefits to the Russians, the United States gains
because the Suspension Agreement and commitments made to Can-
ada would stand. The USEC privatization is able to proceed with-
out the uncertainty of a potential $4 billion obligation [namely, the
duty to pay Russia at a later date for the natural uranium compo-
nent of the LEU], and because the Suspension Agreement contin-
ues in its current form, the United States industry is allowed to
continue to operate according to market conditions. 17 9
The congressional policy thus reflected recognition that the issue
for decision was not a choice between trade and national security in-
terests but, rather, a choice as to how to maximize trade and national
security interests.
An approach maximizing both nonproliferation concerns and
trade concerns entailed tradeoffs that would reduce the potential na-
tional security gains from USEC's privatization, gains which Congress
needed to downplay. Thus, Domenici presented USEC's contingent
liability of payment for Russian natural uranium as a burden that
might complicate USEC's privatization, since a firm, such as a priva-
tized and non-monopolistic USEC, would need to minimize risk to
ensure the confidence of the financial markets where privatization
would ultimately be tested.1 80 What Senator Domenici did not add
was that, in removing USEC's de facto monopoly on the importation
of Russian natural uranium under the HEU Agreement, his proposal
would dramatically undercut USEC's ability to employ predatory
This legislation proposes an innovative remedy to this situation. Simply put, natu-
ral uranium displaced by low-enriched uranium imported under the HEU Agree-
ment would be deemed to be of Russian origin and . .. be subject to the
Suspension Agreement and the understanding with Canada [except] that it could
be sold for commercial end use in the United States starting in 2002 according to
a schedule defined in the legislation.
Under this proposal, the Russians would be able to sell natural uranium de-
rived from the HEU Agreement for future deliveries, in effect establishing a fu-
tures market. The price the Russians would be able to derive for the material
sold now as futures would be dependent upon the conditions of commercial
agreements between the Russians and any private investment entity, and would
vary depending on predicted prices in the year 2002 and beyond.
Id. at S. 6106-07. See also Falkenrath, supra note 3, at 287-S9 (commenting favorably on
the proposal).
179. Domenici Statement, supra note 175, at S. 6107.
180. See GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at apps. II and III (discussing the multiple fac-
tos at stake in arriving at a reasonable assessment of USEC's net present value and, there-
fore, the likely proceeds from privatization for the U.S. Government).
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pricing strategies both domestically and internationally. 181 Recogniz-
ing that the planned introduction into the market through USEC of
the United States' own HEU stocks derived from the dismantling of
the United States' own excess nuclear warheads could have the same
effects as the BEU Agreement, Senator Domenici also proposed re-
strictions that would ensure that such transfers to USIEC would not
afford it excessive market power. l' The bill even removed USEC's
monopoly as the distributor for the U.S. Government of enriched
uranium and uranium enrichment services. 183 Finally, unlike the origi-
nal EP Act, which effectively exempted USEC from U.S. antitrust
law,184 the Domenici approach mandated full compliance with U.S.
181. See supra notes 168-70 (discussing the effect of low-cost Russian supplies on
USEC's competitive position).
182. Senator Domenici stated:
The United States also has significant, undetermined inventories of excess highly-
enriched uranium and low-enriched uranium. This legislation establishes a series
of requirements that must be met before material may enter the civilian market.
Prior to the privatization date, [DOE] may agree to transfer up to 4 million
separative work units and 7,000 metric tons of natural uranium to LJSEC. How-
ever, that material may be delivered for commercial end use only according to a
defined disposition schedule. Additional material, transferred to USEC from
[DOE] following privatization may also enter the commercial market. However,
prior to any such sale, [DOE] must conduct a full rulemaking to determine that
the sale of the material will not have an adverse impact on the domestic mining or
enrichment industry.
Domenici Statement, supra note 175, at S. 6107. Rulemaking proceedings would enable
consumer groups to argue that excess HEU and LEU transfers would give USEC market
power in the United States that could be used to the detriment of U.S. consumers. With-
out market power in the U.S. market, USEC's ability to finance predatory pricing strate-
gies internationally would be undercut. See supra notes 137-46 (discussing the role of
publicity under public choice theory in undercutting neo-mercantilism).
183. Section 1401(a) of the EP Act of 1992 had provided that:
The Corporation shall act as the exclusive marketing agent on behalf of the
United States Government for entering into contracts for providing enriched ura-
nium (including law-enriched uranium derived from highly enriched uranium)
and uranium enrichment and related services. [DOE] may not market enriched
uranium (including low-enriched uranium derived from highly enriched ura-
nium), or uranium enrichment and related services, after the transition date.
EP Act, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1401(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2297c(a). Public Law number 104-34,
however, deleted the first sentence of this provision, permitting DOE to turn to other
entities to market U.S.-owned SWU and uranium feed; cf. S. REP. 104-280, vol. 1, Provid-
ing for Reconciliation Pursuant to Section 105 of the Concurrent Resolut.ion of the Budget
for Fiscal Year 1996, Oct. 17, 1996, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cmtrpt File.
184. It appears Congress initially wished to leave open the door to predatory rent-seek-
ing for national security reasons by USEC only slightly. The EP Act formulation gov-
erning the applicability of U.S. antitrust law was less than categorical, providing only that
"The Corporation shall conduct its activities in a manner consistent wi:h the policies ex-
pressed in the antitrust law, except as required by the public interest.... ." Section 1605(a)
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by EP Act of 1992. The meaning of the
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antitrust laws in the future and left open the possibility that even fu-
ture matched sales might be subject to antitrust challenge.'-' In sum,
Senator Domenici's proposal dramatically reduced the likelihood that
USEC could become an instrument for a neo-mercantilist strategy by
the United States.
The Executive Branch reacted negatively to the new Congres-
sional approach. Instead of accepting the congressional synthesis of
trade and nonproliferation interests, the Executive continued to pur-
sue maximizing USEC's access to low-cost Russian supplies, advanc-
ing with USEC's approval a proposal for a waiver of the antidumping
"public interest" exception is less than clear. Legislative history suggests, however, that
Congress fully understood that national security grounds might argue for a relaxation, but
only in extreme instances, of limits imposed by U.S. antitrust law on collusion with, or
predation against, competitors. In explaining comparable earlier language, the Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources stated:
New AEA Section 1605 requires the USEC to conduct its activities consistent
with the antitrust laws, although as a Federal agency the USEC is not subject to
them. The Committee believes that it would be inappropriate to make the USEC
and its officers and employees subject to the antitrust laws because the Corpora-
tion remains part of the Federal Government. The Committee intends, how ever,
that the USEC avoid any collusive behavior with foreign competitors or any an-
ticompetitive practices. The Committee believes that the instances in which the
common defense and security or other aspect of the public interest outweigh the
aspects of the public interest protected by antitrust policies will be rare, but in
such instances the Corporation should act as the overall public interest requires.
See S. REP. No. 102-72 (1991), accompanying S.1220. The Executive Branch may have
used this crack to open fully the door to using USEC for international rent-seeking.
185. See H.R. REp. No. 104-537, § 5 (1996), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cmtrpt
File ("For purposes of the antitrust laws, the performance by the private corporation of a
'matched import' contract under the Suspension Agreement shall be considered to have
occurred prior to the privatization date, if at the time of privatization, such contract had
been agreed to by the parties in all material terms and confirmed by the Secretary of
Commerce under the Suspension Agreement."). Testifying on June 13, 1995, a leader of a
worldwide uranium trade organization had noted that S. 755 [the initial Domenici propo-
sal] would give USEC antitrust immunity for actions, namely matched sales, undertaken
while it was still a government corporation, and argued: "we believe that, while the legisla-
tion is not intended to provide antitrust protection to USEC for actions taken after priva-
tization, the Committee should take this opportunity to clarify the antitrust concerns for all
market participants." See Prepared Statement by Joe Colvin, Executive Vice President,
Nuclear Energy Institute, Before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources United
States Senate (Federal News Service), available in 1995 WL 103S7397. See also Report of
the General Accounting Office to the Honorable Scott Kiug: Budget Issues-Pri%atizatiord
Divestiture Practices In Other Nations, Dec. 15, 1995 GAOIA1MD 96-23 (Federal Doeu-
ment Clearing House), text at n3, available in 1995 WL 757706 (reporting that in other
countries, "friestructuring also included breaking up monopolies prior to their sale"). It
should be noted that the effect of applying U.S. antitrust laws to USEC wvas only to prevent
activities by USEC having an anticompetitive effect in the U.S. market, since nothing in
the U.S. antitrust laws prevents U.S. persons from harming consumers overseas. CBO
STuDY, supra note 57, at 10.
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law.1 36 Indeed, USEC and MINATOM, in the context of discussing
joint ventures,"s which would enhance USEC's market power by al-
lowing it to sell below other producers' costs both in the United States
and elsewhere,18s seemed to collude to support the Executive Branch
waiver proposal over the competing congressional plan.18 The Exec-
utive Branch even sought to condition its support for the congres-
sional revision of the terms for USEC's privatization."5'0
186. In the official records of USEC and MINATOM's meetings in Moscow on June 13-
15, it was noted that:
Under current U.S. policy, USEC cannot dispose of the feed material in the U.S.
A discussion ensued regarding efforts to enact legislation pernritting the sale
of the feed component in the U.S. without penalty. The Administration legisla-
tive proposal, if passed, would facilitate sales of feed materials to U.S. consumers
by USEC, allowing USEC to promptly pay Tenex for feed delive-ed. USEC is
supportive of this proposal because it would resolve the feed payment issue.
MINATOMJTenexIUEIP appreciate USEC's efforts and are supportive of any
proposal which will result in full and prompt payment for the natural feed
component.
If because of a change in law USEC is permitted to sell feed materials with-
out restriction in the United States, USEC will pay for all feed material delivered
to it prior to the enactment of the enabling law for which it has nat paid.
Record of Moscow Talks Bared, NUCLEAR FUEL, July 3, 1995, at 9, available in 1995 WL
7929669 (printing Protocol of Talks, Held in Moscow on June 13-15, 1995 Between
MINATOM/TENEXIUEIP and USEC).
187. Id. Point 4 of the June 1995 Protocol states: "In a meeting with [MINATOM]
Minister Mikhailov on June 14, both parties expressed a desire to seriously explore joint
venture possibilities." 1d. at 9
188. See supra notes 168-69.
189. On June 14, 1995 MINATOM Minister Shishkin wrote to USF.C Vice President
Rifakes:
We were previously made aware of the Domenici Senate proposal which provided
for some relief, but does not fully solve the payment problem. Yesterday you told
us about an administration proposal supported by USEC that, if passed, would
result in payment by USEC of the total value of the LEU when received. We
appreciate your efforts in this regard. While how this is accomplished is a matter
internal to the United State, we support any effort that results in the fulfillment of
our payment objectives.
We have always anticipated payment in full for enriched urardum accepted
into the United States. Anything less is clearly unacceptable to us. We support
your efforts to resolve this vital issue.
Record of Moscow Talks Bared, supra note 186, at 9 (citing June 1995 Protocol).
190. See USEC Privatization Stuck in Limbo until Compromise on Russian Waiver
Reached, ENERGY REP., MAR. 4, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8375627 ("White House offi-
cials claim that if the so-called antidumping suspension agreement falls through, the
United States will impose large tariffs on the HEU and risk the deal's economics"); see also
Wilson Dizard III & Michael Knapik, New Solution to Waiver Issue Proposed; USEC to
Pick CAMECO, GE for AVLIS Work, NUCLEAR FUEL, Mar. 25, 1996, at 1, available in
1996 WL 8610975 ("The Clinton Administration for months has backed a provision grant-
ing the president authority to waive the antidumping laws as they might affect the HEU
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In spring 1996, a compromise proposal appeared under which the
revenues from USEC's privatization would be used to pay antidump-
ing duties on the uranium component of the Russian HEU, with the
effect of permitting the uranium feed component's immediate intro-
duction in the U.S. market.191 A few days later, Graham Allison, pro-
fessor of government at Harvard and former Clinton administration
assistant secretary of defense, suggested that the impasse be resolved
with the immediate purchase of all available Russian HEU for storage
in the United States.192 USEC's president, William Timbers, coun-
tered that the "Russians want the blending down of the HEU to be
done in their country .... " Timbers added: a "commercial contract is
the best way to deal with the Russian HEU..., [since] USEC can
assure the fissile material is removed from Russia, and also ensure the
world uranium market does not become glutted because of it. m" 93
Either proposal would have satisfied USEC's interest in not paying
for goods it could not market, which would undermine its privatiza-
tion.194 But the first would have shifted to the taxpayer the cost of
paying for any national security gains derived from assisting USEC in
becoming a monopolist, and the second would have precluded the use
of the material to secure market power for the United States.
In the end, Congress rejected both the presidential waiver and
the proposal for a national security purchase in which antidumping
duties would be funded from the proceeds of USEC's privatization.
Instead, it enacted the USEC Privatization Act, which provided for
the introduction of the Russian HEU uranium feed component into
the U.S. market beginning in 1998 and permitted Russia immediately
to sell uranium that could be imported at a later date, though un-
doubtedly for discounted prices.' Thus, after a year's delay exacer-
deal. Opposition to the proposed waiver authority in Congress has however, become over-
whelmingly strong in recent weeks.").
191. See USEC Privatization Stuck in Limbo Until Compromise on Russtan Waiver
Reached, supra note 190; Dizard & Knapik, supra note 190, at 1.
192. See Internationak USEC Head Says U.S. Purchase of All Russian HEU Not Likely,
NucLEAR WASTE NEWS Apr. 11, 1996, available in 1996 WL S09007.
193. Ld.
194. See Thomas W. Lippman, Plan for Fuel from Russian Bombs Snarled U.S. La'
Protecting Uranium Miners Complicates Deal, PrrrsnuRGH-POST GAZETE. June 27, 1995,
at A4, available in 1995 WL 3390449 ("USEC cannot simply give the Russians the money
up front because it would be stuck with uranium for which there is no current market and
such a burden on its balance sheet would preclude privatization.").
195. See USEC Privatization Act, Section 3101 of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescis-
sions and Appropriations Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 note 2296b-7; see also Wilson
Dizard m, USEC Privatization Bill Now is Law, DOE Calls feeting on GDP Safety, Nu.
CLEAR Fum., May 6, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL 5611251 ("The law also provides for
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bated by a budget impasse that had nothing to do with the substance
of the bill,196 the initial congressional plan that balanced a wide range
of U.S. interests prevailed,197 even garnering executive branch recog-
nition that U.S. national security interests had not been
compromised. 98
The differing approaches taken by the Executive Branch and
Congress in the case of USEC's privatization thus seem consistent
with the predictions of public choice theory described in Part IV of
MINATOM to choose whether to sell the uranium component through the matched sales
provision of the antidumping suspension agreement, or for overfeeding enrichment plants
in the United States. The law provides MINATOM the option of directing USEC as the
U.S. executive agent of the HEU deal to engage an independent entity to auction off the
uranium component for future use in U.S. reactors.").
196. See 142 CONG. REc. S. 5391-92 (daily ed. May 20, 1996). Sen. Murkowski stated:
The USEC privatization bill was included in the reconciliation package which was
vetoed for reasons having nothing to do with the USEC language. The USEC
privatization bill was then presented as a stand-alone bill that was placed on the
Senate calendar, and the language emerging from our consensus was finally in-
cluded in the Omnibus Appropriations bill that was recently signed by the Presi-
dent and enacted into law.
id.
197. Senator Murkowski aptly described the Congressional effort as follows:
[The U.S. uranium enrichment] enterprise suffered under the yoke of government
control, and it has steadily lost market share to competitors around the world. As
the result, the maintenance of a secure, economical domestic enrichment capabil-
ity was at stake.... We had conflicts between the desire to implement a Russian
enriched uranium purchase agreement and the legitimate interests of enrichment
plant workers and uranium producers. We had conflicts between plant workers
and plant management. We had conflicts between USEC and other entities that
desired to get into the enrichment business. We had tough issues tc resolve that
impacted every player in the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle, including ura-
nium producers, converters, enrichers, fuel fabricators, and utilities. To compli-
cate the picture, we had to address all these thorny issues in a manner that would
maximize USEC's value without inhibiting competition in the enrichment market.
Id. at S. 5391-92.
198. Two days before the USEC Privatization Act was approved by tha President, Lynn
Davis, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, in
effect conceded that waiver of U.S. antidumping had not been necessary after all to imple-
ment the HEU Agreement, stating:
In Moscow last week, we achieved Russia's final approval of transparency meas-
ures that will give us confidence that the material provided under this contract
originated from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons. Let me note that imple-
menting this HEU contract has been highly complex, involving financial and
trade law considerations, as well as sensitive national security issues The deal is
now on track and functioning, to the benefit of both the United Sates and Russia.
See Lynn E. Davis, Address to the American Bar Association, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 24,
1996), 7 U.S. DEP'T OF ST. DISPATCH 212-13 (1996). Subsequently, implementation of the
HEU Agreement proceeded at an accelerated pace. See Thomas W. Lippman, 5-Year Pact
Set for U.S. to Step Up Buying Enriched Uranium From Russia, WASi-t. POST, Nov. 24,
1996, at A20.
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this Article. Yet the issue was not decided entirely by domestic sepa-
rations of powers and political considerations, although the capture of
the 104th Congress by the Republican party undoubtedly also played
a role in the willingness of the Congress to assert itself on foreign
policy issues.199 The case also demonstrates that the transfer of man-
agement of the issue from the Executive Branch to Congress was facil-
itated by the influence of international law in blocking the Executive
Branch's preferred neo-mercantilist policies.2"0
Indeed, confirmation of the theoretical predictions made in Part
IV about the relative tendencies of the two branches suggests that, if
the Executive Branch is to manage strategic trade issues, international
institutions will need to play a moderating role if the Executive
Branch is to achieve results comparable to those achieved by Con-
gress. Admittedly it seems that, in the case of USEC's privatization,
international law considerations did not persuade the Executive
Branch to adopt a cooperative approach from the very beginning.
That international institutions frustrated an offensive policy yet did
not compel a defensive policy is consistent, however, with the ambig-
uous status of the new international institutions. Even though the in-
ternational legal system is experiencing a period of intensified
constitutional activity, it is still unclear, as Part III argued, whether
these recent efforts signify a permanent increase in the cost of offen-
sive rent-seeking or reduction in the incentives for defensive rent-
seeking that will radically restructure domestic decision-making on
national security issues.201 Accordingly, the role described in Part V
played by international institutions in the domestic U.S. decision-mak-
ing process invites an inquiry, albeit preliminary, into the relationship
between international trade law institutions and domestic processing
of national security issues.
Part VI first analyzes how the treatment of the specific national
security claim posed by the HEU Deal benefited from the special
treatment under NAFTA that impeded excessive rent-seeking by the
Executive Branch and served separation of powers functions by chan-
neling the management of the uranium issue to the Congress. Given
the key role played by the NAFTA security exception in the manage-
199. USEC could not, for example, escape targeting as a source of revenue onder the
proposed Contract with America Tax Relief Act. See 141 CONN. REc. H. 4213-t2, 4247-43
(daily ed. Apr. 5. 1995) (debate concerning committee jurisdiction over tax proisiors (if
USEC Privatization Act).
200. See Lippman, supra note 194, at A4.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 6S-114.
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ment of the nonproliferation/trade policy debate, this Article ad-
vances a tentative proposal for exploring the interpretation of the
GATT/WTO security exceptions as justiciable so as to induce greater
transparency in the domestic decision-making process for the produc-
tion of trade-related national security externalities.
VI. International Constraints on Domestic Balancing-The
NAFTA and GATT National Security Exceptions
Theoreticians insist that a critical variable for assessing how do-
mestic institutions structure policymaking in national security issues is
whether management of an issue, which is important to a domestic
constituency, has been institutionalized internationally: -'[I]nstitutions
themselves spawn their own constituencies, who each have a stake in
the perpetuation and growth of the system.' '202 A complete account
of the constitutional elements that affect policy formulation must as-
sess both the domestic and the international institutional structures.
Thus, an exploration of the role of domestic institutional structure in
this policy production process necessitates consideration of the role of
international institutions.20 3
This Article now argues that, in the case of the HEU Agreement,
practice corroborates the theoretical prediction of the relevance of in-
ternational institutions in domestic policymaking. In the initial imple-
mentation of U.S. antidumping law and the HEU Agreement and in
202. See Gourevitch, supra note 133, at 364; see also Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mat-
tli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 INT'L ORO. 41-76
(1993).
203. In the case of trade relationships between the United States and Japan, for exam-
ple, in contrast to the high level of international institutionalization of tie management of
trade issues in the European Union, policy preferences seem mediated primarily by domes-
tic constitutional structures. See Gourevitch, supra note 133, at 36S-71. Gourevitch argues
that increased cooperation between the United States and Japan would require the United
States to "reduce consumption and increase savings by instituting such measures as higher
taxes, less government spending, tax incentives to save rather than consume, and restrictive
monetary policy," while Japan would need to "relax various trade restrictions (cartelization
of retail distribution, extensive regulatory barriers, and ownership and investment rules),
lower interest rates, increase spending, and cut taxes." However, "[e]aih of these actions
provokes opposition from the domestic beneficiaries of the status quo." Id. at 368.
Gourevitch notes that the domestic institutionalist would explain the failure of policy har-
monization, in the case of Japan on, among other things, its system of administrative gui-
dance, which reduces transparency and facilitates exclusionary practices, and its formerly
multimember electoral system, which favors specialized interests opposed to free trade,
and, in the case of the United States, on the relatively unstructured United States political
process, which allows protectionist groups to have a strong voice in Congress, and Con-
gress' recent denial of so-called "Fast Track" authority to the President (undercutting pros-
pects for free trade agreements). Id at 369.
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privatizing USEC, executive branch policymaking in the initial stages
was inadequately constrained by GATT due to the absence of com-
pulsory dispute resolution and the possibility of invoking the relevant
national security exceptions. Once the NAFTA and WTO compul-
sory dispute resolution procedures became effective, however, the
likelihood of legal review of U.S. policies increased, arguably encour-
aging the United States, and especially the Congress, to adopt some-
what less predatory international trade policies with respect to
USEC's privatization, the HEU Agreement and the Antidumping
Suspension Agreement. More important in explaining the shift in the
U.S. position, however, was the possibility that the non-self-judging
security exception rather than the general self-judging exception,
under NAFTA might apply. Also, arguably, because the lack of clar-
ity in the meaning of the GATT and, to a lesser extent, NAFTA na-
tional security exceptions, predatory strategies were not sufficiently
constrained by law to deter continuing efforts by the Executive
Branch (described in Part V) to secure market power. This was the
case even after the dispute with Canada was provisionally settled, be-
cause congressional intervention ultimately was necessary to secure a
settlement balancing national security and trade interests. This out-
come suggests, therefore, that the current NAFTA and GATT na-
tional security exceptions in the future will play increasingly more
important roles in resolving domestic policy disputes. Accordingly,
this Article concludes with a preliminary argument for interpreting
the GATT national security exception in a way that would comple-
ment the revised constitutional character of the new WTO and better
serve U.S. domestic policymaking interests of optimizing rent-seeking
behavior in the production of national security goods.
A. NAFTA's Special International Constraints on Rent-Seeking
Behavior
The analysis of legal constraints on economic security policymak-
ing occurs within the context of a body of international economic law
that is nowhere near as developed and complete as some might think.
Although the chief vehicle for international rent-seeking is the exer-
cise of market power, there seems to be relatively little international
institutionalization of an international competition law,2V4 with the
204. See Compare American Trade Policy: War Cancelled, supra note 105, at 72 (noting
that Kodak chairman George Fisher testified before a congressional committee that -the
Japanese government's toleration... of systematic anti-competitive activities that blo:k
market access for American and other imported products simply is not covered by NVTO
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possible exception of an emerging regime under NAFA. °5 On the
other hand, there may be somewhat more international institutional-
ization for processing issues governing the use of trade-based meas-
ures, such as dumping or subsidies, to maximize monopoly rents in
international trade. 0 6 In theory, the use of antidumping or counter-
vailing duties is also limited under GAT" by the WTO Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding,20 7 creating the appearance of rule-based limits
on rent-seeking behavior by states for national security reasons. Even
there, however, the degree of institutionalization seems incomplete,
thus leaving substantial room for predatory behavior. °
Yet, any legal justification for national security-related use of an-
tidumping or countervailing duties to support USEC's market power
and effective privatization should be framed explicitly in terms of the
rules."). Cf. Diane P. Wood, International Competition Policy In a Diverse World: Can One
Size Fit All?, in EC AND U.S. CONMETTIVE LAW AND POLICY 71-85 (Barry Hawk ed.,
1992) (questioning the possibilities and, in some cases, the desirability of policy harmoniza-
tion in international competition law).
205. NAFTA contains the beginnings of a competition regime. See NAFTA, supra note
50, ch. 15 (Competition Policy, Monopolies and State Enterprises). Although it does not
articulate criteria for defining anticompetitive activities, it contains the key obligation that
when a party creates a monopoly as a matter of state policy, it will "endeavor to intro-
duce ... such conditions on the operation of the monopoly as will minimize or eliminate
any nullification or impairment of benefits.. . ." Id. art. 1502(2)(b). The NAFTA recog-
nizes the provisional nature of the effort by providing for a working group report within
five years on "relevant issues concerning the relationship between competition laws and
policies and trade in the free trade area." Id art. 1504. It is not clear that study of the
relationship between competition laws and the security exceptions would be addressed by
that report.
206. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade of 1994 (Antidumping Code) and Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures, WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 98, annex IA.
207. See WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding arts. 16.4, 17.14; see also Agreement
on Safeguards, art. 11, supra note 98.
208. See, e.g., Moran, Grand Strategy, supra note 86, at 193 n.40 (arguing that the WTO
Antidumping Code, as applied to strategic trade, permits substantial protectionism). Mo-
ran points out that producers ordinarily sell at marginal cost and that, for high-technology
goods, marginal costs of production do not flatten out until well into a pioduction run. Id.
He therefore argues that the Antidumping Code's requirement that the foreign producer
cost calculations, which serve as the basis for imposing antidumping duties on imports,
reflect costs at "the end of the start-up period," inflates the statutory baseline for assessing
whether a foreign producer is selling below cost. Id. Accordingly, he argues that, in "high-
tech industries ... antidumping measures based on average cost ... without adequate
recoupment of start-up expenses, are strongly exclusionary." Id. In implementing a trans-
national integrative approach to national security, see supra note 113, Moran argues that,
in addition to "whether the new agenda of trade negotiations on competition policy, labor,
and the environment heightens or diminishes the exclusionary measures available to par-
ticular regions," the new WTO should be amended, inter alia, "to change the test for an-
tidumping." Id. at 195.
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security exceptions rather than the anti-dumping regime. The persis-
tent, pretextual use of these indirect tools for national security reasons
would seem to undermine the appearance, if not the reality, of re-
straint. National security concerns are channeled to general national
security exceptions under GATr 2 9 and NAFTA, °10 applicable only in
209. GATT Article XXI provides for three distinct security exceptions:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of
which it considers contrary to its own security interests;
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are
derived;
(ii) relating to traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to
such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly
for the purpose of supplying a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relation; or
(c) to prevent any contracting party, from taking any action any action in pursu-
ance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of
international peace and security.
GATI art. XXI. Exceptions (a) and (b) seem relevant to rent-seeking behavior for strate-
gic purposes. Exception (c) contemplates, at a minimum, actions required under Articles
25 and 103 of the U.N. Charter, in which a state is bound to implement -the decisions" of
the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. There has not yet been a
mandatory, Chapter VII decision on this subject, however, relating to the danger of loose
nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union, much less nuclear materials generally, which
drives the U.S. nonproliferation interest in the HEU Agreement. However, given the gen-
eral duty under Article 2(5) of the Charter to "give the United Nations every assistance in
any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter," exception (c) may also extend
to other actions by the Security Council, or even General Assembly, in an area %ithin its
competence. See Louis B. SoHN, Riolrrs iN CoNFLcr: THE UNrrED NATIONS AND
SouTH AFRICA 69 (1994) (arguing that General Assembly resolutions may ba given effect
under Article 25). Even if this were so, however, it would still be quite a stretch to argue
that Security Council and General Assembly statements concerning the general risks of
nuclear proliferation would provide a basis for invoking Article XXI(c) in a case where a
state unilaterally determined steps it would take to implement a goal articulated by the
United Nations. See, e.g., Security Council Summit Statement, Note By the President of tie
Securit, Council, U.N. Doc. S/23500, at 4 (1992), reprinted in 31 LL.M. 758,761.
210. NAFTA Article 2102 contains provisions similar to GATr Article XXI except that
NAFTA Article 2102(1)(b)(iii) replaces GATT Article XXI(b)(i)'s language "relating to
fissionable materials" with an exception for actions "relating to the implementation of na-
tional policies or international agreements respecting the nonproliferation of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." Arguably, the NAFTA exception includes
not only export control regimes mandated by treaties, such as the NPT, but also supplier
guidelines not expressly required by the NFT but consistent with its larger purposes. See,
e.g., The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, IAEA Doe. INFCIRCa254 (June 1977)
(including restraints with respect to technology transfer, notwithstanding absence of limits
on technology transfer in the NF'', except possibly regarding the nuclear weapon state's
obligation not to assist another state in the acquisition of nuclear weapons). NAFTA also
contains a separate security exception covering only the energy sector. See NAFTA, supra
note 50, art. 607 (discussed infra notes 219-21).
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cases involving a state's "essential security interests," ' Thus, if
GATT and NAFTA are to serve as effective institutional constraints
on domestic policymaking in the national security area, the bounda-
ries for invoking their national security exceptions need to be deline-
ated. Otherwise, the national security exceptions would be as much
subject to pretextual use for offensive strategic trade policies, as well
as unnecessary defensive policies and protectionism, 21 2 as the an-
tidumping and countervailing duties exceptions are susceptible to ex-
cessive protectionism.
Arguably, just as GATT could be understood to tolerate a certain
degree of protectionism,213 WTO and NAFTA would rationally toler-
ate a politically optimal level of national security. The security excep-
tions to international economic treaty law might be understood, then,
as efforts to encourage only optimal levels of national security in stra-
tegic trade. Mining the text of the original GATT exception, for ex-
ample, one finds acknowledgment of national security-based policies
for strategic trade. GATr Articles XX(b)(i) and (ii) focus, respec-
tively, on "fissionable materials or the materials from which they are
derived" and action "for the purpose of supplying a military establish-
ment." '214 The precise scope of each exception and the interrelation-
ships between them is not altogether clear from the text, however.
Article XX(b)(i), under the interpretive convention of lex specialis,15
would seem to be most relevant to the specific case of the interna-
tional trade in uranium.1 6 That provision would also seem to be
broader than Article XX(b)(ii), since the latter on its face requires an
inquiry into the "purpose" of the action which a state seeks to defend
against GATT challenge, while the former is applicable whenever the
action "relates" to "fissionable materials." Yet, the question of "pur-
pose" is addressed elsewhere in the text in a way that makes that ele-
211. See GATT art. XXI; NAFrA, supra note 50, art. 2102.
212. National Security tests have been seen by most commentators as especially suscep-
tible to manipulation. See, e.g., Sykes, Mandatory Retaliation, supra note 105, at 316.
213. Based on public choice theory, it has been argued that the GAT contemplated a
politically optimal level of protectionism, meaning that the right to engage in a certain
level of protectionism during implementation of a trade agreement would give states the
confidence necessary to make trade concessions at the negotiation stage. See Sykes,
Mandatory Retaliation, supra note 105, at 316.
214. See supra note 209.
215. See LASSA OPPENHEIM, 1 OPPENHEIM INTERNATIONAL LAW 1272-73 (R. Jennings
& A. Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
216. Uranium is the so-called "source" material from which fissionable U235 is sepa-
rated, see supra note 23, and thus is "material from which" a fissionable material "is de-
rived" for purposes of GAT' Article XX(b)(i).
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ment of Article XX(b)(ii) a chimera. Article XX(b)'s mythological
qualities flow from the possibility that Article XX's preambular lan-
guage concerning its scope. That is, "any action" by a state "which it
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security inter-
ests"-means literally what it says.2 17 NAFTA also arguably regulates
most strategic trade with a similarly self-judging security exception.21s
In the case of the HEU Agreement, the apparent weakness of the
general security interests exception did not control the situation.
NAFrA contains a special, non-self-judging security exception gov-
erning trade in energy "goods." 219 One might consider the U.S.-Can-
ada dispute relating to strategic trade in uranium and uranium
enrichment services as an experiment in the effect of changing the se-
curity exception to be non-self-judging. Canada had the right under
NAFTA to pursue GATT dispute resolution, which would encompass
NAFTA as well as GATT violations that formed the basis of Canada's
objections.22 It may not be unreasonable to surmise that, in deciding
to resolve its dispute with the United States over the matched sales
217. But cf. Antonio F. Perez, Survival of Rights Under tie Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty: Withdrawal and the Continuing Right of International Atomic Energy Agency Safe-
guards, 34 VA. J. IN"L L. 749, 774-96 (1994) (arguing that similar language in the NPT
should, in the light of its unique context and purpose, together with subsequent practice
and negotiating history, be construed in accordance with its literal meaning).
218. See NAFTA, supra note 50, art. 2102.
219. Article 2102 of NAFTA is expressly made subject to Article 607. See NAFTA,
supra note 50, art. 2102. Article 607 provides that, as between the United States and Can-
ada, but not Mexico:
no Party may adopt or maintain a measure restricting imports of an energy or
basic petrochemical good from, or exports of an energy or basic petrochemical
good to, another Party under Article XXI of the GATI or under Article 2102
(National Security), except to the extent necessary to: (a) supply a military estab-
lishment of a Party or enable fulfillment of a critical defense contract of a Party;
(b) respond to a situation of armed conflict involving the Party taking the mea-
sure; (c) implement national policies or international agreements relating to the
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; or (d)
respond to direct threats of disruption in the supply of nuclear materials for de-
fense purposes.
Id. art. 607. The Article 607 formulation thus narrows the grounds for which the exception
may be invoked. See Anne Marie Godin, Canada's International Obligations to Provide
Energy Under the EIP, GATT, and NAFTA, 1 GREATmR N. CENr. NAT. RESOURCES J. 71,
98 (1996). The requirement of "necessity" remains. But the chief difference between Arti-
cles 607 and 2102 is that the former does not employ the self-judging, "it considers," lan-
guage found in the latter. Id
220. NAFTA Article 2005(1) permits "any matter arising under both" NAFTA and
GAT' to "be settled in either forum at the discretion of the complaining party." Thus, in
the case of Canada's challenge to the U.S. matched sales program, although Canada ini-
tially invoked its right to "consultations" under NAFTA Article 2006, rather than GAIT.
if it were to resurrect its claim, the substance of Canada's argument-which is based on the
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program through the NAFTA procedures, Canada took account of
the fact that NAFTA might be more likely than GATT to apply a
NAFTA principle, the non-self-judging security exception for the en-
ergy sector, that had no apparent counterpart in GATT.
Admittedly, Canada's evaluation of its dispute resolution strat-
egy would certainly have been more complicated and qualified than
that. For example, there may be doubts about the applicability of the
non-self-judging NAFTA security exception in the matched sales pro-
gram, which involved not only energy "goods" but also energy serv-
ices.221 And if the non-self-judging exception were inapplicable,
national treatment concept of the GATT, see supra note 50-would e'ititle it to a WTO
dispute settlement forum. NAFTA, supra note 50, art. 60.
221. It is not clear, for example, whether the exception would have been fully applica-
ble to the U.S.-Russia matched sales program challenged by Canada on national treatment
grounds. The matched sales program extended not only to matched sales of displaced
natural uranium feed but also of SWU. See supra note 44. Because uranium is the basic
energy input in a nuclear power reactor, one might reasonably argue that displaced natu-
ral uranium feed, which is treated as a constructive import of natural uranium upon the
importation of smaller quantities of LEU, is an "energy good" for purposes of NAF'A
Article 607. But the larger component of value in the importation of LEU under the HEU
Agreement and Contract is SWU, which arguably represents the provision of a service.
See supra note 23. Article 607's reference to an "energy good" may then be inapplicable to
the SWU component. A similar characterization issue arises in the L .S. law of contract
under the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), Article 2, which applies to the sale of
goods only, causing considerable uncertainty in cases of the mixed provision of goods and
services. See, e.g., Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532
F.2d 572 (7th Cir. 1976) (trial and appellate courts disagree on whether construction of a
water tank was provision of a service or delivery of a good). If the services dimension of
the matched sales program predominated, arguably the whole measure would be governed
by Article 2102. Cf. Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951,960 (8th Cir. 1974) (leading American
case distinguishing sales from services for U.C.C. Article 2 purposes by employing a "pre-
dominant factor" test). Moreover, adjudication of the SWU component, to the extent it
was separable from the matched sales program as a whole, might have been subject instead
to the Article 2102 security exception.
Because Article 2102 tracks the GAIT formulation, Canada would need to address
the question whether Article 2102's language is self-judging. One might possibly argue
that if the GATr exception could be construed to be non-self-judging, see infra text accom-
panying notes 231-236, then Article 2102's virtually identical language might be similarly
construed. However, because NAFTA contained the parallel Section 607 exception that
lacked the self-judging language of Article 2102, the NAFTA text would tend to undercut
any argument that Article 2102 was not self-judging. Moreover, the U.S. Congress ex-
pressly took the view that the Article 2102 "national security exception is self-judging in
nature, although each government would expect the provisions to be applied by the other
in good faith." See North American Free Trade Implementation Act, ch. 21 (exceptions),
Pub. L. 103-182, 107 Stat. 1057 (1993), available in 1993 WL 561204. For a critique of the
limits of good faith as a control device in auto-interpretation, see Perez, supra note 217, at
778-82.
Yet the services dimension of the problem would have encouraged Canada to rely on
NAFTA, given GATr's inapplicability to services before WTO entered into force. While
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Canada would be faced with the clearly self-judging general exception
under NAFTA. Also, at least with respect to Canada's GATT claim,
the United States might have been able to invoke GATT Article
XX(b) even under the NAFTA dispute resolution without risk of re-
view. It is also conceivable that, if Canada's NAFTA claim were sub-
stantively grounded only on its GATT rights, even Canada's NAFTA
claim would be subject to the limitations governing its GAIT rights,
including the same self-judging security exception as might be avail-
able to the United States under NAFTA.mz Most important, it is diffi-
cult to rule out the possibility that Canada chose to utilize the NAFTA
rather than the GATT procedures simply because, as of 1994 when
the dispute arose, only the compulsory dispute settlement procedures
of NAFTA were available to it,2 while the new Dispute Settlement
Understanding of the WTO had not yet entered into force and the old
GAT" system would permit the United States to block action. 224
Nonetheless, it seems plausible to argue that the tightened NAFTA
security exception for energy sector claims played a part in Canada's
dispute resolution strategy.
It seems to follow, then, that a global non-self-judging security
exception under the WTO would also restrain international predation.
the SWU component of the matched sales program could have been addressed through
the GATT, NAFTA clearly provided a foundation for a Canadian national treatment claim
in relation to services. Compare NAFTA, supra note 50, art. 1202(1) ("Each party shall
accord to service providers of another Party treatment no less favorable than it accords, in
like circumstances, to its own service providers."), widt GATr art. XVII (proiding that it
is only "[i]n the sectors inscribed in its Schedule," in which, pursuant to Article XX( 1)(b)
members indicate "conditions and qualifications on national treatment," must a member
"accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures
affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favorable than it accords to its own like
services and service suppliers.").
222. This argument would need to hurdle the barrier that there are textual differences
even between GATr Article XXI and NAFTA Article 2102, the two general security ex-
ceptions. But, for these purposes, the differences between the GATT "fissionable materi-
als" exception and the NAFIA "nonproliferation" exception, especially as applied to
nuclear nonproliferation, would seem to be immaterial, since the principal difference be-
tween the two seems to relate to the emergence of new non-nuclear weapons of mass
destruction. See, eg., Williamson, supra note 17, at 147-50 (discussing the informal re-
straints on the export of missiles under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
that are related to nuclear nonproliferation).
223. See NAFrA, supra note 50, arts. 210S-09 (requiring implementation of panel re-
ports and, in the alternative, suspension of benefits).
224. See also JACKSON ET AL, LuGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONO.4zC REL.-
TONS, supra note 96, at 342-43 (moving from positive to negative consensus for adoption
of panel reports and automatic retaliation). For a discussion of the move from trade poli-
tics to legalism, see generally G. Richard Snell, Trade Legalism and International Relations
Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DuKE LJ. 829, 848-53 (1995).
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Accordingly, the next section of this Article considers the possibility
that Canada might have a similar opportunity to employ GATT now
that the WTO has entered into force. In brief, it suggests a possible
legal argument for interpreting the security exceptions available under
the WTO as non-self-judging.
B. The Transformation of the GATT National Securty Exception
into Law
The national security exception is new in the WTO in the
straightforward sense that it is included in the new multilateral trade
agreements.2z But its language has not changed from the old GATT.
The language of Article XXI seems to expressly confer upon the Con-
tracting Party the power to make a unilateral determination that can-
not be questioned, since it applies to what "it considers" to be its
"essential security interests. 226 Moreover, to the extent negotiating
history,' 7 subsequent agreements,2 8 and (setting aside the discrepant
U.S.-Nicaragua case discussed below) subsequent practice 2 9 shed
225. Formulations identical to GATT Article XXI are also found in GAIT Article XIV
Bis & TRIPs Article 73.
226. GATT art. XXI.
227. See James R. Wilch, GATT and the Half-Life of Uranium Industry Protection, 10
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 150, 182 nn.199-200 (1991) (reporting GATI dafters' reliance on
only "the spirit" of the exception as a check against its abuse) (citations omitted).
228. See Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement, GATT Doe. LI
5426 (Dec. 2, 1982); GAT' Doc. SR 38/10, at 2-3 (Dec. 16, 1982); 29th BISD, at 23-24
[hereinafter 1982 Decision]. The operative provisions state:
1. Subject to the exception in Article XXI: a contracting parties should be in-
formed to the fullest extent possible of trade measure taken under Article XXI.
2. When action is taken under Article XXI, all contracting parties affected by
such actions retain their full rights under the General Agreement.
3. The Council may be requested to give further consideration to this matter in
due course.
Id, The language seems to confirm the self-judging character of Artizzle XXI: operative
paragraph 1 is only precatory; operative paragraph 2 reaffirms only whatever rights parties
may have under the GATr without specifying what those rights, if any, might be; and
operative paragraph 3 indicates the possibility of further action by the CATT Council, thus
confirming that there may be a need for further action. But see Michael J. Hahn, Vital
Interests and the Law of GATT: An Analysis of GATT's Security Exception, 12 MICH. J. OF
INT'L L. 558, 575 (1991) (reading these clauses to support a non-self-judging interpretation
of Article XXI).
229. See, e.g., Request of the Government of Czechoslovakia for a Decision Under art.
XXIII, June 8, 1949, GAIT' Doc. GATr/CP.3/SR.22, at 7, available in LEXIS, Exec Li-
brary, GAT File (statement of U.K. representative Mr. Shackle) [hereinafter Czechoslo-
vakia Request]. This statement has been relied on by authoritative commentary on the
GATT to manifest the self-judging character of Article XXI. See JACKSON, ET AL., LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONoMIc RELATIONS, supra note 96, at 984.
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light on the meaning of article X, the better view is probably that
the exception was self-judging. One might argue, however, that the
new GAT under the WTO has a meaning different from the old
GATr, because the new WTO represents a constitutionalization of
the GATT system as a forum for the management of international
trade and new international legislation, 0 which flowed in part from
dissatisfaction with the abusive use of economic sanctions by major
powers during the Cold War. 1 This dissatisfaction stemmed in par-
ticular from the U.S. sanctions against Nicaragua considered by a
GATr panel in the United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicara-
gua case (the "Nicaragua Trade Measures case"), 2 where, at the
United States' insistence, the terms of reference for the Panel con-
vened to address Nicaragua's claims explicitly precluded consideration
of the motivation or validity of the United States invocation of Article
XXI.2 33
The Panel's mandate thus reflected the limitations of the proce-
dural framework of GAT Article X I, which grew out of a non-
judicial model of GAT dispute resolution as a negotiating forum for
the satisfactory resolution of disputes.3 However, the new Dispute
Settlement Understanding of the WTO, which conceives of the dis-
pute settlement system as "a central element in providing security and
predictability to the multilateral trading system," -s entrenches a
more adjudicative model as the framework for WVTO dispute resolu-
tion. Because each nation could block consensus on adoption of a
panel report under the old GATT system, its concurrence on terms of
230. See JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL EcoNo.izc REs."
-iONS, supra note 96, at 301-04 (discussing the fruition of the FOGS, or Future of the
GATF System, in the new Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) for international sur-
veillance of national policy, and the creation of the wO as a new international organiza-
tion, which would "promote a sense of legal and practice continuity with the GATF),
Professor Jackson has suggested that the new institutional structure -offers more flexibility
for future inclusion of new negotiated rules or measures which can assist nations to face
the constantly emerging problems of world economics. For example, already mentioned
for such attention are ... competition policies." Uruguay Round Legislation Hearings
Before the Senate Finance Comm., 103d Cong. 2d Sess. 195 (Mar. 23, 1994) (testimony of
John H. Jackson, Hessel E. Yntema Professor of Law University of Michigan).
231. See 1982 Decision, supra note 228, at 1 3.
232. See United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, Report by the Panel
(Unadopted), Oct. 13, 1986, GAIT Doe. I16053, at para. 1.3 [hereinafter Nicaragua Trade
Measures].
233. See Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, Mar. 12, 19S6, GAIT Doc, CIMJI96, at
7; see also Nicaragua Trade Measures, supra note 232, at para. 1.3.
234. See generally JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GAIT, supra note 95, at 163-S9
(tracing evolution of GAIT dispute resolution procedures as a move from politics to law).
235. WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 98. art. 3(2).
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reference for a panel was essential. With the new requirement for
consensus to block adoption, the new adjudicative syslem also elimi-
nates blocking power with respect to terms of reference.236 Thus, the
central premise for the Panel Report's reasoning in the Nicaragua
Trade Measures case no longer remains: WTO dispute settlement bod-
ies, unlike GATT panels, are no longer colleges of arbitrators apply-
ing only the legal rules, and sometimes only problematical versions of
the legal rules, the parties to the dispute agree for them to apply.
Consequently, this change might well have implications for the sub-
stantive interpretation of the essential security interests exception.
If NAFTA's impact on rent-seeking behavior in the national se-
curity decision-making process is a useful precedent, it might well be
fruitful to pursue an interpretation of the GATT essential security in-
terests exceptions as a vehicle for reducing incentives for rent-seeking
behavior in U.S. national security decision-making.
VII. Summary and Conclusions
This Article has argued that optimal national security policymak-
ing gives attention to industrial structure and its consequent market
power in sectors that are significant for national security. This ap-
proach is consistent with the increasing perception that economic
competition will supplant military competition as the chief barometer
of national power. Together with the reduced perception of direct
military threats from other great powers, the strategic economic per-
spective drives policymakers toward giving priority in U.S. national
security decision-making to long-term economic considerations, over-
turning the Cold War pattern in which the U.S. exchanged markets
and resources for short-term political or military gains.
Traditionally, it has been argued that politico-military considera-
tions can be more effectively managed with the secrecy and dispatch
that can be achieved only in the Executive Branch.237 Indeed, it has
been thought under a public goods perspective, that legislative domi-
nance of national security will lead to distorted policymraking and un-
derproduction of national security. Under this reasoning, it might be
suggested that national security will be optimally produced in the do-
mestic political process only when primary authority for its production
236. See JACKSON, ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMic RELA-
TIONS, supra note 96, at 342-43 (discussing the move in violation and nonviolation nullifica-
tion or impairment cases from positive consensus for adoption of Panel Report to adoption
absent consensus).
237. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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is reposed in the Executive Branch. This is so, it is argued, because
the body most insulated from the give and take of normal politics will
be best positioned to assess the optimal level of a public good (such as
those features of the economy that have national security significance)
that would not be produced at its socially optimal level in a fully com-
petitive political system.
As this Article has argued, however, as demonstrated in the Ex-
ecutive Branch's and Congress's conflicting strategies for USEC
privatization in relation to the purchase of Russian uranium from dis-
mantled nuclear weapons, the Executive Branch's approach toward
strategic economic policy may well be biased toward monopolistic or
rent-seeking strategies. Congress's approach, by contrast, is more
likely to optimize national security-related strategic goods production.
The monopolistic or rent-seeking approach is more likely to be per-
ceived internationally as posing a threat to other countries, thus en-
gendering reciprocal strategies by other states. Congress, by contrast,
may well produce a more optimal level of national security because its
decision-making is likely to be relatively more transparent and, as the
Russian HEU case suggests, more likely to balance explicitly the vari-
ous dimensions of national security that are involved in particular
situations.
Yet it is probably fair to say that, although Congress did a better
job than the Executive Branch in balancing the competing interests in
the purchase of Russian uranium, much is still left to be desired. An
adequate effort would have entailed articulating the national security
rationale for preserving a U.S. uranium mining capability, notwith-
standing significant foreign ownership, as the justification for an-
tidumping duties and for assuring U.S. dominance of the uranium
enrichment industry as the justification for U.S. Government subsidies
for the U.S. Enrichment Corporation. These national security ratio-
nales would then need to be balanced against the short-term gains of
assuring that excess Russian nuclear materials are not transferred to
revolutionary states, such as Iran, Iraq and Libya. Ideally, the Execu-
tive Branch would make explicit its argument for the national security
optimality of the purchase of the Russian uranium and not try to bury
the costs of the purchase in USEC's operating costs.
As the role of NAFTA suggests, an international law requirement
that the United States defend its use of trade-based strategies to fur-
ther national security policies under a justiciable national security ex-
ception may well direct the domestic policymaking process into a
more explicit recognition of all the costs and benefits of any particular
1997]
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national security strategy, increasing transparency and thus reducing
rent-seeking in the national security decision-making process. In the
end, it may yet be true that even in national security, clarity and can-
dor is best. That is in fact what Solomon achieved in an inspired
though risky act of judicial statesmanship in adjudicating the claim of
the two women?138 Solomon forced opportunism to reveal itself. To
judge between the nations, no less will do.239
238. "And the king said, 'Divide the living child in two, and give half to the one, and
half to the other.' The woman whose son was alive said to the king, because her heart
yearned for her son, 'Oh, my lord, give her the living child, and by no means slay it.' But
the other said, 'It shall be neither mine nor yours; divide it.' The king answered and said,
'Give the living child to the first woman, and by no means slay it; she is its mother.' And
all Israel heard of the judgment which the king rendered; and they stood in awe of the
king, because they perceived that the wisdom of God was in him, to render justice." 1
Kings 3:26-28.
239. "And the Lord gave Solomon wisdom, as he promised him; and there was peace
between Hiram and Solomon; and the two of them made a treaty." Id. 5:12.
